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ABSTRACT
ZHE WANG: Models for Retail Inventory Management with Demand Learning
(Under the direction of Dr. Adam J. Mersereau)
Matching supply with demand is key to success in the volatile and competitive retail
business. To this end, retailers seek to improve their inventory decisions by learning demand
from various sources. More interestingly, retailers’ inventory decisions may in turn obscure
the demand information they observe. This dissertation examines three problems in retail
contexts that involve interactions between inventory management and demand learning.
First, motivated by the unprecedented adverse impact of the 2008 financial crisis on retailers,
we consider the inventory control problem of a firm experiencing potential demand shifts
whose timings are known but whose impacts are not known. We establish structural results
about the optimal policies, construct novel cost lower bounds based on particular information
relaxations, and propose near-optimal heuristic policies derived from those bounds. We
then consider the optimal allocation of a limited inventory for fashion retailers to conduct
“merchandise tests” prior to the main selling season as a demand learning approach. We
identity a key tradeoff between the quantity and quality of demand observations. We also
find that the visibility into the timing of each sales transaction has a pivotal impact on
the optimal allocation decisions and the value of merchandise tests. Finally, we consider a
retailer selling an experiential product to consumers who learn product quality from reviews
generated by previous buyers. The retailer maximizes profit by choosing whether to offer
the product for sale to each arriving customer. We characterize the optimal product offering
policies to be of threshold type. Interestingly, we find that it can be optimal for the firm to
withhold inventory and not to offer the product even if an arriving customer is willing to
buy for sure. We numerically demonstrate that personalized offering is most valuable when
the price is high and customers are optimistic but uncertain about product quality.
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CHAPTER 1
Introduction
Retail, the business of selling goods and services to end consumers, is one of the most
important industries in the U.S, and has a significant impact on the U.S. economy. A 2011
report from the National Retail Federation reveals that in 2009, the retail industry ranked
third among all industries by directly adding $1.2 trillion to GDP, accounting for 8.5% of the
U.S. GDP; it was also the largest private-sector employer in the country, directly providing
28.1 million full-time and part-time jobs, accounting for 24.1% of total national employment.
The retail business is challenging given its highly volatile and competitive nature. Success
in retail requires successfully matching supply with demand. On the demand side, learning
customer demand is crucial and has become increasingly challenging in a fluctuating economy
with shortened product life cycles, prolonged lead times, and rapidly changing consumer
behaviors. On the supply side, efficient and effective management of inventory, the single
largest asset for most retailers, is at the heart of retail operations.
Demand learning and inventory management are intricately interrelated. On one hand,
optimization of inventory decisions relies on information gathered from demand learning; on
the other hand, the ultimate goal of demand learning is to minimize profit losses, including
inventory costs, that are attributed to demand uncertainty. What further complicates the
relationship between the two is the fact that retailers’ inventory decisions may in turn
obscure their demand observations, as retailers typically do not observe lost sales due to
stockouts. This thesis focuses on the interactions between demand learning and inventory
management in retail contexts (see Figure 1.1). In one direction, this dissertation examines
how inventory decisions should respond when firms learn a dynamically changing demand
1
Figure 1.1: Organization of the dissertation.
(Chapter 2 and 4). In the other direction, we study the impact of inventory decisions on the
effectiveness of demand learning (Chapter 3 and 4).
Demand learning also involves making the best use of available data. In response to rising
trends towards business analytics and big data, this dissertation examines various sources
of data for demand learning. In addition to historical demand, Chapter 2 incorporates
information on past events as indicators for potential demand changes. Chapter 3 discusses
the use of granular timing information of transactions on top of aggregate sales data.
Chapter 4 involves learning demand from consumer-generated product reviews and from
customers’ personal characteristics and preference data.
We provide below an overview of Chapters 2 through 4 of this thesis. In Chapter 2, we
study inventory management following a potential shift in the demand regime. The problem
was motivated by the unprecedented adverse impact of the financial crisis started in 2008,
which put retailers in uncharted territory in terms of revenue declines, credit availability,
and demand forecasting. To analyze how retailers should manage inventory adaptively
under such unpredictable circumstances, we consider a situation in which a firm is aware
that the demand regime may (or may not) have changed due to some notable event and
hopes to efficiently manage its inventory while also learning the actual demand trend. In
the periods soon after such events, the manager can rely on historical demand to carefully
estimate possibly obsolete demand parameters, discard the historical demand data and
instead re-estimate demand parameters based on a limited history, or do something in
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between. The tradeoff inherent to this problem is between the precision brought by a long
(but possibly out-of-date) history and the responsiveness that comes from relying on a recent
(but limited) history.
We formulate the problem as a multi-period Bayesian inventory model with a mixture of
two priors—one summarizes the inventory manager’s historical demand information and the
other reflects the manager’s belief on the potential demand change. Although a theoretical
characterization of some structural properties of the optimal inventory policy is possible,
computing the exact policy remains challenging. As an alternative approach, we construct
bounds on the optimal costs and develop associated heuristics. Constructing the lower
bounds involves finding an “information relaxation” (Brown et al., 2010) that strikes a
balance between the amount of information to relax and the computational complexity
of the problem after the relaxation. In deriving a new “independentized” lower bound,
we consider a novel auxiliary version of the problem that relaxes the natural dependence
between demand signals and inventory trajectories that makes the inventory optimization
difficult. The result is a tractable, meaningful bounding approach.
An extensive numerical study not only demonstrates the performance of the bounds
and heuristics but also reveals the following key insights. Managers should remain wary of
potential shifts in demand, as a demand forecast that fails to account for potential demand
changes can be costly. When potential demand changes are moderate, a myopic policy
may be sufficiently good, suggesting that managers may prioritize demand estimation over
forward-looking inventory optimization in these cases. When extreme demand changes are
possible, managers may need to use sophisticated inventory policies that jointly consider
demand estimation and inventory dynamics.
Chapter 3 focuses on the practice of “merchandise testing” in the retailing of fashion
products. This chapter investigates the role of inventory allocation decisions in demand
learning across multiple locations. “Merchandise testing,” first documented and studied by
Fisher and Rajaram (2000), is a strategy adopted by fashion retailers to reduce demand
uncertainty caused by short product life cycles and/or long lead times. In a merchandise
test, a chain retailer allocates inventory to selected stores in its network to gather test sales
data prior to the primary selling season. The retailer then uses collected data to generate a
3
more accurate demand forecast for the entire chain, thereby improving its ordering decisions
for the main selling season.
At its core, a merchandise test involves simultaneous demand learning across multiple
locations. We formulate the merchandise testing problem as a stylized, two-period, multi-store
Bayesian inventory model. In the presence of a limited quantity of overall test inventory and
demand censoring (i.e., the retailer does not observe lost sales due to stockouts), our analysis
reveals a unique tradeoff between the quantity and the quality of demand observations
collected during a test. Our results on this tradeoff contribute to the literature on Bayesian
inventory control with demand censoring, which mostly considers single-location settings.
This chapter also examines the implication of increased visibility into demand information,
which is relevant to the increased attention being paid to analytics in the retail industry.
In particular, we consider cases in which the retailer does, or does not, observe the timing
of each sales transaction, following a recent work by Jain et al. (2015). This sales timing
information is usually available from point-of-sale systems equipped by most modern retailers.
The characterization of the optimal test inventory allocations involves combining classic
operations theories with the statistical literature on comparisons of experiments (Blackwell
1953). We also develop two near-optimal heuristics for computing test inventory allocations
under general demand processes. Among many other analytical and numerical results, the
key findings of this chapter are:
• The allocation of test inventory can significantly impact the value of demand learning
through a merchandise test;
• The retailer’s visibility into demand information has a pivotal impact on test inventory
allocation decisions: when sales timing information is observable, retailers’ priority is
to achieve as many sales as possible during the test; When sales timing information
is unobservable, retailers should maintain a sufficiently high service level in each test
store before seeking to increase the number of stores to test.
In Chapter 4, we consider the problem of personalized offering when consumers generate
and learn product quality from public product reviews. The motivation comes from online
retailers’ increasing capability to collect consumer preference data, to customize product
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offerings, and to collect and monitor consumer-generated product reviews The fact that an
online retailer cannot offer customers with hands-on product information before purchases
amplifies the importance of customer reviews. We aim to answer the fundamental research
question of how a retailer should dynamically offer its inventory for sale to individual
customers whose product reviews may influence future demand. This chapter incorporates
two central elements: the consumers’ ability to collectively learn product quality through
reviews generated by their peers, and the firm’s ability to personalize product offering based
on its knowledge about individual customers’ preferences.
In particular, we consider a firm that sells an experiential product at an exogenous,
constant price over a finite selling season. For each customer, the gross utility from consuming
the product comprises two parts—an ex ante observable part that we refer to as customer
preference and an ex post observable part that we refer to as product quality. The quality of
the product is known to the firm but is unknown and learned by customers. The customer
base is heterogeneous and customers’ preferences for the product follow a random distribution.
We assume the firm may be able to identify the preference of an arriving customer (by
analyzing the customer’s past purchasing and online behaviors) and choose whether to offer
the product to that particular customer without incurring additional costs. Once offered,
the customer purchases a unit if her ex ante expected net utility is positive.
We model consumers’ review generation and quality learning process by a stylized
quasi-Bayesian social learning process. Consumers form a belief on the unknown quality
of the product and update it as they observe reviews posted by previous buyers. Each
arriving customer bases their purchasing decision on their ex ante expected net utility.
Once they purchase, customers generate reviews based on their ex post net utilities, namely,
utilities received after they have purchased and experienced the product. Customers are
not fully rational and are subject to selection biases: they update their belief in a Bayesian
fashion except that they ignore the potential selection biases and treat reviews as if they
are randomly sampled from the entire population, instead of those who purchase.
We formulate the firm’s personalized offering problem as a finite-horizon dynamic
program. We show that the optimal product offering policy is a threshold-type policy—
the firm should only offer the product for sale to customers with a higher-than-threshold
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preference. We demonstrate that it can be optimal for the firm not to offer the product to an
arriving customer with a low preference in order to avoid a bad review that will negatively
impact future sales, even when it is certain that the customer will buy the product if offered.
While our base model assumes no capacity or inventory constraints, we extend our analysis
to the setting in which the firm has a limited inventory upfront.
We study in a numerical analysis the impact of price and consumers’ mean belief and
uncertainty about product quality on the firm’s optimal product offering decisions and on
the potential value of personalized offerings. We find that compared with a benchmark policy
that offers the product to every arriving customer who is willing to purchase, personalized
offering may significantly improve profit, especially in settings in which the product price is
high and customers are moderately optimistic but uncertain about product quality.
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CHAPTER 2
Bayesian Inventory Management
with Potential Change-Points in Demand
2.1 Introduction
In most real-world inventory control problems, demand changes over time and the true
underlying demand distribution is never fully known to the inventory manager. The manager
makes dual use of historical demand data to populate the current demand distribution and
also to detect fundamental changes in the demand-generating process.
We provide two data examples in Figure 2.1 to illustrate the complexity of the manager’s
task. Figure 2.1(a) shows seasonally adjusted monthly sales by motor vehicle dealers in
the United States before and after September 2001. Imagine the situation faced by an
automobile dealer in the autumn of 2001. While a reasonable dealer would expect the
September 2001 attacks to impact consumer demand for automobiles, the direction and
magnitude of the impact would have been difficult to predict from data available at the
time. In October 2001 sales spiked substantially, but was this just a temporary surge or an
indicator of a new regime in automobile sales? Was pre-October historical data still useful
for understanding demand in October and beyond? History shows that demand eventually
fell back close to its pre-September levels, but this might have been unclear at the time.
Figure 2.1(b) shows seasonally adjusted monthly sales for U.S. women’s clothing stores in
2008 and 2009. Uncertainty in the financial markets reached a crescendo in September 2008
with the backruptcy of investment bank Lehman Brothers. Even if a women’s clothing retailer
at the time anticipated a negative impact on garment sales, the magnitude and persistence
of the impact would have been harder to anticipate. It turns out that adjusted women’s
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clothing demand bottomed out in December 2008 and stayed close to its December 2008
levels for over a year afterwards. In hindsight, we see that the Lehman Brothers bankruptcy
marked a distinct change in women’s clothing demand that rendered the previous demand
history unsuitable for understanding new demand levels.
These two examples illustrate what we believe is a common challenge faced by retail and
other managers, namely how to respond to external events that have the potential to change
the demand environment. While September 2001 and the Lehman Brothers bankruptcy
are well-known events that impacted many firms across many industries, demand-changing
events can also be local. For example, the start of a new marketing campaign, the entrance
of a new competitor, the release of a new product version, and the opening of a nearby
attraction can all potentially usher in new demand regimes for a firm. The introduction
of a new product could also be interpreted as a potential demand-changing event when
historical demand or sales data from a similar product are available for generating a reference
forecast. All of these events have in common that their timing is known but their impact is
not. In the periods soon after such events, the manager can rely on historical demand to
carefully estimate possibly obsolete demand parameters, discard the historical demand data
and instead re-estimate demand parameters based on a limited history, or do something
in between. The tradeoff inherent to this problem is between the precision brought by a
long (but possibly out-of-date) history and the responsiveness that comes from relying on a
recent (but limited) history.
We refer to such events as potential change-points in demand, and we present and analyze
an inventory control model that explicitly allows for potential change-points. We focus on
the case in which there is a single potential change-point in the recent past, which is relevant
to the examples of Figure 2.1 and to other examples in which change-points occur relatively
infrequently. We seek to understand the structure and behavior of the optimal policy, and
we look for computationally tractable bounds and heuristics.
We model the evolution of the manager’s belief on the demand process using a Bayesian
framework, extending the model pioneered by Scarf (1959) to allow for an unknown demand
parameter to be distributed according to a mixture of a “historical” prior distribution and a
“change” prior distribution. We leverage the structure of our demand model to characterize
8
the effects of observed demand and the manager’s belief on the optimal (state-dependent)
base-stock levels.
The optimal policy remains challenging to compute. Scarf (1959) and Azoury (1985)
show that the stationary Bayesian inventory problem can be solved efficiently using a
dimensionality reduction approach for particular assumptions on the prior and demand
distributions, but these assumptions do not hold when the unknown parameter is described
by a mixture of distributions. We pursue heuristic policies coupled with cost lower bounds
specific to our setting. Our most sophisticated bounding approach is novel in its formulation
of an “independentized” problem that relaxes the dependence between physical demand and
demand signals. A particular information relaxation of the demand signal information yields
efficient subproblems that are solutions to stochastic multiperiod inventory problems with
known demand distributions. In contrast to the dimensionality reduction approach of Scarf
and Azoury, this approach can be applied for a broad set of belief and demand distributions.
An extensive numerical analysis reveals that this bound and a look-ahead policy derived
from it achieve small gaps. The numerical study also reveals that a myopic policy that
accounts for potential change-points (but that ignores future inventory dynamics) works
well except in extreme instances.
We also consider the sensitivity of our inventory policies to misspecification of the
parameters of the manager’s Bayesian prior. Taking a maximin profit perspective, we show
that a conservative manager worried about profit downside will follow a policy that assumes
the smallest prior (in a sense we will make precise) among a set of candidates.
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. We review related literature in
§2.2. In §2.3, we formulate our Bayesian demand model and associated inventory control
problem, and we present structural properties of the optimal inventory policy. In §2.4, we
develop lower bounds for the optimal expected cost, and we introduce heuristic policies
derived from these lower bounds. We numerically study these bounds and policies and
measure their performance in §2.5. In §2.6, we discuss the estimation of model parameters
and sensitivity to parameter misspecification. We conclude in §2.7.
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Figure 2.1: Examples of potential change-points in demand include (a) the terrorism events
of September 2001 and (b) the Lehman Brothers bankruptcy in September 2008. (Source:
U.S. Census Bureau)
2.2 Literature Review
This chapter relates to the inventory control literature dealing with nonstationary and/or
partially observed demand processes. For situations in which the demand is nonstationary but
the demand distributions are known, Karlin (1960) analyzes a dynamic inventory system in
which demands are stochastic and may vary from period to period and proves the optimality of
state-dependent base-stock policies. Song and Zipkin (1993, 1996) propose a continuous-time
Markov-modulated Poisson demand framework to model inventory management problems in
fluctuating demand environments. They assume that the demand distribution changes regime
according to a known Markov chain and that the demand distribution in each regime is
also fully known. Under these assumptions, they establish the optimality of state-dependent
(s, S) policies. Sethi and Cheng (1997) show similar results in a generalized discrete-time
inventory model with Markov-modulated demands. Graves (1999) characterizes the behavior
of an adaptive base-stock policy under an ARIMA demand process. Iida and Zipkin (2006)
and Lu et al. (2006) study approximate solutions for inventory planning problems with
demand forecasting based on the martingale model of forecast evolution (MMFE).
Using a Bayesian framework, Scarf (1959) pioneers the study of optimal inventory policies
under a stationary demand process with an unknown demand distribution parameter. Our
work extends this framework to general demand distributions with a more flexible belief
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structure. Scarf (1960) and Azoury (1985) provide conditions under which the dimensionality
of the problem can be reduced and the optimal base-stock levels can be obtained by solving
a one-dimensional dynamic program. Our heuristics make possible the computation of
approximate solutions to problems with more general prior and demand distributions.
Azoury and Miyaoka (2009) study a Bayesian inventory problem where demand in each
period depends on side information through a linear regression model. All of these works
assume, as we do, that demand is fully observable and backlogged. There is another stream
of research on inventory management problems when lost sales are unobserved and demand
is therefore censored, assuming stationary demand. See, for example, Lariviere and Porteus
(1999), Ding et al. (2002), Chen and Plambeck (2008), Bensoussan et al. (2007, 2008), Chen
(2010), and Huh et al. (2011). Chen and Mersereau (2015) include a survey of this literature.
The demand process we consider is also related to that of Treharne and Sox (2002),
who assume a Markov-modulated demand process in which state transitions are unobserved
but the manager knows the transition probability matrix and maintains a belief of the
underlying Markov state. They evaluate several heuristics, including limited lookahead
policies, numerically. Brown et al. (2010) apply information relaxation bounds to an extended
version of Treharne and Sox (2002)’s model with non-stationary cost parameters. Our model
differs from these in two important respects. First, we assume a single potential shift in
the past. This simplification yields structure that we exploit in deriving new results and
bounds. Second, we model component demand distributions that are learned over time,
whereas Treharne and Sox (2002) assume the demand distribution within each Markov state
is known and fixed. We believe that our model brings distinct advantages in flexibility and
parsimony. For further discussion, see §2.3.2. While the bounds we develop in §2.4 make use
of results in Brown et al. (2010), we believe our “independentized” bound to be new.
Inasmuch as our work considers a change in demand regime, it also relates to Besbes
and Zeevi (2011), in which a decision-maker seeks to detect and exploit a potential change
in customers’ willingness-to-pay distribution through dynamic pricing.
Our work is also related to a large stream of the statistics literature on change-point
detection — detecting departures of a stochastic process from a known model by monitoring
observations drawn from the process over time. We refer readers to Basseville and Nikiforov
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(1993), Lai (1995), and the recent text Tartakovsky et al. (2015). This literature most
commonly seeks to identify when a change occurs, focusing on the tradeoff between detection
delay and the risk of false alarm. Our interest is not in declaring when a change-point occurs;
rather, we formulate a dynamic optimization problem built on a stochastic model involving
a potential change-point. Our model specializes typical sequential change-point formulations
in that we assume that the timing of our potential change-point is known. In our model, a
key unknown is whether or not the change actually occurs.
2.3 Model and Analysis
In this section we model an inventory management problem over a finite horizon following a
potential change in the demand process. We present several structural properties, including
certain structure inherited from well-studied inventory problems, which we use in our
algorithm development in §2.4.
2.3.1 Inventory Management Following a Single Potential Change-point
Consider a single-item, T -period inventory system. At the beginning of period t, the decision
maker (DM) observes the inventory position, xt, and can place an order to bring the inventory
position up to yt ≥ xt at a linear purchasing cost c ≥ 0. We assume zero lead time such
that the order is instantaneously delivered. Demand, denoted by a random variable Dt with
realized value dt, is then realized and satisfied by the inventory on hand. If at the end of
the period the DM still has leftover inventory, i.e., yt − dt > 0, a linear holding cost h is
charged; otherwise (i.e., yt − dt ≤ 0), the excess demand is fully backlogged and incurs a
linear shortage cost p. The discount factor is α ∈ (0, 1] each period. We assume p > c(1−α)
to avoid trivial solutions. The salvage value for leftover inventory at the end of period T is
assumed to be zero. We shall omit the subscript t whenever it is clear from the context.
We assume the DM fully observes past demands without censoring, as does Scarf (1959).
This assumption is driven in part by analytical tractability (as is our assumption of inventory
backlogging), but we believe it is reasonable in practice when changes in demand are likely
to impact a whole department, firm, or industry at the same time. This is the case, for
12
example, for the September 2001 and Lehman Brothers bankruptcy contexts described in
§2.1. In such cases, the firm can use data across stock-keeping units to correct for demand
censoring.
We extend the Bayesian framework of Scarf (1959). The distinctive feature of our model
is how we model the demand process. We assume that the demands Dt are independently
drawn according to a density function f(·|θ), where θ ∈ Θ is an unknown parameter. The
DM has a historical prior pih (h stands for “history”) on θ which reflects his prior knowledge
of the demand parameter based on historical information. A potential changepoint occurs in
period 1; thereafter, the DM is uncertain about whether the historical prior pih continues to
apply or whether the demand process has changed. The DM has a second prior distribution
pic on θ conditional on a change occurring (the superscript c stands for “change”). The
change probability γ represents the DM’s initial belief that a change has indeed occurred in
period 1.
In practice, it is reasonable for the DM to estimate the historical prior using historical
demand. However, it may be less obvious how to estimate the change prior pic and the
probability γ. We provide a full discussion of this in §2.6, where we perform a sensitivity
analysis and suggest robust choices for these parameters.
Let pit denote the DM’s prior belief on the unknown parameter θ at the beginning
of period t, then pi1(θ) = (1 − γ)pih(θ) + γpic(θ) by definition, and pit+1 is the posterior
distribution obtained by updating pit based on dt, the demand realization in period t, using
Bayes rule. That is,
pit+1(θ|pit, Dt = dt) = f(dt|θ)pit(θ)∫
Θ f(dt|ω)pit(ω)dω
. (2.1)
We will show in §2.3.4 that this update has a particular structure that enables our anal-
ysis. The predictive demand density in period t given belief pit is defined by φ(ξ|pit) =∫
Θ f(ξ|θ)pit(θ)dθ. A natural generalization of our model allows for multiple change priors.
Most of our results directly extend to this case. (The main exception is Proposition 2.4 in
§2.3.4, which requires further clarification on how priors are ordered and how to handle
multi-dimensional change probabilities.)
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The DM’s objective is to minimize the Bayesian expected discounted total cost over a
finite horizon based on his prior belief on the demand process by choosing an order quantity
in each period. We use (a)+ to denote max{a, 0} for a real number a. Given inventory
position y after ordering and a demand realization d, the holding and shortage cost incurred
in a single period is
l(y, d) = h(y − d)+ + p(d− y)+,
and the expected cost in period t with initial inventory position x and belief pit is given by
EDt|pit [c(y − x) + l(y,Dt)] = c(y − x) + L(y|pit),
where L(y|pit) := EDt|pit [l(y,Dt)] =
∫∞
0 l(y, ξ)φ(ξ|pit)dξ.
Let Ct(x|pit) be the optimal expected cost for periods t, t+ 1, . . . , T . We can formulate
the problem as a Bayesian dynamic program with the following optimality equations for
t = 1, . . . , T :
Ct(x|pit) = min
y≥x
{c(y − x) + L(y|pit) + αEDt|pit [Ct+1(y −Dt|pit ◦Dt)]}, (2.2)
where pit◦Dt := pit+1(·|pit, Dt) as defined by (2.1). The terminal cost is given by CT+1(·|·) = 0.
2.3.2 Discussion of our Demand Model
Our choice of a mixture model as a prior distribution for the unknown demand parameter
is driven by our interest, as discussed in §2.1, in situations in which the DM has reason to
believe a change in demand regime may have just occurred but is uncertain about whether
a fundamental change has really transpired and, if so, about its extent. Our mixture model
explicitly models this uncertainty. Such problems are most relevant and interesting in the
few periods just after the potential change, and our choice of a parametric Bayesian model
permits meaningful demand learning even with a few observations.
We use our model to illustrate numerically in Figure 2.2 the core demand learning
tradeoff we seek to capture. The left panel of Figure 2.2 corresponds with a single demand
14
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Figure 2.2: Illustration of behavior of various Bayesian demand learning models for two
demand paths.
path involving a change in the demand mean from 10 to 5 occuring at time t = 0, while
the right panel corresponds to a demand path drawn from a stationary demand process
with demand mean 10 units.1 The gray curves show statistics of the predictive demand
distribution under our mixture model. For comparison, we also plot predictive demand
statistics for models that use the historical prior alone and the change prior alone from time
t = 0 on.
In the left-hand plot, we see that the mixture model more quickly learns the changed
demand mean compared with the model using the historical prior alone, while (as expected)
not quite as quickly as the model that assumes a change definitely occurred. In the right-
hand plot, we see that the coefficient of variation (CoV) for our mixture model jumps
considerably less and stabilizes more quickly than the model that relies on the change prior
alone. We conclude that our “mixture” model of demand learning achieves a robust balance
of responsiveness (in the event a change actually occurs) and stability (in the event no
change occurs).
Further testing (omitted to conserve space) shows the necessity of allowing for the
component distributions (in particular, the change distribution) to be learned from data
rather than fixed a priori in situations where the DM has uncertainty around the post-
1 The specific instance is similar to those in §2.5.3 (i.e., gamma demand distribution). Using notation to be
introduced later, we assume an initial change prior of γ0 = 0.5, we assume a known “shape” parameter k = 3
for gamma demand, and we assume a “change” gamma prior with ac = 3, Sc = 5. The “historical” gamma
prior is generated based on the observations from time t = −40 to t = 0 starting from (a−40, S−40) = (3, 10).
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change demand parameter. Fixing and mis-specifying θ may prevent the mixture model
from converging to the true mean and variance of demand.
Finally, we have considered alternative modeling approaches for modeling change-points.
Hypothesis testing-based approaches to change-point detection (e.g., Tartakovsky et al.,
2015) do not naturally lead to forward-looking distributional forecasts that we require for
multiperiod inventory control. Non-parametric methods (e.g., Huh et al., 2011) offer no
concise state representation for use in a forward-looking dynamic optimization formulation.
2.3.3 Structure of the Optimal Policy
Although the demand process described in §2.3.1 is complicated by the potential change-
points, it is still independent of the ordering decisions. Because of this, the cost functions are
convex and a state-dependent base-stock policy is optimal. We state the following result for
completeness, but we omit the proof because the result can be obtained by a straightforward
modification of proofs in Scarf (1959) and Treharne and Sox (2002).
Proposition 2.1. (a) Ct(x|pit) is a convex function of x for all pit.
(b) The optimal policy takes the form of a state-dependent base-stock policy. There exists a
sequence of nonnegative functions {y∗t (pit)} such that it is optimal for the DM to order
min{y∗t (pit)− xt, 0} at the beginning of period t given inventory position xt and belief pit.
We do not have closed-form expressions for the optimal policy, and given previous
research it is unlikely that the optimal policy can be easily computed, much less simply
expressed. We discuss the computability of the optimal policy in §2.4. However, as is often
possible in finite horizon, non-stationary inventory problems (see Theorem 9.4.2 of Zipkin,
2000; also Karlin, 1960; Morton and Pentico, 1995), we are able to bound the optimal base-
stock levels by easily computed myopic base-stock levels, which has the potential to reduce
the search space for an optimal policy. The myopic policy is one in which the DM considers
neither the evolution of future demand forecasts nor the carry-over of inventory across
periods. The DM therefore treats each period as a single-period newsvendor problem. In our
case, let Φ(·|pit) be the cumulative distribution function representing the DM’s prediction of
period t demand given belief pit, i.e., Φ(dt|pit) =
∫ dt
0 φ(ξ|pit)dξ. Then, the base-stock level
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for period t under a myopic policy is given by yMt (pit) such that
Φ(yMt (pit)|pit) =

p−c(1−α)
p+h , t = 1, . . . , T − 1,
p−c
p+h , t = T.
(2.3)
The following proposition shows that this myopic policy upper-bounds the optimal policy.
Proofs appear in an appendix unless otherwise indicated.
Proposition 2.2. For all t = 1, 2, . . . , T , yMt (pit) ≥ y∗t (pit).
We remark that both Proposition 2.1 and 2.2 extend to models with multiple potential
change-points in both the past and future, as long as the timing of the potential change-points
and their associated change priors and change probabilities are all known to the DM. Chen
and Plambeck (2008) also show that a DM may want to stock less than the myopic inventory
level when inventory is perishable, albeit in a different Bayesian inventory setting than ours
(with stationary demand and censored observations).
2.3.4 Monotonicity Properties of Optimal Base-Stock Levels
We explore in this subsection some monotonicity properties of the optimal base-stock levels
with respect to demand history, the historical and change priors, and the change probability.
Some definitions are needed here before we proceed.
Likelihood Ratio Order. Let f(·) and g(·) be two probability density functions. f
is larger than g in the likelihood ratio order, denoted by f ≥lr g, if for all d1 > d2,
f(d1)/g(d1) ≥ f(d2)/g(d2).
Monotone Likelihood Ratio Property (MLRP). A distribution family f(·|θ) with
a parameter θ ∈ Θ is said to have the Monotone Likelihood Ratio Property (MLRP) if
f(·|θ1) ≥lr f(·|θ2) for all θ1 ≥ θ2. Many common distributions, such as normal with known
variance, binomial, Poisson, gamma, and Weibull, have MLRP (see Karlin and Rubin, 1956).
Hereafter we assume that the demands are independent and from a distribution family
f(·|θ) with parameters θ ∈ Θ, and that f(·|θ) has MLRP. The underlying implication of
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the MLRP assumption is that if a larger demand occurs, it becomes more likely that the
underlying demand distribution f(·|θ) has a higher θ parameter.
Scarf (1959) shows a monotonicity result in his setting with respect to the observed
demand history. Specifically, the optimal base-stock level is increasing in the demand
observation if the underlying demand process is stationary and the demand distribution
f(·|θ) is from the exponential family of the form f(ξ|θ) = β(θ)e−θξr(ξ) (with r(ξ) = 0 for
ξ < 0). We can view our single change-point model as a variant of Scarf’s model with MLRP
demand and an initial prior being a mixture of distributions. The following proposition
shows that we inherit Scarf’s monotonicity result by generalizing his result to the case of
MLRP demand.
Proposition 2.3. Let y∗t (pit) be the optimal base-stock level in period t (t = 1, . . . , T ) given
belief pit, where pit (t ≥ 2) is updated over pit−1 based on demand realization dt−1. If the
demand distribution family f(·|θ) has MLRP, then the following hold:
(a) y∗t (pit) ≤ y∗t (pi′t) for pit ≤lr pi′t;
(b) y∗t (pit) is increasing in dτ , for all t ≥ 2, τ < t.
Proposition 2.3(a) characterizes the behavior of the optimal base-stock level with respect
to the DM’s belief on the demand process. Intuitively, a larger (smaller) belief (in the
likelihood ratio ordering) indicates a larger (smaller) demand parameter, which further
implies a stochastically higher (lower) demand, which finally leads to a higher (lower) optimal
base-stock level. Proposition 2.3(a) paves the way for establishing monotonicity properties of
the optimal base-stock levels with respect to pic, pih, and γ in what follows. We use a closely
related result when deriving the independentized lower bound in §2.4.1.2. Proposition 2.3(b)
guarantees that it is always optimal to order more (less) in the next period if a higher (lower)
demand is observed during the previous periods. We note that these results do not require
specific assumptions on the initial belief pi1; it need not have a mixture form and can be any
general distribution over the parameter space Θ. We present an example in Appendix A.2
showing the necessity of the MLRP assumption on f(·|θ).
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As mentioned previously, our model is distinguished by its particular prior structure.
The prior is a mixture of two distinct distributions. The following lemma establishes that
this structure survives the DM’s belief updating procedure.
Lemma 2.1. In the single potential change-point problem, let dt = (d1, . . . , dt) be any
demand history up to period t, t = 1, . . . , T . pit(·|dt−1) is then given by
pit(θ|dt−1) = (1− γt(dt−1))piht (θ|dt−1) + γt(dt−1)pict (θ|dt−1),
where piht (·|dt−1) is updated over pih based on dt−1, pict (·|dt−1) is updated over pic based on
dt−1, and γt(·) is a function of dt−1.
Lemma 2.1 shows that the belief updating procedure can be decomposed into two parts:
one separately updates the beliefs conditioned on there being a change and on there being
no change; the other updates the change probability. The belief is still in the form of a linear
mixture distribution of those two updated beliefs, with the updated change probability as
the weight. The following Proposition 2.4 uses this result to establish a relationship between
the corresponding optimal base-stock levels. In §2.4 we will use the structure in Lemma 2.1
to derive an easily computed cost lower bound.
Proposition 2.4. In the single potential change-point problem, let y∗t (pit) be the optimal
base-stock level in period t (t = 1, . . . , T ). Let yht (pi
h
t ) (y
c
t (pi
c
t )) be the corresponding optimal
base-stock level when the change probability γ = 0 (respectively, γ = 1). The following hold:
(a) If pih ≤lr pic, yht (piht ) ≤ y∗t (pit) ≤ yct (pict ); otherwise if pic ≤lr pih, yct (pict ) ≤ y∗t (pit) ≤
yht (pi
h
t );
(b) If pih ≤lr pic, y∗t (pit) is increasing in γ; otherwise if pic ≤lr pih, y∗t (pit) is decreasing in γ.
Proof. We only show the proofs of the first parts of (a) and (b). The proofs of the second
parts follow from a straightforward modification.
It is easy to verify that if pih ≤lr pic and pi1(θ) = (1−γ)pih(θ) +γpic(θ) for some γ ∈ [0, 1],
then pih ≤lr pi1 ≤lr pic. Lemma 2(c) of Chen (2010) further guarantees that piht ≤lr pit ≤lr pict
for all t. The first part of (a) follows directly from this result and from Proposition 2.3(a).
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Now define γ′ such that γ < γ′ ≤ 1, and let pi′1(θ) = (1− γ′)pih(θ) + γ′pic(θ). Because we can
write pi′1 as a convex combination of pih and pic, it follows that pi1 ≤lr pi′1, and thus pit ≤lr pi′t
for all t. The desired result y∗t (pit) ≤ y∗t (pi′t) then follows from Proposition 2.3(a).
Proposition 2.4 provides sufficient conditions for the optimal base-stock levels of the
single potential change-point problem to be bounded by those of the two degenerate problems
— one with γ = 0 and the other with γ = 1. The result is intuitive: if an increase in demand
is possible, the DM should order more than if the demand remains stable, and less than if
the demand is guaranteed to increase. Moreover, the DM should order more as the change
probability increases.
Proposition 2.4 may reduce the search space for optimal policies. It also motivates simple
and computable heuristic ordering policies. In particular, for certain choices of pih and pic,
the optimal solutions to the two degenerate problems can easily be computed by applying
the dimensionality reduction technique in Scarf (1960) and Azoury (1985). A base-stock
level in the form of a convex combination of these two solutions is an appealing heuristic
policy. We have found such a policy to perform reasonably well, though we do not pursue it
in the following section because it is outperformed by a related policy, which is greedy with
respect to a convex combination of cost-to-go functions for the two degenerate problems.
2.4 Bounds and Policies
The usual approach to evaluate the performance of an inventory policy is to compare its
expected cost with that of the optimal policy. However, the complexity of the Bayesian
inventory control problem with potential change-points makes it intractable to compute
optimal solutions. The dimensionality reduction technique in Scarf (1959) and Azoury (1985)
is in general not applicable for our model with potential change-points. The conditions for
applying the technique are:
1. Suppose that St is a sufficient statistic for demand observations up to period t. There is
a function qt(St) such that φ(ξ|St) = (1/qt(St))ψt(ξ/qt(St)), where ψt(·) is a probability
density function that depends only on t;
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2. The function qt(St) satisfies qt+1(St ◦ d) = qt(St)Ut+1(d/qt(St)) for some continuous
real valued function Ut+1 such that
∫∞
0 Ut+1(u)ψt(u)du <∞, where St ◦ d denotes an
update of St based on demand observation d.
However, since the beliefs in our problem are linear mixtures of distributions, there do
not exist qt functions that can serve as such scale parameters for the predictive demand
distributions. Therefore, it is computationally impractical to obtain the optimal policy or
the optimal expected cost.
Treharne and Sox (2002) face a similar issue with an adaptive inventory control problem
with similarities to our own. They point out the difficulty of computing an optimal policy
even with an understanding of the policy structure, and they turn to heuristic policies. As
an alternative approach, we develop lower bounds for the expected cost. Coupled with
ordering heuristics derived from these bounds, we seek to bound the optimal cost as tightly
as possible.
2.4.1 Bounds for Expected Cost
We develop two lower bounds in this subsection. The first makes use of the decomposition of
Lemma 2.1, while the second makes use of a novel relaxation we call the “independentized”
problem. Both make use of the “information relaxation” framework outlined in Brown et al.
(2010).
2.4.1.1 The Mixture Lower Bound.
Lemma 2.1 implies that the DM’s belief in a period can be decomposed as a convex
combination of the beliefs implied by two “degenerate” information structures in which a
change is known to have occurred or known not to have occurred. If the degenerate problems
are easily solved (e.g., if the historical prior pih and change prior pic satisfy the conditions of
Azoury, 1985), then the solutions can be easily employed to form an expected cost lower
bound. Imagine an oracle who reveals to the DM whether or not a change has occurred.
It is intuitive that the expected cost utilizing the oracle information would lower bound
the true expected cost. (Given that the DM is seeking to minimize cost, the additional
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information revealed by the oracle can only help achieve lower cost.) This is the content of
the following proposition.
Proposition 2.5. Let dt−1, pit(·|dt−1), piht (·|dt−1), pict (·|dt−1) and γt(dt−1) be defined as in
Lemma 2.1. For all t = 1, . . . , T , define the mixture lower bound LBMt (xt|dt−1) by
LBMt (xt|pit(·|dt−1)) = (1− γt(dt−1))Ct(x|piht (·|dt−1)) + γt(dt−1)Ct(x|pict (·|dt−1)),
then LBMt (xt|pit(·|dt−1)) ≤ Ct(xt|pit(·|dt−1)).
Proof. The intuition behind the result is given above. The oracle information can be viewed
as an information relaxation. Therefore, the proposition follows from Lemma 2.1 in Brown
et al. (2010).
2.4.1.2 The Independentized Lower Bound.
When implementing an inventory policy with demand learning, the DM uses demand
realizations in two ways: to calculate inventory positions and to update demand beliefs. We
construct a lower bound using the notion of information relaxations (Brown et al., 2010) by
relaxing only the information available to the DM for belief updating.
To motivate this, write as Dt = (Dˆt, Dt) the DM’s observation of demand in period t,
where we artificially distinguish between the physical demand Dˆt that impacts inventory
positions and the demand signal Dt that the DM uses to update his beliefs around θ. In the
original problem, the physical demand and demand signal are one and the same and are
therefore perfectly correlated. We write Dot for the original problem as D
o
t = (Dt, Dt). For
the purpose of constructing a bound, we consider an “independentized” problem in which
the physical demand and the demand signal are assumed to be independent of each other.
We write D⊥t = (D⊥t , Dt) where both D⊥t and Dt have a marginal density φ(·|pit), which is
the predictive demand density implied by the belief pit, but D
⊥
t and Dt are independent,
conditional on pit.
Let Ct(xt|pit) and C⊥t (xt|pit) be the optimal expected costs of the original and the
independentized problems, respectively, for periods t, . . . , T given initial inventory position
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xt and belief pit. Then we have
Ct(xt|pit) = min
y≥xt
{
c(y − xt) + L(y|pit) + αEDot=(Dt,Dt)|pit [Ct+1(y −Dt|pit ◦Dt)]
}
,
C⊥t (xt|pit) = min
y≥xt
{
c(y − xt) + L(y|pit) + αED⊥t =(D⊥t ,Dt)|pit
[
C⊥t+1(y −D⊥t |pit ◦Dt)
]}
,
with terminal values CT+1(·|·) = C⊥T+1(·|·) = 0.
With the notation above, we have the following proposition which shows that the optimal
expected cost of the independentized problem serves as a lower bound for that of the original
problem.
Proposition 2.6. C⊥t (xt|pit) ≤ Ct(xt|pit) for all xt, pit, and t = 1, . . . , T .
The proof, in Appendix A.4, shows that the cost-to-go function, as a function of both
the physical demand realization d⊥t and demand signal realization dt, is supermodular and
that D⊥t = (D⊥t , Dt) is less than Dot = (Dt, Dt) in the supermodular ordering. High-level
intuition is as follows. In the original problem, a small demand observation hurts the DM
because it yields low revenues in the current period, but also because it implies a high
end-of-period inventory position at the same time that demand forecasts are lowered. This
combination of high inventory position and low demand forecast accentuates the possibility
of inventory overage in the original problem. In the independentized problem, the correlation
between high inventory positions and lowered demand forecasts is removed. In particular,
high inventory positions and low demand forecasts are less likely to occur together.
Unfortunately, the independentized problem is not necessarily easier to solve than the
original problem. To cope with this, we use the information relaxation approach proposed by
Brown et al. (2010) to construct a lower bound for the expected cost of the independentized
problem. The basic idea is the following. At each decision point t we assume that an
oracle reveals the entire future path of demand signals (dt, . . . , dT ) to the DM. With this
extra information and his current belief pit, the DM is able to compute his future beliefs
p˜it+1, . . . , p˜iT recursively through
p˜it = pit and p˜iu+1 = p˜iu ◦ du, ∀u = t, . . . , T.
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Let C˜⊥t (xt|pit; (dt, . . . , dT )) be the optimal expected cost-to-go at period t given inventory
position xt, belief pit and future demand signals (dt, . . . , dT ). The independentized problem
after relaxing future demand signals reduces to
C˜⊥t (xt|pit; (dt, . . . , dT )) = C˜⊥t (xt|p˜it, . . . , p˜iT )
= min
y≥xt
{
c(y − xt) + L(y|p˜it) + αED⊥t |p˜it
[
C˜⊥t+1(y −D⊥t |p˜it+1, . . . , p˜iT )
]}
,
with C˜⊥T+1(·|·) = 0. This is in fact a stochastic inventory problem with nonstationary, known
demand distributions, the solution to which can easily be obtained as the solution to a
(fully observed) MDP with a one-dimensional state space. Because the oracle information is
impermissible in the independentized problem, the optimal expected cost of the reduced
problem will be lower than that of the independentized one.
We formally state the independentized lower bound as follows.
Proposition 2.7. Let (Dt, . . . , DT ) denote the random demand signals in the independen-
tized problem for periods t, . . . , T . For all t = 1, . . . , T , define the independentized lower
bound LBIt (xt|pit) by
LBIt (xt|pit) = E(Dt,...,DT )|pit
[
C˜⊥t (xt|pit; (Dt, . . . , DT ))
]
,
then LBIt (xt|pit) ≤ C⊥t (xt|pit) ≤ Ct(xt|pit).
Proof. The first inequality is an application of Lemma 2.1 in Brown et al. (2010). The
second inequality follows from Proposition 2.6.
We estimate LBIt (xt|pit) in the numerical results using the following procedure. In
an outer simulation, we randomly generate full demand signal paths (d1, . . . , dT ) and
calculate predictive demand distributions, (φ1, . . . , φT ), based on the generated demand
signal paths. We then solve for each sequence of predictive demand distributions an inner
optimization problem which is an inventory control problem with nonstationary, known
demand distributions. These inner dynamic programming problems can be solved with
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straightforward backwards induction. The average of the resulting expected costs estimates
the independentized lower bound.
To our knowledge, the “independentized” approach to bounding inventory problems with
demand learning has not previously been used in the literature. An advantage of the approach
over the mixture lower-bounding approach of §2.4.1.1 is that it requires efficient solutions
only for inventory subproblems with known demand distributions, not for subproblems
involving demand learning as required in §2.4.1.1. This widens its applicability. A drawback
of the approach is that it is estimated via simulation. Due to estimation error, this means
that technically we do not have a provable bound if it is based on a finite number of sample
paths. In our numerical results, we estimate the bound based on a large number (100,000)
of sample paths.
The approach may be useful for inventory problems involving demand learning beyond
the one considered in this chapter. It is clearly applicable for other generalizations of the Scarf
(1959) model. Azoury (1985) shows that Scarf’s model can be efficiently solved, but only for
certain assumptions on the demand distribution. Without these assumptions, the optimal
policy remains difficult to compute. In §2.5.2 we demonstrate that the independentized
information relaxation is capable of meaningful bounds for the classic Scarf (1959) problem,
for which we can generate the optimal costs for comparison.
2.4.1.3 Penalties.
The information relaxation approach of Brown et al. (2010) also allows for the assignment of
a penalty on each sample path, which potentially tightens the bound by penalizing the use of
“impermissible” information in solving the inner problems. The lower bound for the optimal
expected cost of the original problem is obtained by either simulation or analytical expression
of the minimum expected value of the cost of the relaxed problem plus the penalty.
Unfortunately, we do not find computationally viable penalties for the two relaxations we
have proposed. For the mixture lower bound, any natural penalty destroys the decomposition
exploited by the information relaxation, and the inner problem becomes as difficult to solve
as the original problem. For the independentized lower bound, limited-lookahead methods
for computing penalties (as considered in Brown et al. (2010)) prove too time consuming
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to compute for the continuous prior and demand distributions we consider. As a result, in
general we impose a zero penalty on our inner problems for computing the lower bounds.
We leave further investigation of penalties for future work. Even with zero penalties, we see
meaningfully tight bounds in our numerical results.
2.4.2 Heuristic Policies
We develop three heuristic policies for the single potential change-point problem: a myopic
policy, a look-ahead policy based on the mixture lower bound, and a look-ahead policy based
on the independentized lower bound. In §2.5 we evaluate these heuristics using the lower
bounds in §2.4.1.
Myopic Policy. Each period the DM updates his belief based on the observed demand and
then uses the single-period newsvendor solution as the base-stock level. This policy therefore
forecasts demand using the potential change-point model but is not forward looking in its
inventory optimization.
Look-Ahead Policy Based on Mixture Lower Bound (LA-M). This policy takes
advantage of the mixture lower bound (LBM ) we have developed in the previous subsection.
For each period t, the DM uses LBMt+1 as an approximation for the optimal cost-to-go
function in period t+ 1, Ct+1(·|·), and solves the following problem:
CMt (xt|pit) = min
y≥xt
{
c(y − xt) + L(y|pit) + αEDt|pit
[
LBMt+1(y −Dt|pit ◦Dt)
]}
.
Of course, the LA-M policy is only implementable if the LBMt+1 lower bound is simple to
compute. Therefore, this policy is only attractive for instances in which the degenerate
“change” (i.e., γ = 1) and “no change” (i.e., γ = 0) problems are easy to solve; e.g., when
they conform to the assumptions of Scarf (1960) or Azoury (1985).
Look-Ahead Policy Based on Independentized Lower Bound (LA-I). This policy
is very similar to the LA-M policy except that it uses the independentized lower bound
LBIt+1 instead of LB
M
t+1 to approximate the optimal cost-to-go function for the next period.
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More specifically, in each period t the DM solves the following problem:
CIt (xt|pit) = min
y≥xt
{c(y − xt) + L(y|pit) + αEDt|pit
[
LBIt+1(y −Dt|pit ◦Dt)
]},
where LBIt+1(·|·) is estimated using Monte-Carlo simulation as described in §2.4.1.2. This
LA-I policy can be applied to the single change-point problem with any belief and demand
distribution; however, the computation effort grows as more sample paths are used to
estimate the LBI lower bound.
2.5 Numerical Analysis
In this section we conduct numerical analyses to demonstrate the performance of the
lower bounds and heuristics proposed in §2.4. Without loss of generality we normalize the
purchasing cost c to zero and the unit holding cost h to one. We also assume no discounting
(α = 1) throughout the section. We have also run our experiments with discount factor
α = 0.8 and found that the results do not change qualitatively.
We make use of the gamma-gamma conjugate pair as our model of demand in our
numerical results. This demand structure is amenable to the dimensionality reduction
technique of Scarf (1960) and Azoury (1985) for stationary versions of our problem. Given
this demand structure we can therefore easily compute the degenerate problems required to
evaluate the LA-M bound.
We will first review the gamma-gamma demand model and its relevant properties in
§2.5.1. We will then test the independentized lower bound against Scarf (1960)’s Bayesian
inventory problem with gamma-gamma demand in §2.5.2. Unlike the potential change-point
problem, we are able to solve Scarf’s problem optimally and compare our bound against the
known optimal solution. Finally in §2.5.3, we will perform a comprehensive numerical study
on bounds and heuristics for the potential change-point problem analyzed in §2.3 and 2.4.
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2.5.1 The Gamma-Gamma Demand Model
The gamma-gamma demand model is a common one for the study of inventory management
with demand learning (e.g., Azoury, 1985; Scarf, 1960; Chen, 2010) because of its versatility
and ease of updating. Assume that demand follows a gamma density with known shape
parameter k and unknown scale parameter θ:
f(ξ|θ) = θ
kξk−1e−θξ
Γ(k)
.
We assume an initial gamma prior with parameters (a, S) around the unknown scale
parameter θ:
pi1(θ) = pi(θ|a, S) = S
aθa−1e−Sθ
Γ(a)
.
Given this information structure and demand observations (d1, . . . , dt−1), it is well-known
that sufficient statistics for Bayes updating are
at = at−1 + k = a+ k(t− 1) and St = St−1 + dt−1 = S +
t−1∑
i=1
di.
Furthermore, the updated distribution around θ at the beginning of period t is
pit(θ) = pi(θ|at, St) = S
at
t θ
at−1e−Stθ
Γ(at)
,
and the predictive demand density can be written as
φ(d|pit) = φ(d|at, St) = 1
St
φt
(
d
St
)
,
where φt(u) =
Γ(at+k)
Γ(at)Γ(k)
uk−1(1 + u)−(at+k). A result of Scarf (1960), extended in Azoury
(1985), is that the optimization (2.2) can be written as a one-dimensional dynamic program:
vt(x) = min
y≥x
{
c(y − x) + Lt(y) + α
∫ ∞
0
(1 + u)vt+1
(
y − u
1 + u
)
φt(u)du
}
,t = 1, . . . , T,
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with vT+1(·) = 0. Let y∗t denote its optimal solution for period t. Then we have
(i) Ct(x|St) = Stvt(x/St),
(ii) y∗t (St) = Sty∗t .
Property (i) greatly simplifies calculation of our policies and bounds, in particular the
mixture lower bound. Assuming that the change belief pict for θ in period t is gamma with
parameters (act , S
c
t ) and that the no-change belief pi
h
t is gamma with parameters (a
h
t , S
h
t ),
the mixture bound can be computed as
LBMt (xt|pit) = LBMt (xt|γt, Sht , Sct ) = (1− γt)Ct(x|Sht ) + γtCt(x|Sct )
= (1− γt)Sht vht (x/Sht ) + γtSct vct (x/Sct ).
2.5.2 Applying the Independentized Lower Bound to a Classical Problem
In this subsection we use the classic Bayesian inventory problem with gamma-gamma demand
from Scarf (1960) to explore the behavior and quality of the independentized lower bound.
This problem is a special case of our change-point problem with change probability equal to
zero (or one), and it can be solved using a dimension reduction technique (as previously
discussed). Therefore, it qualifies as a reasonable testbed for understanding the potential
tightness of the independentized lower bound.
We make two observations about the results, which cover 36 instances in a full factorial
design. First, we are able to estimate the lower bounds precisely, resulting in standard errors
no more than 0.5% of the optimal cost for each of the instances. Second, the independentized
bounding method produces meaningful lower bounds for most of the instances. We find the
average gap over the 36 instances to be 0.73% (negative gaps are truncated to zero), and
smaller than 2% for 33 out of the 36 instances. We observe that the gap is relatively larger
for larger critical ratios (i.e., for large p) and for large spread in the prior (i.e., small a).
2.5.3 Bounds and Heuristics for the Change-Point Problem
In this subsection we numerically examine the performance of three heuristic policies –
Myopic, LA-M and LA-I – for the single change-point problem introduced in §2.3 by
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comparing their expected costs with the lower bounds. In order to compute both the LBM
and LBI lower bounds and their corresponding one-period look-ahead policies LA-M and
LA-I, we assume a gamma-gamma conjugate demand structure. The demands are from a
gamma distribution with parameters (k, θ). We only report the results for k = 3 here since
we have observed results for k = 1 and 5 to be qualitatively similar. If the demand does
not change at the beginning of the planning horizon, θ follows a gamma distribution with
parameters (ah, Sh); otherwise it follows a gamma distribution with parameters (ac, Sc). We
choose the shape parameters of the two prior distributions to be ah = 48 and ac = 3. We
therefore have ah > ac, which implies that the DM is more uncertain about the demand
distribution if the demand does change. This seems representative of practice, where the DM
would have an accurate demand forecast based on an abundant demand history but would
only have a coarse one following a potential demand shock. We fix Sh = 160 such that the
no-change prior mean is ah/Sh = 48/160 = 0.3. We vary Sc such that Sc = 1, 5, 10, 15 and
19, indicating extremely downward, downward, stationary, upward, and extremely upward
potential changes in demand. We label the Sc = 5, 10, 15 cases as “moderate change” cases
and the Sc = 1 and 19 cases as “extreme change” cases in which potential demand changes
are quite large. We vary the initial change probability γ such that γ = 0.2, 0.5 and 0.8.
The unit shortage cost p is set to be 4 and 9, indicating critical fractiles of 0.8 and 0.9,
respectively. To examine the effect of the length of the planning horizon T , we let T = 5
and 10. Therefore, we have 5× 3× 2× 2 = 60 instances in total in our full-factorial design.
For each instance, we compute the LBM bound, estimate the LBI using Monte-Carlo
simulation with 100,000 demand signal paths, and estimate the expected costs of the Myopic,
LA-M, and LA-I policies using simulations with an identical set of 10,000 demand paths. We
also use the same set of demand paths to estimate the expected costs of two additional na¨ıve
policies – optimal policies as if γ = 0 (denoted by OPTNOCHG) and as if γ = 1 (denoted
by OPTCHG) – as performance benchmarks. The OPTNOCHG policy would be adopted if
the DM ignores the potential change-point and only uses the historical demand information
for forecasting and inventory decisions. At the other extreme, the OPTCHG policy would
be employed if the DM ditches all the historical demand information and starts fresh with a
belief reflecting a change in demand.
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Due to space limitations, we refer readers to the electronic companion for detailed tables
of results. We find the estimated independentized lower bound LBI to be tighter than
the mixture lower bound LBM across all 60 instances, and therefore we use our estimated
LBI to evaluate optimality gaps of the various policies. We calculate the deviation of each
policy’s estimated expected costs from the estimated independentized lower bound LBI
(computed by (Cost−LBI)/LBI × 100%) for each instance. The percentage gaps, averaged
over parameter levels, are summarized in Table 2.1 (for “moderate change” cases) and
Table 2.2 (for “extreme change” cases).
We make several observations about the results in Table 2.1 and Table 2.2. First, for both
moderate and extreme scenarios, myopic, LA-M and LA-I policies nearly always perform
significantly better than the OPTCHG and OPTNOCHG policies. Intuitively, as change
probability γ increases, the performance of OPTCHG gets better while that of OPTNOCHG
gets worse. But even in their best instances (i.e., γ = 0.2 for OPTNOCHG and γ = 0.8 for
OPTNOCHG), they yield larger gaps than the three heuristics. This highlights the danger
of ignoring uncertainty around whether a demand change may or may not have happened.
Second, myopic, LA-M and LA-I policies have nearly the same performance under
moderate scenarios, achieving average gaps of 1.16%, 1.15% and 1.16%, respectively. This
suggests that the myopic policy may be an appealing choice except when extreme demand
changes are possible, especially given its simplicity for implementation in practice. Other
authors have found myopic policies to perform well in inventory contexts with demand
learning (e.g., Lovejoy, 1990, 1992). A managerial insight is that intelligent demand
estimation may merit more attention than forward-looking optimization when a (moderate)
demand shift may have recently occurred.
The myopic policy still performs reasonably well along with the two look-ahead heuristics
when there has been a large potential increase in demand (Sc = 19). However, when there
has been a potential extreme downward change in demand (Sc = 1), all the three heuristics
exhibit larger gaps relative to the lower bound. The myopic policy yields an average gap
of 15.74%. The LA-M and LA-I policy have much smaller average gaps (5.72% and 5.74%,
respectively) than the myopic policy. This observation suggests that more sophisticated
policies bring significant benefits over the myopic policy when relatively extreme changes
31
Table 2.1: Mean percentage gaps for moderate change cases, averaged over parameter levels.
Parameter Myopic LA-M LA-I OPTCHG OPTNOCHG
Sc 5 1.00% 0.99% 0.99% 5.79% 14.32%
10 0.90% 0.97% 1.00% 3.41% 21.73%
15 1.58% 1.50% 1.50% 7.67% 39.78%
p 4 0.74% 0.79% 0.81% 4.73% 19.83%
9 1.58% 1.51% 1.51% 6.52% 30.72%
γ 0.2 0.83% 0.91% 0.90% 11.09% 11.89%
0.5 1.53% 1.55% 1.58% 4.54% 26.49%
0.8 1.12% 1.00% 1.00% 1.23% 37.45%
T 5 1.50% 1.50% 1.51% 6.95% 25.39%
10 0.82% 0.81% 0.81% 4.29% 25.16%
Overall 1.16% 1.15% 1.16% 5.62% 25.27%
Note. Negative gaps are truncated to zero before averaging.
are possible. The gaps discussed here reflect the deviation of the policies’ expected costs
only from the cost lower bound rather than the optimal cost. Therefore, these gaps are
conservative in that they overestimate the optimality gaps.
Finally, although we have observed that LBI is tighter than LBM for all instances,
the LA-M and LA-I policies (which approximate cost-to-go functions by LBM and LBI ,
respectively) have nearly the same performance under all scenarios. Recall that the LA-
M policy can only be efficiently computed for cases in which the “degenerate” problems
referenced in §2.4.1.1 can be solved easily. The LA-M policy is recommended for such cases;
for other cases, the LA-I policy is likely to be more efficient to compute.
2.6 Parameter Estimation and Sensitivity
The demand model of §2.3 requires the specification of three inputs: a “no-change” or
historical prior pih, a change prior pic, and a change probability γ. The no-change prior pih,
the forecast of demand in the absence of a potential change-point, can be estimated using
established techniques applied to historical demand, and we do not elaborate on it here.
However, in many contexts it may be less obvious how to estimate the parameters pic and γ.
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Table 2.2: Mean percentage gaps for extreme change cases, averaged over parameter levels.
Parameter Myopic LA-M LA-I OPTCHG OPTNOCHG
Sc 1 15.74% 5.72% 5.74% 35.06% 73.97%
19 1.73% 1.56% 1.55% 12.09% 53.38%
p 4 6.79% 2.96% 2.97% 18.55% 61.74%
9 10.68% 4.32% 4.32% 28.60% 65.60%
γ 0.2 5.16% 3.97% 3.96% 43.12% 21.92%
0.5 11.74% 4.94% 4.96% 20.89% 53.49%
0.8 9.30% 2.01% 2.02% 6.72% 115.60%
T 5 8.96% 4.32% 4.32% 29.43% 60.73%
10 8.51% 2.97% 2.97% 17.72% 66.62%
Overall 8.73% 3.64% 3.64% 23.58% 63.67%
Note. Negative gaps are truncated to zero before averaging.
Selecting the change prior pic entails predicting the direction and magnitude of a potential
change. This represents a new demand regime for the firm by definition, but in many cases
it may be a regime with past precedents. Imagine a retailer facing the entrance of a new
competitor at one of its locations. It is likely to have faced similar entrances in the past
at other locations. When potential change-points are driven by changes in the state of the
economy (e.g., the example of women’s clothing following the 2008 financial crisis, discussed
in our introduction), financial markets (or forecasts thereof) may offer signals that can be
used to inform demand forecasts (Osadchiy et al., 2013). If neither of these two approaches
is applicable, a firm might generate pic by inflating the variance of pih and/or inflating or
deflating its mean by percentages determined by expert opinions.
The change probability γ is particularly challenging to estimate because it is arguably
most situation-specific and least amenable to estimation from historical data. Fortunately,
we have found that the performance of our policies is relatively insensitive to mis-specification
of γ. Figure 2.3 plots results from a numerical study similar to §2.5.3 except that we allow
for misspecification of the change probability γ. The manager employs the LA-M heuristic,
but computes forecasts and stocking decisions using a γ parameter that may differ from the
parameter used to simulate the underlying demand process.
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Figure 2.3: Sensitivity to misspecification of the change probability γ when the change prior
represents a moderate decrease (left) and moderate increase (right) in demand. The bars in
each chart represent expected profits when the manager assumes γ = 0.0 (white), 0.2, 0.5,
0.8, and 1.0 (black).
In contrast to our earlier development, we take a profit perspective here because changing
the “true” value of γ changes expected demand, making a comparison between costs
meaningless. Specifically, we translate expected costs into expected profit in the natural
way, defining expected single-period profit as E [pmin{y,D} − c(y − x)− h(y −D)+] =
−E [c(y − x) + h(y −D)+ + p(D − y)+] + pE [D]. The results in Figure 2.3 assume c = 0,
h = 1, p = 9, T = 5, historical prior pih given by a Gamma(48,160), and change prior pic
given by either Gamma(3,5) (i.e., “moderate decrease”), or Gamma(3,15) (i.e., “moderate
increase”), where the parameters have the same interpretations as in §2.5.3. We have found
consistent results across a broader set of instances.
We observe from Figure 2.3 that the expected profits naturally vary with the true
underlying demand process, and that the profits are always highest for each instance when
the assumed γ matches the “true” one used to generate the demand data. We also observe
that the expected profit for each instance remains relatively flat as we move the assumed
change probability γ from 0.2 to 0.5 to 0.8. In particular, the policy assuming γ = 0.5
exhibits robust performance across all of the instances we tried.
We also observe the least variation in profits across instances for policies that assume
demand will be low. That is, when the change prior indicates a possible downward change,
the “flattest” profits are obtained by the policy assuming γ equal to 1.0 or 0.8. When
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the change prior indicates a possible upward change in demand, the flattest profits are
obtained by the policy assuming γ equal to 0 or 0.2. This suggests that a conservative
decision-maker worried about downside risk may wish to choose pic and γ by erring on the
side of underestimating demand.
Proposition 2.8 below formalizes this finding for a Bayesian repeated newsvendor setting
in which there is no inventory carryover across periods. Consider a T -period Bayesian
newsvendor problem with unit selling price r, unit purchasing cost c < r, and inventory
that perishes at the end of each period with zero salvage value. As before, demands are
i.i.d. with density f(·|θ). Let G(y|pi) = ED|pi [rmin{y,D}]− cy be the single-period expected
profit given order quantity y and prior pi. We denote by y = (y1, . . . , yT ) a non-anticipative
inventory policy. In general, yt may be a function of all the information that the DM has up
to period t. Let Dt = (D1, . . . , Dt) be demand until period t. For any initial prior pi, let
VT (pi) denote the optimal expected profit for this problem, i.e.,
VT (pi) = max
y
T∑
t=1
E[G(yt|pi ◦Dt−1)|pi], (2.4)
where pi◦Dt−1 is the posterior updated based on demand history. Suppose that a conservative
DM has a bounded set P that contains all candidate priors on θ, and there exists a “smallest”
prior pi ∈ P such that pi ≤lr pi for all pi ∈ P. The objective is to maximize the worst-case
expected profit, which translates into a max-min version of problem (2.4):
RT (P) = max
y
min
pi∈P
T∑
t=1
E[G(yt|pi ◦Dt−1)|pi].
Proposition 2.8. Suppose that f(·|θ) has MLRP. Then RT (P) = VT (pi).
The proposition says that the DM can obtain the optimal policy for the max-min problem
by simply solving (2.4) for pi = pi. We note that Proposition 2.8 is a fairly general statement
about the choice of prior beliefs, and the intuition can be applied to the selection of pic as
well as γ.
To summarize this section, we have suggested a few ways for a manager to think about
choosing the parameters pic and γ. We show evidence that the results of our heuristics
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are relatively insensitive to the specification of the change probability, particularly if a
change prior is chosen away from the extremes 0 and 1. We also find both analytically and
numerically that a max-min formulation is solved by assuming the smallest change prior
structure among a set of candidates. Therefore, a manager concerned about downside profit
risk may choose to “play it safe” by erring on the side of underestimating demand.
2.7 Conclusions
Our numerical study yields several insights on inventory management in uncertain demand
environments. First, if a change in demand regime is suspected, managers can recover
significant costs by accounting for this uncertainty. That is, a manager should remain wary
of demand changepoints. Second, a Bayesian myopic policy may be sufficiently good in many
cases, suggesting that a manager may be justified in prioritizing demand estimation over
forward-looking inventory optimization in these cases. Third, more sophisticated policies
may be needed when extreme demand changes are possible. Fourth, a manager worried
about profit downside may opt for lower demand estimates.
Several extensions of our model may merit further research. First, it would be interesting
to examine the case with censored demand, which makes the DM’s future observations
dependent on current ordering decisions. A conjecture is that the “stock more” result of
Lariviere and Porteus (1999), Ding et al. (2002), and others may be accentuated in the
presence of potential upward changes in demand. Second, interesting questions arise when a
potential change-point is anticipated in the future (as opposed to the assumption we have
made in most of the present paper that the potential change-point is at a known time in
the past). Third, it would seem relevant to inventory management practice to allow for
uncertainty in the timing of potential change-points in order to model demand shifts that
occur for unobserved reasons. Fourth, we believe that the independentized bound idea may
merit further investigation for other inventory models involving demand learning.
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CHAPTER 3
Optimal Merchandise Testing
with Limited Inventory
3.1 Introduction
Fashion products, which are characterized by highly uncertain demand, short life cycles, and
often long lead-times, pose great challenges for retailers trying to match supply with demand.
With only limited replenishment opportunities and inaccurate demand forecasts, retailers
often end up with significant losses in profit due to either lost sales from stockouts or heavy
price discounts needed to clear excess inventory at the end of the selling season. The past
two decades have seen various initiatives by retailers to streamline inventory management for
fashion products: for example, quick response (Fisher and Raman, 1996), backup agreements
with manufacturers (Eppen and Iyer, 1997), and advanced booking discount programs (Tang
et al., 2004), to name a few.
An effective strategy used in practice to improve initial demand forecasts is so-called
“merchandise testing,” wherein a retailer gathers demand information about new products
by offering inventory for sale in selected stores of its network during a short testing period
before the primary selling season starts. The retailer then uses the information gained
during the test to construct more accurate demand forecasts and thereby to make improved
ordering decisions in preparation for the main selling season (Fisher and Rajaram, 2000).
There are three key decisions involved in such a merchandise test: (1) store selection—which
store to select for the test? (2) inventory allocation—how to allocate inventory across the
test stores? and (3) demand learning—how to construct demand forecasts based on the test
sales data?
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Fisher and Rajaram (2000) formulate the merchandise testing problem as a store
clustering problem based on historical sales data of similar products and apply their methods
to a large women’s apparel retailer and two major shoe retailers in the United States.
Designed for practical implementation, their model requires a few simplifying assumptions.
First, Fisher and Rajaram implicitly assume retailers adopt a “depth test;” that is, they
assume that ample inventory is placed at each test store to meet demand during the test
period. Second, they assume that store-level demand forecasting for the selling season is
accomplished using a linear function of test sales that is calibrated using historical sales data.
In this chapter, we complement their work by relaxing these two assumptions. Our goal
is to obtain insights into the interplay between limited inventory and (Bayesian) demand
learning in a multi-location setting.
We consider a model in which a retailer, with multiple stores and a fixed quantity of
available test inventory, manages a testing period followed by a selling period. Demands at
each store in both the testing and selling periods are dependent on an unknown parameter
that is common across stores and periods. Demands are independent once conditioned on
this unknown parameter. Between the two periods, the retailer updates its demand forecast
in a Bayesian fashion (over some prior distribution on the unknown demand parameter)
based on its observations from the testing period, and it chooses inventory quantities for
the selling period, during which we assume no further replenishment opportunities. The
retailer’s objective is to allocate the test inventory to stores at the beginning of the testing
period such that the ex-ante expected total profit in the selling period is maximized. We
assume no fixed costs of testing at a store and no inventory carryover, choosing instead to
focus on the statistical forces at play.
When spreading test inventory across multiple locations, a retailer must choose not only
how many (and which) stores to include in the test, but also the service level to target
at each of the test stores. There is a natural incentive for the retailer to test at a large
number of stores, as this yields a large quantity of demand observations. On the other hand,
spreading a limited inventory among many stores compromises the service level targeted at
each store during the test, and these service levels can impact the quality of information
gathered in the test. How exactly service levels impact information quality depends on the
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retailer’s visibility into the demand process. When the retailer has access to the timing of
each sales transaction within a period (e.g., Jain et al., 2015), the available inventory at a
test store limits the maximum number of transactions that can be observed. However, when
the sales timing information is unobservable, the retailer only observes the total sales during
the test period at each store. It is known that such sales information is an imperfect demand
observation that is “censored” by the amount of inventory at each store (e.g., Lariviere and
Porteus, 1999; Ding et al., 2002). In this case, the retailer has an incentive to concentrate
inventory in fewer stores to achieve higher service levels, reduce censoring, and thereby
enhance the quality of the demand observations.
We begin in §3.4 with the case in which sales timing information is observable. We
first analyze a base case in which stores have stochastically identical demands. For general
demand processes with a general prior, we prove that (in the absence of fixed costs) an
optimal policy will never omit a store from a merchandise test. We further show that an
“even-split” policy, which allocates the test inventory to all stores as evenly as possible, is
always optimal under a Poisson demand process with a gamma prior. These results suggest
the opposite of the traditional practice of a depth test which tends to avoid stockouts during
the test. In fact, a high service level in the testing period is no longer a necessity when
the retailer has access to sales timing information. We then extend our analysis to the
non-identical-store case, in which stores may have diverse demand volumes. We characterize
the monotone structure of the optimal allocation policy with respect to the relative demand
volumes among stores.
A key intuition underlying the above results is that the availability of data on the
timing of sales transactions largely ensures that store-level observations are of high quality,
freeing the retailer to primarily consider observation quantity when allocating test inventory.
Moreover, “quantity” in this context is best interpreted not in terms of the number of
stores but rather in terms of the total number of sales observations—following Jain et al.
(2015), each sales transaction can be viewed as an (exact) observation of an inter-arrival
time in the underlying demand process. Therefore, an effective merchandise test is one that
tends to maximize the quantity of sales transactions in the testing period across the store
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network. Motivated by this insight, we propose a “Max-Sales” heuristic allocation policy
which maximizes the expected sales during the testing period.
We obtain contrasting results when the retailer does not have access to sales timing
information. In this case, the form of the optimal allocation policy becomes contingent upon
the amount of test inventory as well as the shape of the demand distribution, and it can be
complex to characterize. Our analysis of the case with stochastically identical stores suggests
that (1) when the amount of test inventory is small, a retailer should follow a “single-store”
policy which allocates all of the test inventory to only one store; (2) when the amount of test
inventory is large, an even-split policy is optimal. These results are established analytically
assuming a continuous gamma-Weibull demand structure (with shape parameter exceeding
one), and they are corroborated numerically for the case of Poisson demand with a gamma
prior. Moreover, we find examples with a moderate amount of available test inventory in
which the optimal allocation policy may stock unbalanced positive quantities in each store
even though stores are otherwise identical.
These findings reveal a delicate tension between the quantity of stores included in the
test and the quality of observations obtained from each one. Our results show that improving
the quality of each demand observation is a higher priority than seeking a large observation
quantity when the total test inventory is tightly constrained. This encourages the retailer to
consolidate inventory in fewer stores to increase service levels in the testing period so as to
avoid the negative impact of censoring on demand learning. This may be one justification
(in addition to operational fixed costs) for adopting a concentrated test at a small number
of stores. Motivated by these insights, for cases with heterogeneous stores we propose a
“Service-Priority” heuristic that allocates test inventory to achieve a target service level
during the testing period at as many stores as the inventory budget allows.
We evaluate our heuristic allocation policies in a numerical study by comparing their
performance with the optimal policies. We consider two- and three-store problems in
which the optimal allocations of the test inventory can be obtained through an exhaustive
enumeration. Our numerical study indicates that when timing information is observable,
the Max-Sales policy yields allocations that are extremely close to the optimal solutions;
in fact, the maximum optimality gap in our study is 0.01% across both two-store and
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three-store instances. When timing information is unobservable, the Service-Priority policy
also appears near-optimal in our numerical experiments, resulting in an average gap of 0.05%
and a maximum gap of 1.02% for two-store instances, and an average gap of 0.08% and a
maximum gap of 1.30% for three-store instances. Furthermore, we find that using inefficient
allocations—for example, using the Max-Sales and Service-Priority heuristics in the wrong
settings—can result in significantly suboptimal performance.
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. After a review of relevant literature
in §3.2, §3.3 describes a general modeling framework for the merchandise testing problem
with limited test inventory. §3.4 characterizes the structure of optimal allocation policies
for test inventory when sales timing information is observable to the retailer. In §3.5, we
analyze the case in which the retailer does not have sales timing information. We numerically
evaluate the performance of our proposed heuristics in §3.6. §3.7 concludes the chapter with
discussions of managerial insights and future research directions.
3.2 Literature Review
By studying the merchandise testing problem, our work contributes to a broad literature
studying strategies for retailers to learn about demand for products with short life cycles
and high demand uncertainty. Other examples include the “quick response” strategy of
Fisher and Raman (1996), the “advanced booking discount” program modeled by Tang et al.
(2004), and models allowing for advanced demand information that is updated over time
(e.g., Wang et al., 2012).
There is a well-established body of research that jointly considers demand estimation and
inventory optimization when unmet demand is lost and unobservable, or in other words, when
demand observations are “censored.” For a survey, we refer readers to Chen and Mersereau
(2015). The majority of this literature focuses on single-location settings. Our work belongs
to a substream of this literature that uses a Bayesian framework for demand estimation.
Lariviere and Porteus (1999) analyze the Bayesian inventory problem with censored demand.
To achieve tractability, they assume that the underlying demand distribution is from a family
of so-called “newsvendor distributions” defined by Braden and Freimer (1991) and that a
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gamma prior is used. The dimensionality reduction scaling technique in Scarf (1960) and
Azoury (1985), both assuming fully backlogged and exactly observable demand, is extended
to the censored demand case under a Weibull demand distribution with a gamma prior.
The problem receives continued exploration in Ding et al. (2002), Bensoussan et al. (2007),
Lu et al. (2008), Chen and Plambeck (2008), and Chen (2010). Recently, Bisi et al. (2011)
closely revisit the Bayesian inventory problem with censored observations and newsvendor
distribution demand and confirm that Weibull is the only member of the newsvendor family
for which optimal solutions are scalable. A common insight from this stream of literature is
that the retailer should stock more than myopic order-up-to levels to better learn future
demand information.
The recent paper of Jain et al. (2015) extends the literature on demand learning
with censored observations by incorporating the timing of individual sales transactions.
(Interestingly, Jain et al. (2015) use as a motivating example the Middle Eastern cosmetics
brand Mikyajy, which uses merchandise testing at a single store to make profitable purchasing
decisions prior to a full product launch.) In a parsimonious Bayesian multiperiod newsvendor
framework, they prove that the “stock more” result continues to hold with the additional
timing information. Furthermore, their numerical study shows that the use of timing
observations significantly reduces losses in expected profit due to censoring. While their
scope is again limited to a single-location setting, our research further extends their framework
to a multi-location setting, which leads to tradeoffs that are non-existent in a single-location
model.
A novel aspect of our work is the focus on demand learning (for a single product) across
multiple locations, which is different from Caro and Gallien (2007), who consider a dynamic
assortment problem with demand learning (at a single location) for multiple products. In
this regard, our model is conceptually related to Harrison and Sunar (2014), who consider a
firm choosing among several modes to learn the unknown value of a project for optimizing
investment timing. The cost and quality of each learning mode in Harrison and Sunar (2014)
are exogenously given, while our model seeks to maximize the value of demand learning
subject to a resource constraint on the amount of test inventory available.
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This chapter is also related to a large number of papers concerning inventory management
at a warehouse serving multiple retail locations. A detailed review can be found in Agrawal
and Smith (2009). Only a small subset of this literature is applicable to fashion products
with short life cycles and high demand uncertainty. Two notable examples, in addition
to Fisher and Rajaram (2000), are Agrawal and Smith (2013) and Gallien et al. (2015).
Agrawal and Smith (2013) consider a two-period inventory model in which the retailer
has multiple non-identical stores that share a common unknown parameter and uses a
Bayesian scheme to update demand forecast. Gallien et al. (2015) also develop a two-period
stochastic optimization model to determine initial shipments to stores at fashion retailer
Zara, accounting for the allocation of leftover and replenished stock at a central warehouse
to stores in the second period. Our work differs in several important ways. First, in the
previous two contexts, the widespread rollout of a product occurs at the very beginning of
the first period, which typically involves allocating a large amount of inventory to a large
number of stores; however, the first period in our merchandise testing problem only involves
distributing a very limited amount of inventory to a relatively small set of stores. Second,
neither paper explicitly considers demand censoring when updating demand forecasts based
on observations in the first period. Demand censoring is at the core of our study, as it leads
to the quantity versus quality tradeoff at the heart of our research questions. Finally, neither
of these papers considers using the timing of sales occurrences for demand learning.
At a high level, this chapter is related to research on the value of information and its
structure in problems involving collecting information with limited resources, examples of
which come from multiple disciplines including economics, simulation optimization, computer
science, and decision science. For example, Frazier and Powell (2010) consider the Bayesian
ranking and selection problem in which the decision maker allocates a measurement budget
to choose the best among several alternatives. They find that spreading the measurement
budget equally among alternatives can be paradoxically non-optimal when the prior is
identical for each alternative, due to lack of concavity of the value of information. In our
merchandise testing context, we also find that the value of information is not necessarily
concave, in particular, when timing information is unobservable.
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3.3 Model
In this section, we describe a general framework for the merchandise testing problem.
Consider a retailer that tests and sells a single product through a chain of N stores. We
model two periods, labeled 1 and 2 respectively, where period 1 represents the testing
period and period 2 the main selling period. At the beginning of period 1, the retailer has
Q ∈ Z+ units of inventory available in total to allocate to N stores for the merchandise test.
We denote a feasible allocation of the test inventory by a vector q ∈ Q = {(q1, . . . , qN ) :∑N
n=1 qn ≤ Q, qn ∈ Z+}.
We assume that the testing period has length T and that demand arrives at each store
n according to a renewal process, denoted by {Dn(t|θ), 0 ≤ t ≤ T}, where θ ∈ Θ is a
parameter that is common to all N stores but unknown to the retailer. Let tin denote
the arrival time of the i-th demand at store n and τ in = t
i
n − ti−1n the inter-arrival time
between the i-th and the (i − 1)-th demand. We assume that τ in has probability density
function (pdf) ψn(·|θ), cumulative distribution function (cdf) Ψn(·|θ), and complementary
cdf Ψn(·|θ), and is independent of the demand processes at other stores if conditioned on
θ. Cumulative demand Dn(t) until time t has probability mass function fn(·|t, θ) and cdf
Fn(·|t, θ) (complementary cdf Fn(·|t, θ)). We will use Dn and Dn(T ) interchangeably to
denote the total demand in period 1 at store n. A Bayesian framework is employed to model
demand learning and we assume that the retailer has a prior density pi(θ) representing its
initial belief about the unknown demand parameter θ.
In order to highlight the value of demand learning associated with the allocation of
test inventory, we make the following simplifying assumptions. First, we assume no fixed
costs of including a store in the merchandise test. It is intuitive that fixed costs would
create an incentive to consolidate inventory; we focus instead on the statistical incentives
to consolidate inventory in a few stores versus spreading it among many stores. Second,
we assume that the revenue generated from sales in period 1 is negligible, as the testing
period is typically short compared to the primary selling season. Finally, we do not consider
inventory carryover from period 1 to period 2 for tractability reasons; in other words, the
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amount of leftover inventory from the test period is assumed to be negligible compared to
the substantially larger order quantities for the main selling period.
At the end of period 1, the retailer makes an observation X(q) which may depend on the
test demand realization Dn, the allocated test inventory level qn, and in some cases the timing
of demand epochs {t1n, t2n, . . . , tDnn } (or equivalently the inter-arrival times {τ1n, . . . , τDnn }), at
each store n. The retailer can obtain different types of observations during period 1 and we
defer the details to §3.3.1. Let l(X(q)|θ) denote the likelihood of observing X(q) for some θ
and test inventory allocation q. The retailer uses Bayes rule to update its knowledge about
θ based on observation X(q) over prior pi as follows:
pˆi(θ) = pi(θ) ◦X(q) = l(X(q)|θ)pi(θ)∫
Θ l(X(q)|ω)pi(ω)dω
, (3.1)
where pˆi(θ) is the updated posterior density.
Period 2 models the retailer’s operations in the primary selling season. In essence, the
retailer solves a newsvendor problem to choose the ordering quantity yn for each store n
to maximize the expected total profit generated by the entire chain based on its updated
knowledge pˆi about θ. Let Dˆn be the period 2 demand at store n. Our most general model
is flexible in the demand structure of period 2 in that we only assume that Dˆn is distributed
according to some cdf Fˆ (·|θ) which also depends on the unknown demand parameter θ and
is independent of demand at other stores once conditioned on θ. We assume a unit selling
price p and a unit procurement cost c < p, both of which are exogenously determined and
apply universally to all N stores. The expected total profit in period 2 with respect to
ordering quantities y = (y1, . . . , yn) under belief pˆi is thus given by
Πˆ(y|pˆi) , E
[
N∑
n=1
pmin{Dˆn, yn} − cyn
∣∣∣∣pˆi
]
.
Denote by Φˆn(·) be the unconditioned cdf of demand at store n in period 2, i.e.,
Φˆn(x) =
∫
Θ Fˆ (x|θ)pˆi(θ)dθ. It is straightforward to see that the optimal order quantity y∗n for
store n is given by the well-known newsvendor order quantity y∗n = Φˆ−1n (
p−c
p ), where Φˆ
−1
n (·)
is the inverse unconditioned cdf, i.e., Φˆ−1n (r) = min{x : Φˆn(x) ≥ r}.
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Let Vˆ (pˆi) = maxy Πˆ(y|pˆi) be the optimal expected total profit in period 2. The retailer’s
problem at the beginning of period 1 is to find the optimal allocation q ∈ Q of the total Q
units of test inventory that maximizes its ex-ante expected profit Π(q|pi) = E[Vˆ (pi◦X(q))|pi],
with the anticipation of an observation X(q) being made after period 1.
3.3.1 Types of Demand Observations in Period 1
We present in this subsection two types of demand observations the retailer may receive
during period 1.
Observations without Timing Information (XNT (q)). This is the type of observations
assumed by the majority of the literature: at the end of period 1, the retailer observes
only the sales quantity at each store and whether a stockout has occurred. We denote by
sn = min{Dn, qn} the sales quantity at store n and by en = 1{Dn ≥ qn} a binary indicator of
the store’s stockout status at the end of period 1. The overall observation XNT (q) = {s, e}
is simply a collection of two vectors where s = (s1, . . . , sn) and e = (e1, . . . , en). The
superscript NT is for “No Timing.” For each store n, the likelihood of observing sales
quantity sn at time T given some demand parameter θ is f(sn|T, θ) if there is excess test
inventory (i.e., en = 0) and is F (qn − 1|T, θ) otherwise (i.e., en = 1). Recall that we assume
independent demand processes among N stores for any fixed θ. As a result, the likelihood
of observing XNT (q) for some θ is given by
l(XNT (q)|θ) =
N∏
i=1
[
(1− en) · f(sn|T, θ) + en · F (qn − 1|T, θ)
]
. (3.2)
Observations with Timing Information (XT (q)). This type of observation is considered
by Jain et al. (2015) in a single-store setting and we extend their definition to our multi-
location setting. It contains not only stores’ sales quantities and stockout statuses but also
the timing of all sales occurrences. Let ~τn = (τ
1
n, . . . , τ
sn
n ) denote the observed sequence
of inter-arrival times between sales at store n. Let XTn (qn) = {sn, en, ~τn} be the retailer’s
observation at store n where the superscript T stands for “Timing.” If the retailer decides
not to test at store n, i.e., qn = 0, then it automatically stocks out (i.e., en = 1) and
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of course sees no sales (i.e., sn = 0). Otherwise, if qn > 0, the likelihood of it observing
XTn (qn) = (sn, 0, ~τn) at store n is
∏sn
i=1 ψn(τ
i
n|θ) · Ψn(T −
∑sn
i=1 τ
i
n|θ) and of it observing
XTn (qn) = (sn, 1, ~τn) is
∏sn
i=1 ψn(τ
i
n|θ). Overall, the retailer’s observation, XT (q) = {s, e, ~τ},
is a collection of sales quantities, stockout statuses, and times between consecutive sales at
all stores where we define ~τ = (~τ1, . . . , ~τn). The likelihood of observing X
T (q) for some θ is
therefore given by
l(XT (q)|θ) =
N∏
n=1
[
en ·
sn∏
i=1
ψn(τ
i
n|θ) + (1− en) ·
sn∏
i=1
ψn(τ
i
n|θ) ·Ψn(T −
sn∑
i=1
τ in|θ)
]
, (3.3)
where we use the conventions
∏0
i=1 ψn(τ
i
n|θ) = 1 and
∑0
i=1 τ
i
n = 0 for the case sn = 0.
3.3.2 Marginal Value of Learning of an Additional Unit of Test Inventory
It is intuitive that the retailer would always prefer to allocate all Q units of test inventory
in period 1 so as to acquire as much demand information as possible. We formalize this
intuition in the following lemma which shows that the retailer’s ex-ante expected profit is
increasing in the test inventory quantity allocated to any store. In other words, the marginal
value of learning from an additional unit of total test inventory is always nonnegative.
To facilitate our presentation throughout the rest of this chapter, we introduce δn =
(0, . . . , 0, 1, 0, . . . , 0) as an N -dimensional vector with only the n-th element being one and
all other elements zero. We use this notation mainly to describe allocation modifications.
For instance, allocation q + δi − δj modifies allocation q by sending one more unit of test
inventory to store i and one less to store j.
Let ΠT (q|pi) and ΠNT (q|pi) denote the ex-ante expected profits for the cases with and
without timing information.
Lemma 3.1. The following hold for all pi, q ∈ ZN+ , and n = 1, . . . , N :
(a) ΠT (q|pi) ≤ ΠT (q + δn|pi);
(b) ΠNT (q|pi) ≤ ΠNT (q + δn|pi);
(c) There exists an optimal allocation q such that
∑N
i=1 qn = Q.
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All proofs can be found in the appendix. We prove Lemma 3.1 using results from
the statistics literature on comparisons of experiments (Blackwell, 1951, 1953). To prove
Lemma 3.1(a), we define merchandise tests with allocations q + δn and q as two statistical
experiments, ET and FT , when timing information is observable. The outcomes of the two
experiments are demand observations XT (q + δn) and X
T (q). We then establish that there
exists a stochastic transformation from the distribution of XT (q + δn) to that of X
T (q)
(which is intuitive as the retailer observes more information with the additional unit of test
inventory). As a result, experiment ET is said to be sufficient for FT and Lemma 3.1(a)
immediately follows. The proof of part (b) uses a similar argument, and part (c) is an
immediate corollary part of (a) and (b). Therefore, for the rest of the chapter, we narrow
our focus to the set of allocations satisfying
∑N
n=1 qn = Q without loss of generality.
3.4 With Timing Information
In this section, we analyze the retailer’s optimal policy for allocating test inventory when
timing information is observable. We first examine in §3.4.1 the case in which stores have
stochastically identical demand. Then we generalize our analysis to the case in which stores
follow a more general demand structure.
3.4.1 Identical Stores
We consider a base case in which all stores are identical. More specifically, we assume that
stores’ demand processes in period 1 share a common inter-arrival time distribution, i.e.,
ψn(τ |θ) = ψ(τ |θ) for all n = 1, . . . , N . The identical-store case enables us to gain focused
insights into the role of inventory allocation in gathering demand information from multiple
locations. Practically, a group of identical stores may be interpreted as stores that have
been clustered into a relatively homogeneous set in terms of demand or sales volume.
We first show in the following proposition that when the stores are identical and the
retailer observes sales timing information, the retailer benefits from allocating a positive
amount of test inventory to as many stores as possible under general renewal process demand
with a general prior.
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Proposition 3.1. Suppose that stores are identical. Then for all pi, the following hold when
timing information is observable:
(a) Let q = (q1, . . . , qN ) be a test inventory allocation such that qi ≥ 2 and qj = 0 for some
i 6= j. Then, ΠT (q|pi) ≤ ΠT (q− δi + δj |pi);
(b) There exists an optimal allocation q∗ = (q∗1, . . . , q∗N ) such that q
∗
n > 0 for n =
1, 2, . . . ,min{Q,N}.
The main implication of Proposition 3.1 is that the retailer should cover as many stores
as possible in a test without worrying about the potential to stock out at stores. This finding
reveals an incentive for the retailer to deviate from a “depth test” that stocks high test
inventory levels to avoid stockouts.
A formal proof appears in the appendix, but we sketch it here. We prove Proposi-
tion 3.1(a) by constructing two statistical experiments, E and F , corresponding to the two
inventory allocations, q− δi + δj and q, respectively. As discussed in the sketch proof of
Lemma 3.1, the result follows if we establish that there exists a stochastic transformation
from the distribution of observation XT (q− δi + δj) to that of XT (q). The intuition is as
follows. When timing information is observable, the retailer learns the unknown demand
parameter essentially through observations of inter-arrival times. Each realized sale gives
the retailer an exact observation of a single inter-arrival time. Moreover, the retailer receives
a censored observation of the inter-arrival time when a store does not stockout, as the time
until the next demand epoch is truncated at the end of period 1. Therefore, by moving one
unit of test inventory from store i to store j (with no inventory), the retailer increases both
the probability of selling this unit and that of getting an accurate instead of a censored obser-
vation of the inter-arrival time. Both the quantity and the quality of observations collected
during the test increase (in a stochastic sense), therefore the distribution of XT (q− δi + δj)
can be transformed to that of XT (q). Proposition 3.1(b) is an immediate corollary of part
(a) given we have established in Lemma 3.1 that it suffices to consider allocation policies
that distribute all test inventory to stores.
Proposition 3.1 hints at the desirability of an “even-split” policy which evenly distributes
test inventory to all stores, thereby maximizing the expected sales, or equivalently, the
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number of uncensored inter-arrival time observations during period 1. This would be true
if one could generalize Proposition 3.1(a) to any allocation q that has qi − qj ≥ 2 without
requiring qj = 0. Unfortunately, the proof generally does not extend for qj > 0, as a
stochastic transformation from XT (q− δi + δj) to XT (q) appears no longer possible—in
other words, observations under allocation q−δi+δj do not always contain more information
than that under allocation q. Nevertheless, in the remainder of this subsection we present a
result showing that the even-split policy is indeed optimal for an important special case.
Poisson Demand with a Gamma Prior. In the following, we assume that the inter-
arrival times between consecutive demand epochs are exponentially distributed with an
unknown rate parameter λ > 0, i.e., ψ(τ |λ) = λe−λτ . In other words, the cumulative demand
up to time t at each store n, {Dn(t|λ), t ≥ 0}, is a Poisson process with unknown arrival rate
λ, a demand process often assumed in academic research on retail inventory management.
We further assume that the retailer uses a gamma prior with shape and rate parameters
α > 0 and β > 0, i.e., pi(λ) = pi(λ|α, β) = βαΓ(α)λα−1e−βλ. When timing information is
observable, pi(·|α, β) is a conjugate prior for λ. More specifically, let XT = {s, e, ~τ} be a
realized observation in period 1 under some allocation when timing information is observable.
Then the posterior, updated based on XT , is pˆi(λ) = pi(λ|α, β) ◦XT = pi(λ|α+ S, β + T ),
where
S =
N∑
n=1
sn and T =
N∑
n=1
[
en ·
sn∑
i=1
τ in + (1− en)T
]
constitute the sufficient statistics. Note that S and T are essentially the total sales quantity
and the total sales duration across all stores, respectively.
The following proposition shows that the even-split policy is optimal for Poisson demand
with a gamma prior when the retailer observes sales timing information.
Proposition 3.2. Suppose that the demand at each store in period 1 is a Poisson process
with unknown arrival rate λ and that the retailer has a gamma prior pi(·|α, β) with shape
and rate parameters (α, β). Then, the following hold when timing information is observable:
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(a) Let q = (q1, . . . , qN ) be a test inventory allocation such that qi − qj ≥ 2 for some i 6= j.
Then, ΠT (q|α, β) ≤ ΠT (q− δi + δj |α, β).
(b) The “even-split” allocation q∗ = (q∗1, . . . , q∗n), which allocates all Q units of test inventory
to all N stores as evenly as possible, is optimal. In particular:
(i) If Q ≤ N , q∗i = 1 for i = 1, . . . , Q and q∗j = 0 for j = Q+ 1, . . . , N ;
(ii) If Q > N , q∗i = bQ/Nc+ 1 for i = 1, . . . , (Q mod N) and q∗j = bQ/Nc for j = (Q
mod N) + 1, . . . , N .
The proof of Proposition 3.2(a) builds upon Proposition 3.1 and extends it to any
allocation q that has qi − qj ≥ 0 through a two dimensional induction on qi and qj . The
induction relies on a first-step analysis which conditions on the time until the next demand
arrival at either store i or j and treats the remaining testing period as a new merchandise
test with a shorter testing periodand an updated prior. This first-step analysis relies on
the memoryless property of Poisson processes and on the fact that S and T are sufficient
statistics for the past demand information. Proposition 3.2(b) is a straightforward corollary
of part (a).
The overall implication is that when sales timing information is used for demand learning
in a merchandise test, the retailer need not aim for a high service level to avoid stockouts
during the testing period. Instead, the retailer should allocate the limited test inventory
to more stores so as to maximize the total sales, or equivalently, the quantity of exact
inter-arrival time observations. The service level during the testing period is less of a concern
because each sale individually reveals information about the demand distribution and has
an equal value whether it is made in a store with a high or low service level.
3.4.2 Non-Identical Stores
In this subsection, we extend our analysis to the more general case where stores may be
non-identical. We model non-identical demand as follows. We assume that stores’ inter-
arrival times are stochastically ordered in a consistent way conditioned on any value of the
unknown demand parameter. Without loss of generality, we label the stores such that their
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demand inter-arrival times are increasing in the sense of first-order stochastic dominance. In
particular, we assume that
Ψ1(τ |θ) ≤ Ψ2(τ |θ) ≤ · · · ≤ ΨN (τ |θ) (3.4)
for all τ ≥ 0 and θ ∈ Θ. Recall that Ψn(·|θ) is the complementary cdf of the inter-arrival
times at store n given a fixed θ and is assumed to be known to the retailer. This assumption
also implies that stores’ demands are decreasing in the sense of first-stochastic dominance,
i.e., F 1(x|T, θ) ≤ F 2(x|T, θ) ≤ · · · ≤ FN (x|T, θ) for all x ≥ 0 and θ ∈ Θ. In this formulation,
one can interpret θ as the overall market potential of the product. The retailer does not
know θ, but knows the market share of each store, which may be relatively more stable and
predictable than the overall demand.
The following proposition extends Proposition 3.1 and sheds light on which stores the
retailer should prefer when allocating test inventory with timing information observable.
Proposition 3.3. Suppose that stores are non-identical such that Ψ1(τ |θ) ≤ Ψ2(τ |θ) ≤
· · · ≤ ΨN (τ |θ) for all τ ≥ 0 and θ ∈ Θ. Then for all pi, the following hold when timing
information is observable:
(a) Let q = (q1, . . . , qN ) be a test inventory allocation such that qi = 0 and qj ≥ 1 for some
i < j. Then, ΠT (q|pi) ≤ ΠT (q + δi − δj |pi);
(b) There exists an optimal allocation q∗ = (q∗1, . . . , q∗N ) such that q
∗
n > 0 for n = 1, . . . ,m
and q∗n = 0 for n > m, where m is some number in {1, . . . , N}.
Proposition 3.3 indicates that the retailer should always allocate test inventory to stores
with higher demand before testing at stores with lower demand. This is in line with the
intuition we have gained in §3.4.1 that the retailer should maximize its test sales to maximize
the value of the test when timing information is observable. This result is also useful if the
retailer has an additional constraint on the maximum number of stores to test, say, M < N
stores. In that case, instead of considering all subsets with at most M stores, the number of
which is
∑M
m=1
(
N
m
)
in total, the retailer need examine only M subsets, each containing the
m stores with the largest relative demand, m = 1, 2, . . . ,M .
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Given the above proposition, it is natural to expect that the optimal quantities of test
inventory allocated to stores should be ranked according to stores’ relative demand volumes.
That is, the retailer should send the most test inventory to store 1, the second most to store
2, and so forth. We prove that this conjecture holds for an important special case involving
Poisson demand processes. Before formally stating the proposition, we first introduce our
gamma-Poisson demand model for the non-identical-store setting.
Non-Identical Poisson Demand with a Gamma Prior. We assume that the demand
inter-arrival times at store n are exponentially distributed with rate γnλ, i.e., ψn(τ |λ) =
γnλe
−γnλτ , where λ > 0 is unknown but γn > 0 is known to the retailer. In other words,
the cumulative demand up to time t at each store n, {Dn(t|λ), t ≥ 0}, is a Poisson process
with (partially) unknown arrival rate γnλ. In addition, we assume that γ1 ≥ γ2 ≥ · · · ≥ γN .
We call γn the relative demand coefficient of store n. The retailer still uses a gamma prior
pi(λ|α, β) on λ with shape and rate parameters α > 0 and β > 0.
One can easily verify that the above Poisson demand model satisfies our general non-
identical-store assumption in (3.4) by noting that the complementary cdf of inter-arrival
times at store n is given by Ψn(τ |λ) = e−γnλτ . Furthermore, the gamma distribution is still
a conjugate prior for this non-identical Poisson demand process. Let XT = {s, e, ~τ} be a
realized observation in period 1 under some allocation when timing information is observable.
Then the posterior, updated based on XT , is pˆi(λ) = pi(λ|α, β) ◦XT = pi(λ|α+ S, β + T ),
where
S =
N∑
n=1
sn and T =
N∑
n=1
γn ·
[
en ·
sn∑
i=1
τ in + (1− en)T
]
.
The sufficient statistics still have two dimensions with one being the total sales quantity
and the other the “weighted” total sales duration across all stores where the weights are the
relative demand coefficients.
We prove in the following proposition that in the gamma-Poisson demand model the
optimal quantities of test inventory allocated to stores are ordered by stores’ relative demand
coefficients.
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Proposition 3.4. Suppose that the inter-arrival times at store n are exponentially distributed
with rate parameter γnλ where λ is unknown but γ1 ≥ . . . ≥ γn are known, and that the
retailer has a gamma prior on λ with shape and rate parameters (α, β). The following hold
when timing information is observable:
(a) Let q = (q1, . . . , qN ) be a test inventory allocation such that qi < qj for some i < j.
Then, ΠT (q|α, β) ≤ ΠT (q + δi − δj |α, β);
(b) There exists an optimal allocation q∗ = (q∗1, . . . , q∗N ) such that q
∗
1 ≥ q∗2 ≥ · · · ≥ q∗N .
The structure of the optimal allocation policy characterized by Proposition 3.4 provides
an intuitive guideline for practitioners to distribute test inventory in merchandise testing:
allocate more inventory to the stores with higher demand. However, computing the exact
optimal allocation quantities remains difficult due to the combinatorial nature of the problem.
We propose an easy-to-implement heuristic policy in the following subsection.
3.4.3 The Max-Sales Heuristic
In this subsection, we propose a heuristic policy named “Max-Sales” based on the intuition
developed in §3.4.1 that with timing information observable, a good policy tends to maximize
the sales during the testing period.
The Max-Sales policy is a greedy heuristic which sequentially allocates Q units of
test inventory to N stores such that each unit of product is sent to the store having
the highest (unconditioned) probability of selling that additional unit. Let φn(x) be the
unconditioned probability mass function of demand being x at store n in period 1, i.e.,
φn(x) =
∫
Θ fn(x|T, θ)pi(θ)dθ. We denote by Φn(x) the corresponding unconditioned cdf,
i.e., Φn(x) =
∑x
u=0 φn(u), and let Φn(x) denote the unconditioned complementary cdf. The
algorithm of the Max-Sales policy is as follows:
B Max-Sales Heuristic
q1, . . . , qN←0;
for i← 1 to Q
54
n∗←min{n : Φn(qn) ≥ Φm(qm) for all m = 1, . . . , N};
qn∗←qn∗ + 1;
end
Proposition 3.5. Suppose that stores are non-identical such that Ψ1(τ |θ) ≤ Ψ2(τ |θ) ≤
· · · ≤ ΨN (τ |θ) for all τ ≥ 0 and θ ∈ Θ. The following hold:
(a) The Max-Sales heuristic yields an allocation qMS = (qMS1 , . . . , q
MS
N ) that maximizes the
expected total sales in period 1;
(b) qMS1 ≥ qMS2 ≥ · · · ≥ qMSN .
Proposition 3.5(a) shows that our greedy Max-Sales heuristic indeed maximizes the
expected total sales during period 1 under the general non-identical demand introduced in
§3.4.2. Proposition 3.5(b) guarantees that the Max-Sales allocation is monotonic, which
which shares the same structure as the optimal policy under gamma-Poisson demand as we
have proved in Proposition 3.4(b). The Max-Sales heuristic is easy-to-compute and applies
to general demand processes and priors. Based on our numerical experience, this heuristic
performs extremely well, coinciding with the optimal policy in almost all cases (see a detailed
discussion in §3.6.2).
3.5 Without Timing Information
We discuss in this section the optimal test inventory allocation policy when the retailer does
not observe sales timing information.
3.5.1 Identical Stores
When timing information is unobservable as is commonly assumed in the classic Bayesian
inventory literature with demand censoring, analyzing the optimal allocation policy becomes
particularly challenging. Even in the single-location setting, it is well-known that computing
the optimal inventory policy is difficult (Bisi et al., 2011). In addition, we lose conjugacy
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under the discrete demand assumption, which makes it challenging even to compute the
Bayes update between periods.
To achieve tractability, instead of assuming discrete, renewal process demand, we turn
to a continuous Weibull demand distribution with a gamma prior, a parsimonious demand
model widely adopted in the Bayesian inventory control literature with demand censoring.
We will corroborate our key results numerically for gamma-Poisson demand in §3.5.2. For
the present analysis we assume that the demand at each store in both periods is Weibull
distributed with known shape parameter k > 0 and unknown scale parameter θ > 0, and
that the retailer has a gamma distributed prior on θ with shape and scale parameters (a,S)
at the beginning of period 1. Note that the length T of period 1 is rendered irrelevant under
this assumption. In particular,
fn(x|θ) = fˆn(x|θ) = θxk−1e−θxk , and pi(θ) = S
a
Γ(a)
θa−1e−Sθ.
The following proposition partially characterizes the optimal allocation policy under
gamma-Weibull demand when timing information is unobservable.
Proposition 3.6. Suppose that the demand at each store in both periods is Weibull with
shape parameter k > 0 and unknown scale parameter θ, and that the retailer has a gamma
prior on θ with shape and scale parameters (a,S). The following hold for all a > 1k and
S > 0 when timing information is unobservable:
(a) If 0 < k ≤ 1, the even-split allocation, q∗n = Q/N for all n, is optimal;
(b) If k > 1:
(i) there exists Q0 > 0 such that for 0 ≤ Q < Q0, a “single-store” allocation is optimal,
i.e., q∗i = Q for some i and q
∗
n = 0 for all n 6= i;
(ii) the even-split allocation, q∗n = Q/N for all n, becomes optimal as Q→∞.
We can see from Proposition 3.6 that the form of the optimal allocation policy is generally
complex when timing information is unobservable. It may depend on the total test inventory
Q as well as the shape of the demand distribution.
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When k ≤ 1, the demand density is strictly decreasing with a shape similar to that of
an exponential density. (The exponential distribution is itself a special case of the Weibull
distribution with k = 1.) In this case, the even-split allocation is always optimal regardless
of the total test inventory Q. In fact, the ex-ante expected profit ΠNT (q|a, S) is jointly
concave in the allocation q. This resembles Bisi et al. (2011)’s result that the expected cost
is convex in the inventory level under gamma-exponential demand in a single-store setting.
When k > 1, the demand density has a unimodal shape. In this case, the optimal policy
is “single-store,” i.e., allocating all Q units of test inventory to only one store, when Q is
sufficiently small relative to demand. We note that Q0 is a constant that depends on demand
parameters k, a, and S. The even-split allocation becomes optimal for sufficiently large Q.
In contrast with the case in which timing information is observable, the pursuit of the
quality and the quantity of demand observations need to be carefully balanced in the absence
of timing information. Sending more test inventory to a store increases the service level
and reduces the probability of demand being censored, thereby improving the quality of
the demand observation obtained from the store. But with a fixed overall quantity of test
inventory, this also means either sending less test inventory to some other store, which
degrades the observation quality at that store, or excluding one or more stores from the test,
which reduces the quantity of demand observations. When k > 1, Bisi et al. (2011) show in
a single-store setting that the expected cost can be non-convex in the inventory level; we
observe a similar phenomenon in our model, where the ex-ante expected profit ΠNT (q|a, S)
is non-concave in each qn. As a result, the retailer gains little demand information from
a store until it stocks sufficient test inventory at the store. Spreading the test inventory
equally to all stores may not be beneficial, as the increase in the total observation quantity
may not compensate for the significant loss in the quality of demand observations at each
store.
Proposition 3.6 suggests that the retailer may want to consolidate test inventory in a
few stores to achieve a sufficiently high service level during the testing period. In other
words, we provide a theoretical justification, in addition to fixed costs, for the practice of
avoiding stockouts in merchandise testing. We remark that this tendency to consolidate test
inventory is present even though we assume zero fixed cost of conducting a test at a store.
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Figure 3.1: Ex-ante expected profit Π(q1, Q− q1|α, β) as a function of q1 in a two-identical-
store example under Poisson demand with a gamma prior when Q = 5, 10, 15.
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Note. N = 2, α = 2, β = 0.4, p = 10, c = 1, T = 1.
3.5.2 Identical Stores: Numerical Illustration
In the following, we numerically test and illustrate the findings of Proposition 3.6 for example
merchandise testing problems with identical stores, Poisson demand, and a gamma prior.
To have a contrasting comparison, we also include the case with observable sales timing
information in this numerical illustration. We plot in Figure 3.1 the ex-ante expected profit
for a two-store problem as a function of q1, the units of test inventory allocated to store
1. The dashed lines with triangle markers are for the case in which timing information
is observable, whereas the solid lines with circle markers are for the case in which timing
information is unobservable. Lemma 3.1 implies that it is sufficient to consider allocations
q = (q1, q2) that have q2 = Q− q1. The shape and rate parameters of the retailer’s prior are
α = 2 and β = 0.4, so for each store the expected arrival rate E[λ] = α/β = 5. The profits
are plotted for Q = 5, 10, and 15, respectively. For each Q value, we only plot q1 from 0
to bQ/2c. Given that the two stores are identical, the profits for q1 ∈ {bQ/2c+ 1, . . . , Q}
mirror those shown.
We observe that even-split allocations (i.e., (2,3) when Q = 5, (5,5) when Q = 10, and
(7,8) when Q = 15) are always optimal when timing information is observable, consistent
with Proposition 3.2. However, when timing information is not observable, the structure
of the optimal allocation may differ as the total test inventory Q varies. The results in
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Figure 3.1(a) and 3.1(c) are consistent with the extreme cases of Proposition 3.6: if Q is small
compared to the demand (Q = 5), the single-store allocation (0,5) maximizes profits; if Q is
large (Q = 15), the even-split allocation (7,8) maximizes profits. Figure 3.1(b) highlights the
complexity of allocating test inventory without timing information: if Q is at a moderate
level (Q = 10), an unbalanced allocation (1,9), which allocates unequal, positive quantities
of test inventory to stores even though the stores are identical, can be optimal. Nonetheless,
the additional benefit of using the (1,9) allocation is small compared with the single-store
allocation (0,10). We find that the additional benefit of an unbalanced allocation is typically
small; also, the region for an unbalanced allocation to be optimal is typically very small.
Figure 3.1 also yields insights into the value of using timing information for demand
learning in the merchandise test. Naturally, the added value of timing information is always
positive under the same allocation of test inventory, and it decreases as Q increases. An
important observation is that the additional value of timing information hinges on the
allocation of test inventory. Figure 3.1(b) gives an example in which the use of timing
information may bring little extra value if the retailer employs a single-store rather than the
optimal even-split allocation. Interestingly, Figure 3.1(c) shows that the ex-ante expected
profit of using a single-store allocation with timing information is lower than that of using
the even-split policy without timing information. In other words, a suboptimal allocation of
test inventory may completely negate the advantage of observing sales timing information.
Figure 3.2 shows the ex-ante expected profit as a function of the total test inventory
Q under various allocation policies in a three-store example with identical stores, Poisson
demand, and a gamma prior. The parameters are the same as those used to generate
Figure 3.1 except that we increase the number of stores to N = 3. We consider the optimal
allocation when timing information is observable (i.e., the even-split allocation) and the
following four allocation policies when timing information is unobservable: (1) the single-
store policy; (2) the “two-store” policy (i.e., q = (Q2 ,
Q
2 , 0) if Q is even or q = (
Q+1
2 ,
Q−1
2 , 0)
if Q is odd); (3) the “three-store” policy, or equivalently, the even-split policy; (4) and the
optimal allocation. We obtain the optimal ex-ante expected profit for each Q value when
timing information is unobservable through an exhaustive enumeration of all allocations
satisfying q1 + q2 + q3 = Q. Again, Figure 3.2 reinforces our insights from Proposition 3.6:
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Figure 3.2: Ex-ante expected profit in a three-identical-store example as a function of total
test inventory Q under various allocation policies.
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Note. N = 3, α = 2, β = 0.4, p = 10, c = 1, T = 1.
the single-store allocation is optimal when Q is small (Q < 10) while the even-split allocation
is optimal when Q is large (Q > 30). We also find that the use of timing information may
increase the ex-ante expected profit, potentially by a significant margin when Q is limited.
The additional value of timing information diminishes as Q increases.
We further notice in Figure 3.2 that when timing information is unobservable, the
optimal ex-ante expected profit closely follows the envelope of the profits achieved by a class
of “m-store” allocations, which allocate test inventory to m out of N stores as evenly as
possible. The optimal allocation can be something other than an m-store allocation: e.g.,
neither the single-store nor the two-store allocation is optimal at Q = 11; similarly, both
the two-store and the three-store allocation are suboptimal at Q = 29. However, the loss in
the ex-ante expected profit is negligible in both cases if the retailer chooses either m-store
allocation instead of the optimal allocation. This suggests that a retailer without access to
sales timing information may start with a single-store allocation and gradually add more
stores to the test as the total test inventory increases. The intuition is that the retailer
need maintain a sufficient service level at test stores during the testing period to ensure the
quality of the collected demand observations before seeking additional observation quantity
by increasing the number of stores to test.
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3.5.3 The Service-Priority Heuristic
Given the complexity of the optimal allocation policy for test inventory even in the identical-
store case, computing the exact optimal allocation quantities appears to be out of reach for
general demand processes when timing information is unobservable. Instead, we use the
intuition uncovered in previous subsections to develop a heuristic policy for allocating the
test inventory.
We have learned in §3.5.1 and §3.5.2 that the optimal allocation policy strikes a balance
between observation quantity (i.e., number of stores to test) and quality (i.e., service level
at each store tested). We develop our heuristic with this tradeoff in mind. The idea is to
achieve a certain target service level r at as many stores as possible in period 1, where r is
a tunable parameter. For this reason, we name our heuristic the “Service-Priority” policy.
In particular, the heuristic allocates test inventory starting from store N , the store with
the lowest relative demand. The motivating logic is that the retailer can always use less
inventory to achieve the target service level r in a store with lower demand.
Let Φ−1n (r) be the inverse unconditioned cdf of demand at store n in period 1, i.e.,
Φ−1n (r) = min{x : Φn(x) ≥ r}. The algorithm of the Service-Priority policy is the following:
B Service-Priority Heuristic
n←N;
while Q > 0
qn ← min{Q,Φ−1n (r)};
Q←Q− qn;
n←n− 1;
end
The question remains how to choose the target service level r for the Service-Priority
policy. A na¨ıve method would be to arbitrarily specify a relatively high r. One could also
perform a search over a set of candidate r values to identify the r value that maximizes
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the ex-ante expected profit. In §3.6.3, we compare the performance of both methods for
choosing r.
3.6 Performance of Heuristic Policies
In this section, we evaluate the performance of the Max-Sales policy and the Service-
Priority policy proposed in §3.4.3 and §3.5.3 in an extensive numerical study. We consider
a merchandise testing problem under non-identical Poisson demand with a gamma prior
as introduced in §3.4.2. More specifically, the demand at each store n in both periods is
a Poisson process with arrival rate γnλ, where λ is unknown but γn, the relative demand
coefficient, is known. We normalize the γn’s such that
∑N
n=1 γn = 1. The prior distribution
of λ is gamma with shape and rate parameters (α, β).
We first report results for a set of two-store instances (N = 2). We choose values of
the parameters to construct a large set of instances. We vary γ1 and γ2 such that γ1/γ2
takes value in {1,2,3,4,5}. The stores are identical if γ1 = γ2 = 0.5 and are non-identical
otherwise. The shape parameter α reflects the degree of uncertainty about λ and takes
values in {1, 2, 4, 8}, indicating a coefficient of variation of λ in {1, 1√
2
, 12 ,
1√
8
}. In order to
illustrate the inventory allocations in a unified scale, we fix the total test inventory Q at
30 and vary the demand level. We choose the value of the rate parameter β such that the
expected total arrival rate E[(γ1 + γ2)λ] = E[λ] = α/β ∈ {10, 20, 30, 40, 50, 60}. The unit
selling price is fixed at p = 20, and we vary the unit purchasing cost c in {1, 2, . . . , 10} to
have a range of newsvendor ratios (p − c)/p in {0.50, 0.55, . . . , 0.95} targeted in period 2.
This gives us a set of 1,200 instances in total. We also briefly report results for a set of
N = 3 instances in §3.6.4.
Throughout the section, we denote by qσn the test inventory quantity allocated to store
n under some policy σ. We use T ∗ and NT ∗ to denote the optimal allocation policy for the
cases with and without timing information, respectively. We refer to the “optimality gap” (or
“gap”, for short) of a policy σ for a problem instance as the percentage gap with respect to
the ex-ante expected profit under the optimal allocation policy. For example, the optimally
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Figure 3.3: Comparison of the optimal test inventory allocation policies for the cases with
and without timing information (N = 2).
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Note. The area of a bubble is linear in the number of instances at the bubble’s coordinate.
gap of a policy σ when timing information is observable is given by (ΠT
∗ −Πσ)/ΠT ∗ × 100%,
where Πσ is the ex-ante expected profit of policy σ.
3.6.1 Optimal Test Inventory Allocations
For all the two-store instances, we compute through an exhaustive enumeration the optimal
quantity of test inventory allocated to store 1 when timing information is observable, qT
∗
1 ,
and that when timing information is unobservable, qNT
∗
1 . (Recall from Lemma 3.1 that
when N = 2, the optimal allocation quantities to store 2 are just Q− qT ∗1 and Q− qNT
∗
1 ,
respectively.) Figure 3.3 shows a bubble plot of (qT
∗
1 , q
NT ∗
1 ) pairs for all instances. A bubble
at (qT
∗
1 , q
NT ∗
1 ) means that there is at least one instance for which the optimal allocation
quantity for store 1 is qT∗1 if the retailer observes timing information and is qNT∗1 if the
retailer does not. The size of each bubble indicates the total number of such instances out
of the 1,200 total instances explored.
Figure 3.3 demonstrates the pronounced difference between the behavior of the optimal
allocation policy when timing information is observable and that when timing information is
unobservable. Also, we observe that qT∗1 ≥ 15 across all instances, which is consistent with
Proposition 3.2 given that our instances have γ1 ≥ γ2 and Q = 30.
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Figure 3.4: Comparison of the heuristic and the optimal allocation policies (N = 2).
0 2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20 22 24 26 28 30
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
14
16
18
20
22
24
26
28
30
qT
∗
1
q
M
S
1
(a) Timing Information Observable
0 2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20 22 24 26 28 30
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
14
16
18
20
22
24
26
28
30
qN T
∗
1
q
S
P
−
S
1
(b) Timing Information Unobservable
Note. The area of a bubble is linear in the number of instances at the bubble’s coordinate.
3.6.2 Performance of the Max-Sales Heuristic
We test the performance of the Max-Sales heuristic proposed in §3.4.3 against the optimal
allocation policy in the case where timing information is observable. Let “MS” denote the
Max-Sales policy. Figure 3.4(a) shows a bubble plot of (qT
∗
1 , q
MS
1 ) pairs for all 1,200 instances.
We observe that the bubbles are all located close to the diagonal line, implying that the
Max-Sales policy closely follows the optimal allocation policy. The maximum difference
between qT∗1 and qMS1 for an instance is 3 units—at (qT
∗
1 = 18, q
MS
1 = 15). In addition, We
compute the optimality gap of the Max-Sales policy for each instance. The average gap is
0.0007% and the maximum is only 0.01% across all 1,200 instances1. The evidence lends
strong support to the near-optimality of the Max-Sales policy when timing information is
observable.
3.6.3 Performance of the Service-Priority Heuristic
We investigate the performance of the Service-Priority heuristic proposed in §3.5.3 against
the optimal allocation policy in the case where timing information is unobservable.
1We compute all the ex-ante expected profits using Monte Carlo simulation with 1,000,000 trials. Therefore,
the extremely small optimality gaps raise a natural question whether the Max-Sales heuristic is indeed optimal
under Poisson demand with a gamma prior. We do not seem to have a proof (or an exact counterexample)
for this claim and view it as an open question.
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Figure 3.5: Optimality gaps of the Service-Priority policy with various values of target
service level r when timing information is unobservable (N = 2).
0.8 0.81 0.82 0.83 0.84 0.85 0.86 0.87 0.88 0.89 0.9 0.91 0.92 0.93 0.94 0.95 0.96 0.97 0.98 0.99 1
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
Target Service Level r
%
 O
pt
im
al
ity
 G
ap
 o
f L
ow
−D
em
an
d−
Fi
rs
t P
ol
icy
 
 
Mean
Max
We first consider the na¨ıve approach in which the retailer arbitrarily chooses a relatively
high target service level r and applies it uniformly across all instances. Figure 3.5 shows
the summary statistics of the optimality gaps of Service-Priority policies under various
specifications for the target service level r when timing information is unobservable. We
observe that as r varies from 0.80 to 0.99 in increments of 0.01, the lowest mean optimality
gap is 0.13% (achieved at r = 0.95) and the lowest maximum gap is 1.38% (achieved at
r = 0.90). These results imply that the na¨ıve variant of the Service-Priority policy can be
reasonably satisfactory as long as the retailer chooses a relatively but not extremely high r.
We then examine an alternative approach in which a search over a set of r values
is performed for each instance to find the r value that maximizes the ex-ante expected
profit. We numerically test the performance of this variant of the Service-Priority policy,
abbreviated to SP-S, with a search over r ∈ {0.50, 0.51, . . . , 0.99} for each of the 1,200
instances. Figure 3.4(b) shows a bubble plot of (qS
∗
1 ,q
SP-S
1 ) pairs for all the instances. We
observe that in most of the cases the SP-S policy closely follows the optimal policy, with
a few exceptions in which the optimal policy allocates zero units of test inventory to the
low demand store 2. In addition, we compute the optimality gap for each instance. The
average gap of the SP-S policy is only 0.05% across all 1,200 instances and the maximum
gap is 1.24%. As expected, the performance of the Service-Priority policy further improves
after we include a search for a better target service level r for each instance.
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3.6.4 Three-Store Instances
We report in this section the results for another set of instances in which N = 3. The
parameter setting is the same as in the N = 2 instances except for the relative demand
coefficients. For ease of exposition, we label the three stores H, M, and L, respectively,
which stand for relatively high, medium, and low demand. We vary their relative demand
coefficients such that γH/γL ∈ {1, 2, 3, 4, 5}. The medium demand store’s coefficient is set
at γM = (γH + γL)/2. As in the two-store instances, we also normalize the relative demand
coefficients such that γH + γM + γL = 1.
We compare the performance of the Max-Sales policy and the Service-Priority policy
with a number of benchmark heuristics. We include a set of simple heuristics, each named
with a set of the store labels, that always allocate the test inventory evenly to the stores
in its name. For example, an H policy allocates Q = 30 units of test inventory to store H,
an ML policy allocates 15 units each to store M and L, and so forth. We also include a
“Volume-Priority” policy (VP-S), a modification of the SP-S policy that gives priority to
stores with higher, instead of lower, demand for test inventory allocation. In addition, we
include the optimal policy without timing information (NT ∗) as a benchmark for the case in
which timing information is observable, and also the optimal policy with timing information
(T ∗) as a benchmark for the case in which timing information is unobservable.
The optimality gaps are plotted in Figure 3.6. When timing information is observable,
we observe that the Max-Sales performs extremely well with a mean gap of only 0.0008%
and a maximum gap of 0.01%. We also see that the H, HM, and HML policies dominate
other simple heuristics, consistent with our Proposition 3.3. In particular, we find that
the HML policy, which is the even-split policy in this N = 3 case, performs reasonably
well with a mean gap of 0.14% and a maximum gap of 0.71%. When timing information is
unobservable, the SP-S policy significantly outperforms other heuristics with a mean gap
of only 0.08% and a maximum gap of 1.30%. In addition, Figure 3.6 emphasizes again the
pivotal impact of timing information on the inventory allocation decisions for a merchandise
test. The optimal allocation policies can result in a significant loss in profit if employed
in a wrong situation. The optimality gap could be as large as 6.38% if the optimal policy
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Figure 3.6: Optimality gaps under heuristic test inventory allocation policies (N = 3).
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Note. For each policy, the box shows the median and the first and the third quartiles; all
the instances with an optimality gap below the first quartile or above the third quartile are
plotted as an circle outside the box.
without timing information were used when timing information is observable, and could be
as large as 22.06% if the optimal policy with timing information were used when timing
information is unobservable.
3.7 Concluding Remarks
This chapter uncovers new insights on the value of inventory for demand learning, in
particular, on how demand censoring, demand learning across multiple locations, and the
level of visibility into demand processes collectively impact inventory allocation decisions in
merchandise testing.
There are fundamentally two ways to improve demand estimation given a fixed time
frame to collect demand information: increasing the number, or the quantity, of the demand
observations, and improving the quality of each observation. In the case where the retailer
has a relatively coarse visibility into demand, i.e, the demand data contains only the sales
quantities and stockout statuses, a single demand observation is made at each location if
there is inventory for sale, and the quality of the observation is negatively associated with the
probability of obtaining an imperfect demand observation due to stockout. One can increase
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the observation quantity by stocking inventory at more locations, and can improve the
observation quality at a location by raising the inventory level thereat. Our results suggest
that improving the quality of each demand observation is a higher priority than seeking a
large observation quantity, especially when the total inventory is tightly constrainted. On
the contrary, if sales timing data is observable for a reconstruction of the entire demand
process, each sale transaction can be viewed as an exact demand observation. As a result,
the value of inventory in demand learning is approximately maximized by simply selling
as much inventory as possible so as to maximize the observation quantity. This generally
involves spreading inventory among more locations.
These findings have two important managerial implications for retailers that have access
to increasingly larger and richer demand data sets. First, when collecting and combining data
from multiple locations for demand estimation, inventory allocation may have a significant
impact on the outcome of demand learning. With the same amount of inventory, an inefficient
allocation can lead to a significant loss in demand information and profit. Second, how
to allocate inventory to maximizes its value in demand learning depends on the level of
visibility into the demand. In particular, the use of sales timing information considerably
reduces the need to maintain a high service level for demand learning as seen in reported
practice.
Our work suggests several avenues for future research. In our model, demand at stores
shares a common unknown parameter. Natural extensions would be to consider a hierarchical
parameter structure under which each store has an unique unknown parameter in addition
to the common parameter shared across stores. For example, Fisher and Rajaram (2000)
cluster stores using sales histories. One could view our heuristics as solutions to the problem
of inventory allocation within a store cluster; the question remains how to allocate a fixed
quantity of inventory across clusters, which can be modeled by the hierarchical parameter
structure described above. Another direction would be to consider a multi-product setting
in which the retailer learns customer preferences in addition to demand volume through
assortment experimentation. The retailer might choose to offer a full assortment with a low
service level at each store, or to offer partial assortments at distinct stores with high service
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levels. It would be interesting to examine what would be the best inventory strategy in this
setting.
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CHAPTER 4
Optimal Personalized Offering
when Customer Reviews Influence Demand
4.1 Introduction
There has been considerable growth in online retailing in recent years. The 2014 annual
report of the National Retail Federation estimated a 9-12% growth in online sales, as
opposed to a 3.6% growth in total retail sales. One of online retailers’ strengths over their
brick-and-mortar counterparts is their capability to collect consumer characteristics and
preference data. Many online retailers, e.g., Amazon.com, require customers to log in their
accounts to make purchases so as to keep track of their purchasing history. Typical flash deal
websites such as Gilt.com even require a customer to log in in order to simply browse their
sales listings. In addition to buying records, online retailers also mine real-time click-stream
data and track customers’ locations in hopes of obtaining a better understanding of their
browsing behaviors and preferences. Other informative data include consumers’ wish lists
and abandoned shopping carts. On top of these, even more personal information may become
available by encouraging individual customers to link their social network accounts. The
variety and amount of data that online retailers collect has only been growing more rapidly
with online retailers’ increased interests in embracing big data and analytics.
Another edge of online retailers over traditional retailers is the extremely low cost
and high flexibility in product listing and showcasing. Changing product assortments in a
physical retail store can be labor-intensive and costly, and customizing product offers for
individual customers is typically impossible. The story is quite different for an online retailer.
Many online retailers have invested in sophisticated analytics and personalization tools,
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and customization has become increasingly common. By personalizing their front pages,
product listings, search results, and product recommendations based on aforementioned
rich consumer preference data, online retailers essentially have the opportunity to choose
whether to offer a product to a customer. An even simpler way is to switch between the
“in-stock” and “out-of-stock” tags (Bernstein et al., 2015), despite potential controversy over
honesty and fairness.
The remote and virtual nature of online retailing also introduces significant uncertainty
about product quality to consumers. Unlike shopping in a brick-and-mortar store where
customers are able to gain hands-on experience by directly interacting with products,
customers shopping online can receive product information via only limited channels, e.g.,
texts, pictures, and occasionally videos. To reduce such uncertainty, uninformed consumers
may gather quality information from reviews generated by other peer consumers who have
purchased and experienced the product. A third distinguishing feature of online retailing
compared with brick-and-mortar retailing is the availability of these customer product
reviews. The Internet has considerably facilitated the availability of consumer-generated
reviews. Nowadays, most online retailers provide functionalities on their websites which
allow consumers to post their reviews for a purchased product. The content of a review
may range from a simple rating on a five-star scale, to as rich as a 500-word essay detailing
every aspect regarding a product. The proliferation of social media sites such as Twitter and
Facebook has opened up even more channels for consumers to share their likes and dislikes
of a product.
Reviews generated by other consumers may substantially impact consumers’ purchasing
decisions. Academic research has empirically established the link between positive reviews
and increased sales (Chevalier and Mayzlin, 2006). Product reviews can also be a valuable
input to retailers’ decision-making. Firms can use such review information to gauge consumers
attitude toward their product and adapt their management decisions. For example, online
reviews have been shown to significantly increase forecasting accuracy for motion picture
revenues (Dellarocas et al., 2007).
Motivated by both online retailers’ advantages in collecting consumer preference data
and in personalizing product offerings, and their disadvantages in increased product quality
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uncertainties, this chapter incorporates two central elements: the consumers’ ability to
collectively learn the product quality through reviews generated by their peers, and the
firm’s ability to personalize offerings based on its knowledge about individual customers’
preferences. We are interested in how an online retailer may wish to shape future demand by
expanding or restricting access of current customers to an experiential product, and thereby
influencing the trajectory of customer reviews.
Although a few papers have studied how to modulate social learning through operational
levers, including inventory and pricing decisions, little work has been done in understanding
product offering when the demand process is affected by social learning. We consider
the problem of personalized offering when consumers generate and learn product quality
information from public product reviews and the retailer monitors consumer reviews to learn
customers’ perception of the product quality. In particular, we consider a firm that sells
an experiential product at an exogenous, constant price over a finite selling season. For
each customer, the gross utility from consuming the product comprises two parts—an ex
ante observable part that we refer to as customer preference and an ex post observable part
that we refer to as product quality. The quality of the product is known to the firm but is
unknown to and learned by customers. The customer base is heterogeneous and customers
preferences for the product follow a random distribution. We assume the firm may be able to
identify the preference of an arriving customer (by analyzing the customer’s past purchasing
and online behaviors) and choose whether to offer the product to that particular customer
without incurring additional costs. Once offered, the customer purchases a unit if her ex
ante expected net utility is positive.
We model consumers’ review generation process by a stylized quasi-Bayesian social
learning process. Consumers form a belief on the unknown quality of the product and update
it as they observe reviews posted by previous buyers. By quasi-Bayesian, we mean that
customers update their belief in a Bayesian fashion except that they ignore the potential
selection biases and treat reviews as if they are randomly sampled from the entire population,
instead of from those customers who have been offered and have purchased the product. We
base our formulation upon empirical evidence on online product reviews (e.g., Li and Hitt
(2008)). Each arriving customer bases her purchasing decision on the ex ante expected net
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utility. Once they purchase, customers generate reviews based on their ex post net utilities,
namely, utilities received after they have purchased and experienced the product.
We formulate the firm’s product offering problem as a finite-horizon dynamic program.
We show that the optimal product offering policy is of a threshold type—the firm should
only offer the product for sale to customers with a higher-than-threshold preference. We
demonstrate that it can be optimal for the firm to forgo an arriving customer with a low
preference, even when it is certain that the customer will buy the product if offered, in order
to avoid a review that will negatively impact future sales. While our base model assumes no
capacity or inventory constraints, we extend our analysis to the setting in which the firm
has a limited inventory upfront.
In an numerical analysis to follow, we investigate the impact of the product price and
consumers’ mean belief and uncertainties about product quality on the optimal product
offering decisions and on the potential value of personalized offerings. We find that personal-
ized offering may significantly improve profit, especially in settings in which the product
price is high and customers are optimistic but uncertain about product quality.
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. In §4.2 we review the relevant
literature. In §4.3, we describe our model framework. §4.4 presents analysis on the social
learning process and optimal inventory policies in a setting with ample supply, whereas
§4.5 extends the analysis to the problem with a limited inventory. We conduct a numerical
analysis in §4.6 to understand the value of personalized offering. In §4.7, we conclude the
chapter with discussions and future research directions.
4.2 Literature Review
Product reviews have long received attention in the marketing literature. Most of this line
of work focuses on studying the effect of product reviews on sales of experiential products.
Findings are mixed on the association between product reviews and sales. There are empirical
studies showing that positive reviews are associated with higher sales, while negative reviews
may hurt sales of experiential goods (Chevalier and Mayzlin, 2006; Dellarocas et al., 2007).
Some other papers do not find statistically significant relationships (Duan et al., 2008; Liu,
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2006). This stream of literature centers on how online product reviews drive consumer choice
behaviors, whereas our focus is on how firms should adaptively manage inventory in the
presence of such a review-driven demand process.
Our work also connects to the social learning literature as late consumers learn quality
information from early consumers through public product reviews. Our social learning
process occurs when buyers report their ex post utilities, which is in line with the empirical
work of Godes and Silva (2012), and the theoretical framework in Papanastasiou et al. (2014),
Besbes and Scarsini (2014), and Ifrach et al. (2015). In these papers as in this chapter,
consumers’ purchasing decisions are non-informative of the product quality. This contrasts
with the settings in Banerjee (1992) and Bikhchandani et al. (1992), in which social learning
occurs when agents observe their predecessors’ ex ante actions.
A growing stream of literature studies how firms can modulate social learning through
their operational decisions. The majority of this literature focuses on pricing decisions
when customer behavior is driven by social learning processes. Ifrach et al. (2012) consider
monopoly pricing when buyers report whether their experience is positive or negative,
and subsequent customers learn from these reports according to an intuitive non-Bayesian
rule. Jing (2011), Papanastasiou and Savva (2014), and Yu et al. (2013) analyze dynamic
pricing policies when forward-looking consumers may strategically delay their purchases
in anticipation of product reviews. The literature is rather limited on inventory control
in the presence of social learning. Papanastasiou et al. (2014) provides an explanation for
early-supply shortage strategies in the presence of quasi-Bayesian social learning.
This chapter is also related to the assortment planning literature. For a thorough review,
readers are referred to Ko¨k et al. (2015). This literature generally considers a firm’s optimal
choice of a subset of multiple products to offer. In this regard, our problem can be seen as
a special single-product assortment planning problem with only two assortment options,
offering or not offering the product. Two papers on dynamic assortment customization are
specifically relevant. Bernstein et al. (2015) consider a retailer selling identically-priced,
substitutable products to a heterogeneous customer base. The firm is able to identify
arriving customers’ types and to customize the assortment seen by each arriving customer.
They find it may be optimal for the retailer facing low inventory levels to reserve product
74
for customers with stronger preferences. Golrezaei et al. (2014) propose algorithms for
optimally personalizing assortment for each arriving customer with the availability of real-
time consumer characteristics data. Both papers find that personalization leads to significant
improvements in revenue, but none considers a demand process governed by a social learning
process.
4.3 Model
In this section, we describe our model framework for the firm’s optimal offering problem.
Consider a firm selling an experiential product over T periods, indexed by T , T − 1, . . ., 1.
We assume that the product’s unit price p > 0 is exogenously given and constant throughout
T periods. For simplicity, we assume a constant stream of customer arrivals; one customer
arrives each period, and each purchases at most one unit of the product.
4.3.1 Consumers
A representative customer i’s gross utility from consuming the product consists of two
components, θi and q. The term θi represents a customer’s idiosyncratic preference—utility
derived from observable product features before purchase (e.g., product brand) and is known
to the consumer ex ante. Customers are heterogenous in their preferences. We assume
that θi’s in the population follow a Normal distribution with θi ∼ N (µθ, σ2θ). The density
function is denoted by fΘ(·), the distribution function by FΘ(·) and the complementary
distribution function by FΘ(·) := 1− FΘ(·). The distribution FΘ(·) is assumed to be known
to both the firm and customers.
The term q represents the product’s quality—utility derived from attributes which are
unobservable before purchase (e.g., product usability) and is referred to generically as the
product’s quality for customer i; q is known by the firm but is ex ante unknown and is
learned by the consumer only after purchasing and experiencing the product. For ease of
exposition, we assume away randomness in consumers’ ex post quality perceptions; namely,
all customers perceive exactly q as the product’s underlying quality after consuming the
product.
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Consumers hold a common prior belief over q, which summarizes their initial perception
on the product quality. We assume this belief to be a Normal random variable QˆT where
QˆT ∼ N (qˆT , σ2T ). Customers update their belief over q as customer reviews accumulate. We
will elaborate on this belief updating process in the sections to follow.
We assume customers to be risk-neutral utility-maximizers. Customer i with a non-
negative ex ante expected utility, i.e., qˆ + θi − p ≥ 0, is willing to buy a unit of the product.
Once she purchases, customer i derives a net utility of θi + q − p from purchasing and
experiencing the product. We do not consider in our model strategic customers who delay
purchasing to wait for more information about the product quality; each arriving customer
leaves permanently regardless of her purchasing decision.
Review Generation. Each buyer i generates a review of the product that is viewable
by the firm and all customers yet to arrive. Empirical evidence has shown that product
reviews may be systematically biased by customers’ idiosyncratic preferences. To capture
this effect, we assume that a buyer i simply (and truthfully) reports her net utility q+ θi− p,
or equivalently, generates a review ri = q + θi − µθ, as both p and µθ are assumed to be
common knowledge. We note that reviews are sampled only from customers who are offered
the product and who purchase, not from the entire population. As a result, reviews do not
necessarily follow a N (q, σ2θ) distribution.
Social Learning of q. Consumers collectively learn the underlying product quality q by
monitoring reviews generated by previous buyers. A rational customer would update her
belief using Bayes rule. However, a full Bayesian updating would require customers to
keep track of the entire review history, to process it, and to anticipate the firm’s offering
policy, which is numerically challenging even for computers, and thus arguably impractical
for customers to perform, considering the large amount of cognitive processing power it
demands (see Appendix C.7 for a derivation of Bayesian updating that accounts for the
selection bias induced by customer purchasing). Indeed, there is empirical support that
online product reviews are subject to self-selection biases (Li and Hitt, 2008).
For the above reasons, in our model we take a quasi-Bayesian approach to model
customers’ belief updating process. More specifically, we assume that customers ignore
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the selection bias and update their belief as if reviews are i.i.d. sampled from the entire
population, i.e., reviews follow a N (q, σ2θ) distribution. Under this assumption, the belief
updating could be carried out according to the usual parametric Bayesian paradigm. Let Qˆt
denote consumers’ common belief at the beginning of period t. Following Bayes rule, Qˆt is
Normal; in particular, Qˆt ∼ N (qˆt, σ2t ), with
qˆt =
σ2θ qˆT + σ
2
TRt
σ2θ + stσ
2
T
and σ2t =
σ2θσ
2
T
σ2θ + stσ
2
T
,
where Rt is the sum of reviews generated prior to period t and st the cumulative sales.
It is convenient in our problem setting to use mean belief qˆt and cumulative sales st as
sufficient statistics for belief updating. Suppose that a customer with preference θi buys a
unit of the product in period t and generates a review ri = q + θi − µθ. Then, the updated
qˆt−1 and st−1 for period t− 1 are given by
qˆt−1 = u(qˆt, st, θ) :=
qˆt(σ
2
θ + stσ
2
T ) + (q + θ − µθ)σ2T
σ2θ + (st + 1)σ
2
T
,
st−1 = st + 1.
(4.1)
We define the mean belief updating function u(qˆ, s, θ) as a function of θ from the firm’s
perspective, as θ is essentially revealed to the firm after a customer posts a review r = q + θ,
since we assume that the firm knows the value of q. This parameterization also proves useful
in our analysis of the problem to come. From the customers’ perspective, the updating is
also valid by treating q + θ − µθ as a single term. In addition, we remark that customers’
belief remains unchanged, i.e.,
qˆt−1 = qˆt and st−1 = st.
if a customer does not make a purchases. In other words, a non-purchase is non-informative
for customers to learn the true value of q. Intuitively, this is because when a customer makes
a purchasing decision, she has no additional knowledge of q beyond the common belief.
We summarize in Lemma 4.1 some basic properties of the mean belief updating function
u(qˆ, s, θ).
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Lemma 4.1. The following hold for all s = 0, 1 . . . ,:
(a) u(qˆ, s, θ) is increasing in qˆ;
(b) u(qˆ, s, θ) is increasing in θ;
(c) u(qˆ, s, µθ + qˆ − q) = qˆ.
All the proofs can be found in Appendix C. Parts (a) and (b) of Lemma 4.1 show that
consumers’ posterior mean belief increases with their prior mean belief on q as well as the
reviewer’s preference. Part (c) provides a threshold value on consumers’ preferences. An
immediate corollary of part (b) and (c) is that a review generated by a customer with
preference higher than µθ + qˆ − q will raise consumers’ posterior mean belief; otherwise,
customers’ mean belief decreases.
4.3.2 The Firm
A unique feature of our model is that the firm is allowed to personalize whether to offer the
product to each individual customer. As is discussed in the introduction, this is rarely a
viable option for traditional brick-and-mortar retailers but is increasingly adopted by online
retailers through customized product listings, search results, and other methods. The firm
seeks to maximize its expected total profit over the entire selling season by choosing whether
to offer the product for sale to each arriving customer. As mentioned previously, we assume
the firm knows the (exogenously determined) true value of q. We denote by ot ∈ {0, 1} the
firm’s offering decision for period t, where ot = 1 indicates that the firm chooses to offer the
product for sale to the arriving customer. In our base model, we assume that the firm has
ample supply of the product. We will discuss in §4.5 the case in which the firm has only a
limited inventory to sell.
An implicit assumption we make is that customers also ignore the potential bias in
reviews induced by the firm’s offering policy. That is, customers treat reviews as if they
are randomly sampled from the entire population, instead of customers who are willing to
purchase and are offered the product by the firm.
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4.4 Analysis
4.4.1 Unobservable Customer Preference Information – A Benchmark
As the first step of our analysis, we consider a benchmark case in which individual customers’
preferences are not revealed to the firm at their time of arrival. In other words, the firm
only knows that an arriving customer’s preference θi is a random draw from distribution
FΘ(·). Practically, this corresponds to traditional situations in which the firm may lack or
otherwise not use customers’ personal information.
We formulate the firm’s optimal offering problem as a finite-horizon dynamic program
(DP). Let Vt(qˆ, s) be the optimal expected profit with t periods left, consumers’ mean belief
qˆ on q, and cumulative sales s. Then, the Bellman equations are given by
Vt(qˆ, s) = max
ot∈{0,1}
ot ·
{
FΘ(p− qˆ)Vt−1(qˆ, s) +
∫ ∞
p−qˆ
[p+ Vt−1(u(qˆ, s, θ), s+ 1)]dFΘ(θ)
}
+ (1− ot) · Vt−1(qˆ, s),
with terminal value functions V0(qˆ, s) = 0.
Denote by o∗t (qˆ, s) the firm’s optimal offering decision for period t given consumer mean
belief qˆ and cumulative sales s. We show in Lemma 4.2 that it is optimal for the firm to
offer the product to every arriving customer. This is not surprising given that the firm is
not able to differentiate one customer from another when making offering decisions. We call
this an “offer-to-all” policy and will use it as a benchmark in our numerical analysis in §4.6
when the firm has access to individual customers’ preferences.
For the case in which the firm does not observe individual customer preferences,
Lemma 4.2. o∗t (qˆ, s) = 1 for all t, qˆ, and s.
4.4.2 Observable Customer Preference Information
In this subsection, we consider the case in which the firm has knowledge of each arriving
customer’s preference. Specifically, we assume that the firm knows the exact value of each
arriving customer’s idiosyncratic preference θi. The implication of this assumption, given the
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review-generating process in our model, is that the firm knows exactly whether an arriving
customer i with common mean belief qˆ will make a purchase (qˆ+ θi− p ≥ 0), and the review
she would generate (ri = q + θi − µθ) if she buys. Although highly stylized, this assumption
simplifies our exposition while capturing a key feature in our problem setting that the firm
possesses information for identifying individual customers’ preferences. In addition, our
main results can be generalized to the more general case in which the firm observes θ plus a
zero-mean Gaussian random noise. As the insights generated are qualitatively similar, we
do not present this general case for expositional simplicity.
Dynamic Program. Similar to the benchmark problem in §4.4.1, we formulate the firm’s
optimal product offering problem as a finite-horizon DP. The firm’s objective is to maximize
the expected total profit over T periods. With a slight abuse of notation, let Vt(qˆ, s, θ) be
the optimal expected total profit with t periods left, consumers’ mean belief qˆ, cumulative
sales s, and the arriving customer’s preference θ. If the arriving customer with preference
θ has a negative expected net utility, i.e., θ + qˆ − p < 0, she does not buy the product.
The firm collects no revenue and customers do not update their common belief on q. The
next arriving customer’s preference will be a random variable Θ following the preference
distribution FΘ(·). If the arriving customer’s expected net utility is positive, she will make
a purchase as long as the firm offers the product for sale. In that case, the firm collects
revenue p, and consumers update their common belief according to (4.1), in response to the
review generated by the buying customer. In summary, the value functions Vt(qˆ, s, θ) are
given by
Vt(qˆ, s, θ) =

EΘVt−1(qˆ, s,Θ), θ + qˆ − p < 0,
max{p+ EΘVt−1(u(qˆ, s, θ), s+ 1,Θ),EΘVt−1(qˆ, s,Θ)}, θ + qˆ − p ≥ 0.
(4.2)
for t = T, T − 1, . . . , 1, with V0(qˆ, s, θ) = 0 for all qˆ, s, and θ.
Optimal Offering Policy. Let o∗t (qˆ, s, θ) ∈ {0, 1} be the optimal offering decision with t
periods left, customers’ mean belief qˆ, and arriving customer’s preference θ, where o∗t (qˆ, s, θ) =
1 indicates that retailer chooses to offer the product and o∗t (qˆ, s, θ) = 1 otherwise. We use the
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convention that o∗t (qˆ, s, θ) ≡ 0 whenever θ+ qˆ− p < 0. In the following proposition, we show
monotonicity properties of the value functions, which we subsequently use to characterize
the form of the optimal offering policy.
Proposition 4.1. The following hold:
(a) Vt(qˆ1, s, θ) ≤ Vt(qˆ2, s, θ) for any qˆ1 < qˆ2, t = 0, . . . , T , s = 0, . . . , T − t, and all θ.
(b) Vt(qˆ, s, θ1) ≤ Vt(qˆ, s, θ2) for any θ1 < θ2, t = 0, . . . , T , s = 0, . . . , T − t, and qˆ ∈ R.
(c) There exists a series of functions, {θ∗t (qˆ, s), t = 1, . . . , T}, on R such that o∗t (qˆ, s, θ) = 1
if θ ≥ θ∗t (qˆ, s), and o∗t (qˆ, s, θ) = 0 otherwise.
Proposition 4.1(a) and (b) show that the optimal expected total profit increases with
consumers’ mean belief and the arriving customer’s preference. These monotone properties
are consistent with the intuition that higher mean belief/preference leads to not only a higher
revenue from the arriving customers but also a higher mean belief for future customers.
Proposition 4.1(c) characterizes the firm’s optimal offering policy to be of a threshold
type. The threshold θ∗t (qˆ, s) separates the potential arriving customers in period t into two
segments; to maximize profit, the firm should only offer the product for sale to customers
who have a preference higher than θ∗t (qˆ, s).
We remark that the optimal offering thresholds may be non-trivial. Recall that a
customer with preference θ and common mean belief qˆ will buy if qˆ + θ − p ≥ 0, or
equivalently, if θ ≥ p − qˆ. Therefore, a constant threshold θ∗t (qˆ, s) ≡ p − qˆ would simply
imply an offer-to-all policy. However, as will be evident in our numerical illustrations, θ∗t (qˆ, s)
can be greater than p− qˆ. Such a threshold value would mean that it can be optimal for
the firm to “conceal” the product from an arriving customer, even if the firm is aware that
the particular customer will purchase the product if offered. The underlying reason for
the firm to forgo the immediate, guaranteed revenue is to avoid the negative externality
of offering the product to a low-preference customer. Accompanied with a revenue of p, a
low-preference customer also generates a low product review, which may decrease consumers’
mean belief and thus decrease the expected revenue from future customers.
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Moreoever, with Proposition 4.1(c), we are able to simplify the firm’s problem by
dropping θ as a state variable. Define Gt(qˆ, s) := EΘVt(qˆ, s,Θ), where Gt(qˆ, s) is the firm’s
expected optimal profit in anticipation of a customer arriving in period t, with consumers’
mean belief being qˆ and the cumulative sale s. We can rewrite the DP in (4.2) as
Gt(qˆ, s) = max
θt≥p−qˆ
FΘ(θt)Gt−1(qˆ, s) +
∫ ∞
θt
[p+Gt−1(u(qˆ, s, θ), s+ 1)]dFΘ(θ)
= max
θt≥p−qˆ
FΘ(θt)Gt−1(qˆ, s) + pFΘ(θt) +
∫ ∞
θt
Gt−1(u(qˆ, s, θ), s+ 1)dFΘ(θ)
= FΘ(θ
∗
t (qˆ, s))Gt−1(qˆ, s) + pFΘ(θ
∗
t (qˆ, s)) +
∫ ∞
θ∗t (qˆ,s)
Gt−1(u(qˆ, s, θ), s+ 1)dFΘ(θ)
with terminal value functions G0(qˆ, s) = 0 for all qˆ and s.
With the above simplified notation, we further characterize the optimal offering threshold
θ∗t (qˆ, s) in Proposition 4.2.
Proposition 4.2. Let θ0t (qˆ, s) be the unique solution to the equation
Gt−1(qˆ, s)−Gt−1(u(qˆ, s, θ), s+ 1) = p, (4.3)
if it exists. Then, θ∗t (qˆ, s) = max{p− qˆ, θ0t (qˆ, s)} if θ0t (qˆ, s) exists. Otherwise, θ∗t (qˆ, s) = p− qˆ.
Proposition 4.2 reveals the key tradeoff the firm faces when making its offering decision
for each arriving customer. The solution to Equation (4.3), θ0t (qˆ, s), if it exists, strikes a
balance between the firm’s immediate return, the selling price p, and the expected marginal
return from skipping a low-value customer and maintaining a high mean belief for future
customers. We note that θ0t (qˆ, s) may not exist at all: a straightforward example is when
t = 1, as G0(qˆ, s) = 0 for all qˆ and s. Indeed, the firm should offer the product to the last
customer whenever she is willing to buy. When θ0t (qˆ, s) does not exist, it means that the
future benefit of not offering the product to a potential buying customer never outweighs the
immediate revenue; as a result, the optimal decision is to offer the product to all customers.
Similarly, if θ0t (qˆ, s) does exists but is below the buying threshold p− qˆ, there are customers
with low enough preferences to justify a no-offering decision as a result of their negative
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externality on future sales through social learning; however, such customers will not purchase
due to their low preferences.
The following proposition indicates that the firm’s optimal offering region shrinks as t
increases.
Proposition 4.3. θ∗t (qˆ, s) ≤ θ∗t+1(qˆ, s) for t = 0, . . . , T − 1, qˆ ∈ R and s = 0, . . . , T − t.
The intuition behind Proposition 4.3 is as follows. As the selling horizon lengthens,
so does the marginal benefit of personalized offering, since the number of affected future
customers increases. To illustrate, with t+ 1 periods left, if the firm chooses the optimal
threshold for a t-period problem, θ∗t (qˆ, s), the firm’s marginal immediate profit loss remains
unchanged as in a t-period problem, whereas the marginal future profit gain increases due
to the additional period at the end to sell the product. Therefore, by (weakly) increasing
the offering threshold from θ∗t (qˆ, s) and thus offering to a smaller segment of customers in
the current period, the firm re-strikes a balance between an increased its marginal profit
loss and the marginal future profit gain.
4.5 Limited Inventory
In this section, we extend our analysis to the case in which the firm has a fixed quantity
of inventory, I ∈ Z+, at the beginning of the selling season. The firm has no additional
replenishment opportunity throughout the T -period horizon. We note that this problem
reduces to an unlimited inventory problem when I ≥ T , and our results in §4.4.2 immediately
follow.
We incorporate the inventory constraint into the DP in Equation (4.2) by including
inventory level x as an additional state variable. In particular, let Vt(qˆ, s, x, θ) be the optimal
expected total profit with t periods left, consumers’s mean belief qˆ, cumulative sales s,
inventory level x, and the arriving customer’s preference θ. The Bellman equations are given
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by
Vt(qˆ, s, x, θ) =

EΘVt−1(qˆ, s, x,Θ), θ + qˆ − p < 0 or x = 0,
max{p+ EΘVt−1(u(qˆ, s, θ), s+ 1, x− 1,Θ),
EΘVt−1(qˆ, s, x,Θ)}, θ + qˆ − p ≥ 0 and x > 0.
(4.4)
for t = T, T − 1, . . . , 1, with V0(qˆ, s, x, θ) = 0 for all qˆ, s, x, and θ.
In a similar fashion to Proposition 4.1, we derive monotone properties of function
Vt(qˆ, s, x, θ) and subsequently the form of the optimal offering policy.
Proposition 4.4. The following hold:
(a) Vt(qˆ1, s, x, θ) ≤ Vt(qˆ2, s, x, θ) for any qˆ1 < qˆ2, t = 0, . . . , T , s = 0, . . . , T − t, and all θ.
(b) Vt(qˆ, s, x, θ) ≤ Vt(qˆ, s, x+ 1, θ) for x = 0, . . ., all qˆ, s, and θ;
(c) Vt(qˆ, s, x, θ1) ≤ Vt(qˆ, s, x, θ2) for any θ1 < θ2, t = 0, . . . , T , s = 0, . . . , T − t, and qˆ ∈ R.
(d) There exists a series of functions, {θ∗t (qˆ, s, x), t = 1, . . . , T}, such that o∗t (qˆ, s, x, θ) = 1
if θ ≥ θ∗t (qˆ, s, x), and that o∗t (qˆ, s, x, θ) = 0 otherwise.
While Proposition 4.4(a), (c) and (d) do not change qualitatively from their counterparts
in Proposition 4.1, Proposition 4.4(b) suggests that the optimal expected profit is also
monotonically increasing in the inventory level x.
Again, we see that the optimal offering policy is of the threshold type in the presence
of an inventory constraint. The optimal offering thresholds are functions that depend on
inventory level x, in addition to t, qˆ, and s.
Similarly, we are able to simplify the firm’s problem by dropping θ as a state variable.
Define Gt(qˆ, s, x) := EΘVt(qˆ, s, x,Θ), where Gt(qˆ, s, x) is the firm’s expected optimal profit
in anticipation of a customer arriving in period t, with consumers’ mean belief qˆ, cumulative
sales s, and inventory level x. We rewrite the DP in (4.4) as
Gt(qˆ, s, x) = max
θt≥p−qˆ
FΘ(θt)Gt−1(qˆ, s, x) +
∫ ∞
θt
[p+Gt−1(u(qˆ, s, θ), s+ 1, x− 1)]dFΘ(θ)
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= max
θt≥p−qˆ
FΘ(θt)Gt−1(qˆ, s, x) + pFΘ(θt) +
∫ ∞
θt
Gt−1(u(qˆ, s, θ), s+ 1, x− 1)dFΘ(θ)
= FΘ(θ
∗
t (qˆ, s, x))Gt−1(qˆ, s, x) + pFΘ(θ
∗
t (qˆ, s, x))
+
∫ ∞
θ∗t (qˆ,s,x)
Gt−1(u(qˆ, s, θ), s+ 1, x− 1)dFΘ(θ)
for x > 0, with terminal value functions G0(qˆ, s, x) = 0 for all qˆ and s, and Gt(qˆ, s, 0) = 0
for all t, qˆ, and s by noticing that the expected profit is zero with no inventory to sell.
With the above simplified notation, we characterize the optimal offering threshold
θ∗t (qˆ, s, x) in Proposition 4.5, which extends Proposition 4.2 to a limited inventory setting.
Proposition 4.5. Let θ0t (qˆ, s, x) be the unique solution to the equation
Gt−1(qˆ, s, x)−Gt−1(u(qˆ, s, θ), s+ 1, x− 1) = p, (4.5)
if it exists. Then, θ∗t (qˆ, s, x) = max{p − qˆ, θ0t (qˆ, s, x)} if θ0t (qˆ, s, x) exists. Otherwise,
θ∗t (qˆ, s, x) = p− qˆ.
In the following, we analyze the optimal offering threshold θ∗t (qˆ, s, x) as a function of
the selling horizon t as well as the inventory level x. We show in Proposition 4.6 that the
optimal offering region shrinks as t or x increases.
Proposition 4.6. The following hold:
(a) θ∗t (qˆ, s, x) ≤ θ∗t+1(qˆ, s, x) for x = 0, 1, . . ., all qˆ and s;
(b) θ∗t (qˆ, s, x) ≤ θ∗t (qˆ, s, x+ 1) for x = 0, 1, . . ., all t and s;
Proposition 4.6(a) shows that with more time left to sell the product, the firm should
be more selective in product offering; that is, the firm should offer the product to a smaller
segment of high-preference customers with the same consumer belief and leftover inventory.
This confirms that our finding in Proposition 4.3 continues to hold with a limited inventory.
Proposition 4.6(b) suggests that the firm should be more selective in product offering
with more leftover inventory, holding the consumer belief and selling horizon constant. This
conforms with our intuition that more inventory corresponds to more selling opportunities,
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hence a stronger incentive to personalize offerings. We remark that this result is contrary to
findings in the classic revenue management literature that the firm should be less selective
(i.e., reduce price in a dynamic pricing context) with more leftover inventory (Elmaghraby
and Keskinocak, 2003).
We also note that Proposition 4.6 links the optimal threshold for the limited inventory
problem to that for the unlimited inventory problem by providing a lower and an upper
bound for the former with the latter. Particularly, it follows straightforwardly that θ∗x(qˆ, s) =
θ∗x(qˆ, s, x) ≤ θ∗t (qˆ, s, x) ≤ θ∗t (qˆ, s, t) = θ∗t (qˆ, s), where θ∗x(qˆ, s) and θ∗t (qˆ, s) are the optimal
offering thresholds for an x- and t-period unlimited inventory problem, respectively (recall
that x ≤ t). That is, for a t-period problem with x units of inventory, solving a t-period
problem with unlimited inventory gives an upper bound on the optimal offering threshold,
whereas solving an x-period problem with unlimited inventory yields a lower bound.
4.6 Numerical Analysis
In this section, we conduct a numerical analysis in order to obtain a deeper understanding
of the optimal product offering problem with customer preference and review information.
We first describe in §4.6.1 how we parameterize the problem and vary the model parameters.
Then in §4.6.2, we examine the value of personalized offering and demonstrate how the
optimal offering policy behaves under different parameter settings.
4.6.1 Parameter Settings
We simplify our model parameterization by focusing on three derived parameters—initial
belief mean qˆT , nominal purchasing probability β := P(Θ + q − p ≥ 0) = FΘ(p − q), and
uncertainty ratio γ := σT /σθ. We normalize q = 0 throughout our numerical analysis without
loss of generality. As a result, qˆT represents consumers’ relative expectation on product
quality: a positive (negative) qˆT value indicates that customers have an expectation on
quality that is higher (lower) than the actual quality of the product.
We define the nominal purchasing probability, β, to be the probability that a random
customer is willing to buy the product if the consumer mean belief qˆ = q = 0. One can
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interpret β as a normalized proxy for price p. We let β take values in {0.9, 0.5, 0.1},
corresponding to a relatively low, medium, and high price, respectively.
The uncertainty ratio γ reflects consumers’ level of uncertainty about the unknown
product quality. The higher the value of γ, the more susceptible is the consumers’ mean
belief to be affected by reviews. We choose the value of γ from {0.5, 1, 2}. In addition, we
fix µθ = 3 and σ
2
θ = 1 to allow for low nominal purchasing probabilities β’s with price still
being positive.
We perform the analysis for the unlimited inventory problem with T = 10, 20, 50 and
the limited inventory problem with T = 50 and I = 10, 20, 50. We do not observe qualitative
difference among these parameter settings. Therefore, in the following we only report our
results for the unlimited inventory problem with T = 10.
4.6.2 The Value of Personalized Offering
We have discussed in Section 4.4.1 the “offer-to-all” policy, a benchmark product offering
policy that simply offers the product to all arriving customers. We have also demonstrated
its optimality in settings in which the firm does not observe individual customers’ preferences.
In this subsection, we investigate the value of personalized offering with customer review and
preference information by comparing the performance of the optimal offering policy with
that of the “offer-to-all” benchmark. Recall that GT (qˆ, 0) is the optimal expected total profit
of a T -period problem with consumers’ prior mean belief qˆ. Let GoT (qˆ, 0) denote the expected
total profit of the same problem under the offer-to-all benchmark policy. To evaluate the
value of personalized offering over the traditional practice of offering to the entire customer
base, we compute the percentage profit gain by using personalized offering across a set of
numerical examples. In particular, the metric that we use is given by
(
1− GoT (qˆ,0)GT (qˆ,0)
)
× 100%.
We plot in Figure 4.1 the percentage profit gain from personalized offering as a function
of qˆ under various β and γ values. We also show in Figure 4.2 the optimal offering threshold
for the first arriving customer in a T -period problem, θ∗T (qˆT , 0), as a function of consumers
initial mean belief qˆT . The thin lines represent customers purchasing thresholds θ = p− qˆT ,
which correspond to offering threshold for the offer-to-all policies. We observe that in general
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Figure 4.1: Percentage profit gain from personalized offering.
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Figure 4.2: Optimal offering threshold θ∗T (qˆ, 0).
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the firm optimally chooses not to offer the product when consumers’ mean belief is high but
the arriving customer’s preference is low.
The Impact of qˆ. We observe that personalized offering seems to be most valuable for
moderately positive qˆ values, that is, when customers hold an initial expectation that is
slightly higher than the product’s true quality. Figure 4.1 shows that the potential profit
gain from personalized offering can be more than 10% over an offer-to-all policy.
The value of personalized offering diminishes as qˆT becomes either negative or very large.
When qˆT is low, customers have a low expectation on product quality. As a result, only
customers with a high preference will purchase, and the generated reviews will only boost up
consumers’ mean belief on quality. In this case, the firm tends to adopt an offer-to-all policy
as the immediate revenue and future expected sales are aligned rather than conflicted. This
is reflected in Figure 4.2(b). When qˆT is high, customers’ expectation on product quality
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becomes so high that even offering the product to a low-preference customer will not bring
down customers’ expectation enough to negate future purchases. For example, Figure 4.2(b)
shows that as qˆT increases, the optimal offering threshold falls below µθ−3σθ = 0 for β = 0.9
and γ = 2; the firm is offering the product to essentially all customers.
The Impact of β. The value of personalized offering seems to decrease with β, or equiva-
lently, to increase with price. As shown in Figure 4.1, its value almost vanishes at β = 0.9,
which translates into a low price tag with a 90% purchasing probability when customers
know the true quality q. The value is most significant at β = 0.1, which corresponds to a
high price with only a 10% purchasing probability.
The intuition is as follows. When the price is low, most customers will buy regardless of
a low expectation on product quality. Therefore, the benefit of personalized offering is small.
On the contrary, when the price is high, an increase in customers’ quality expectation will
significantly increase the purchasing probability of an arriving customer. Hence, the value of
personalized offering increases. We observe in Figure 4.2(b) that the firm tends to be more
selective in its offerings as price increases, or, as β decreases.
The Impact of γ. Figure 4.1 shows that personalized offering is most valuable when γ is
large; that is, when consumers are very uncertain about their belief on the product quality.
A large γ implies that customers’ mean belief is easily changed in response to reviews.
Therefore, personalized offering makes a big difference. However, when γ is small, reviews
hardly affect customers’ belief about quality. As a result, the benefit of withholding product
from customers goes down.
Figure 4.2(a) displays how the value of γ affects the optimal offering threshold with a
fixed β = 0.1. For a fixed price, the optimal offering region shrinks as γ increases. Note that
the optimal offering policy approaches the offer-to-all benchmark policy as γ decreases from
2 to 0.5.
To summarize, our numerical analysis shows that personalized offering may be most
prominent and also may provide its highest benefit when the price is high and when consumers
have a moderately optimistic but highly uncertain expectation on the underlying quality of
the product.
89
4.7 Concluding Remarks
In this chapter, we have considered a firm that maximizes its profit by personalizing
product offering decisions for a sequence of arriving customers based on their observable and
heterogeneous preferences. Customers collectively learn product quality by updating their
common belief based on product reviews generated by previous buyers. We characterize
that the optimal offering policy is of threshold type. Our most important finding is that the
optimal offering threshold can be higher than consumers’ purchasing threshold; that is, it can
be optimal for the firm not to offer the product for sale, even knowing the arriving customer is
willing to buy. The decision to offer the product involves a key tradeoff between an immediate
profit loss versus the marginal expected future sales from maintaining a high mean belief.
We remark that both features in our model—that the firm can observe individual customer
preferences and that customers learn product quality through reviews—are essential for our
main results to hold. Removing either will immediately trivialize the problem, making an
offer-to-all policy optimal.
Our work suggests several directions for future research. It would be interesting to
endogenize the initial inventory level I and/or the selling price p as decision variables and to
analyze the joint optimal pricing, inventory ordering, and product offering policy. Another
natural avenue to pursue is to extend the problem to a multi-product setting. In this case, the
problem closely resembles classic dynamic assortment planning problems, but with a demand
process that can be affected by customer reviews. It would be particularly valuable to
explore whether and how the firm would benefit from personalizing assortment for individual
customers in the presence of substitution and complementarity among products.
Our results rely on the assumption that customers are not fully rational in updating
their belief over product quality. In interpreting previous customer reviews, they do not
adjust for the selection bias due to customer purchasing decisions nor for the selection bias
due to the firm’s product offering policy. Our numerical analysis has been able to isolate and
showcase the effect and the value of personalized offering. However, it remains an intriguing
question whether our results extend to other customer learning schemes that may be able to
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correct for selection biases due to purchasing (e.g., Besbes and Scarsini, 2014), or even those
due to the adoption of personalized offerings.
We have considered a simplified model for consumer behaviors in which all customers are
homogeneous in terms of their beliefs and behaviors except for their individual preferences.
In reality, customers may be more diverse in their ways of generating and interpreting
product reviews. For instance, customers may subject to “under-reporting” biases in reviews
as people tend to write reviews only when they are either extremely satisfied or extremely
unsatisfied (Hu et al., 2009); previously posted reviews may affect customers’ decisions on
whether and what to contribute (Moe and Schweidel, 2012). As a result, it is worthwhile
to check the validity of our results under richer consumer behavior models that are able to
capture such effects.
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APPENDIX A
Proofs of Results in Chapter 2
A.1 Proof of Proposition 2.2
Proof. y∗t (pit) is the solution to
Ht(x|pit) = −p+ (h+ p)Φ(x|pit) + αEDt|pit
[
∂Ct+1
∂x
(x−Dt|pit ◦Dt)
]
= −c.
For t = T ,
∂CT+1
∂x (·|·) = 0, thus HT (y∗T (piT )|piT ) = −p + (h + p)Φ(y∗T (piT )|piT ) = −c, or
Φ(y∗T (piT )|piT ) = p−cp+h = Φ(yMT |piT ), namely, yMT (piT ) = y∗T (piT ). One can show that due to
the convexity of Ct+1(·|·),
EDt|pit
[
∂Ct+1
∂x
(x−Dt|pit ◦Dt)
]
≥ −c,
therefore for t = 1, . . . , T − 1,
Ht(y
∗
t (pit)|pit) = −p+ (h+ p)Φ(y∗t (pit)|pit) + αEDt|pit
[
∂Ct+1
∂x
(x−Dt|pit ◦Dt)
]
≥ −p+ (h+ p)Φ(y∗t (pit)|pit)− αc.
Since y∗t (pit) satisfies Ht(y∗t (pit)|pit) = −c, we have
Φ(y∗t (pit)|pit) ≤
p− (1− α)c
p+ h
= Φ(yMt (pit)|pit),
namely, y∗t (pit) ≤ yMt (pit).
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Figure A.1: An example showing that Proposition 2.3(b) may not hold if f(·|θ) does not
have the MLRP property.
A.2 Proof of Proposition 2.3
Proof. We postpone the proof of part (a) until Appendix A.4, where Lemma A.3 includes
this result as a special case. Alternatively, part (a) can be proved directly with an extension
of Theorem 2 in Scarf (1959) to all demand distribution families that have MLRP.
To prove part (b), we note that for any dτ < d
′
τ , Lemma 2 of Chen (2010) establishes
that pit ≤lr pi′t. The result then follows from (a).
We provide an example showing that it is necessary for f(·|θ) to have the MLRP
property for part (b) to hold. Let the demand parameter θ take values in the set {1, 2}.
Demand in each period is 0, 1, or 2 units, and the demand probability mass function is
shown in Figure A.1(c). Note that f(·|θ) does not have the MLRP property; in particular,
f(0|θ=2)
f(0|θ=1) =
f(2|θ=2)
f(2|θ=1) = 4 > 0.25 =
f(1|θ=2)
f(1|θ=1) . Now consider a two-period inventory problem.
Figure A.1(d) shows the predictive cumulative demand distribution given a uniform initial
prior pi1(θ = 1) = pi1(θ = 2) = 0.5. Suppose we choose cost parameters such that the
newsvendor critical ratio determining the period 2 base-stock level is 0.70. Then the optimal
base-stock level in period 2 is two units if d1 = 0 or d1 = 2 but is one unit if d1 = 1.
Therefore, the optimal base-stock level is not increasing in d1.
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A.3 Proof of Lemma 2.1
Proof. The proof is by induction. The lemma is true for t = 1. Suppose it is true for some
t ≥ 1; that is
pit(·|dt−1) = (1− γt(dt−1))piht (·|dt−1) + γt(dt−1)pict (·|dt−1).
Using Bayes rule, for i ∈ {h, c}, we have
piit+1(θ|dt) =
piit(θ|dt−1)f(dt|θ)∫
Θ pi
i
t(ω|dt−1)f(dt|ω)dω
,
and
pit+1(θ|dt) = [(1− γt(dt−1))pi
h
t (θ|dt−1) + γt(dt−1)pict (θ|dt−1)]f(dt|θ)∫
Θ[(1− γt(dt−1))piht (ω|dt−1) + γt(dt−1)pict (ω|dt−1)]f(dt|θ)dω
.
Write Ii =
∫
Θ pi
i
t(ω|dt−1)f(dt|ω)dω for i ∈ {h, c}, then
pit+1(θ|dt) = (1− γt(dt−1))pi
h
t (θ|dt−1)f(dt|θ)
(1− γt(dt−1))Ih + γt(dt−1)Ic +
γt(dt−1)pict (θ|dt−1)f(dt|θ)
(1− γt(dt−1))Ih + γt(dt−1)Ic
=
(1− γt(dt−1))Ih
(1− γt(dt−1))Ih + γt(dt−1)Icpi
h
t+1(θ|dt)
+
γt(dt−1)Ic
(1− γt(dt−1))Ih + γt(dt−1)Icpi
c
t+1(θ|dt).
By defining
γt+1(dt) =
γt(dt−1)Ic
(1− γt(dt−1))Ih + γt(dt−1)Ic ,
the lemma is true for t+ 1, which completes the induction.
A.4 Proof of Proposition 2.6
For the purposes of this section, we consider an T -period generalized Bayesian inventory
problem as described below. Let Cˆt(x|pi) be the optimal expected cost for periods t, . . . , T
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given initial inventory level x and prior distribution pi, where
Cˆt(x|pi) = min
y≥x
{
c(y − x) + L(y|pi) + αEDt=(Dˆt,Dt)|pi
[
Cˆt+1(y − Dˆt|pi ◦Dt)
]}
,
with terminal value CˆT+1(·|·) = 0. We assume that Dˆt and Dt have the same marginal
distribution induced by the prior pi but their dependence is induced by some copula.
We denote the minimizer of this expression by yˆ∗t (pi). Note that the original and the
independentized problems are both special cases of this formulation. In the original problem,
Dˆt = Dt, whereas in the independentized problem, Dˆt and Dt are independent with the
same distribution induced by pi.
The proof of Proposition 2.6 requires a few lemmas:
Lemma A.1. For all pi and t = 1, . . . , T + 1:
(i) Cˆt(x|pi) has a continuous derivative with respect to x, and is convex with respect to x;
(ii) The optimal policies are defined by single critical numbers yˆ∗t (pi) ≥ 0;
(iii) Cˆt(x|pi) has a continuous second derivative with respect to x at all points except perhaps
x = yˆ∗t (pi), at which point both the left and right hand second derivatives exist.
We omit the proof, as it is a minor modification of the one for Proposition 2.1.
Lemma A.2. Let Di = (Dˆ,D)|pii be a random vector in which Dˆ and D have the same
marginal predictive demand density φ(·|pii), for i = 1, 2, and suppose that D1 and D2 have a
common copula. If pi1 ≤lr pi2, then D1 ≤st D2.
Proof. Let Dˆ|pii and D|pii denote random variables with density φ(·|pii) for i = 1, 2, then
Dˆ|pi1 ≤st Dˆ|pi2 and D|pi1 ≤st D|pi2 (Lemma 2(d), Chen, 2010). The lemma follows from
Theorem 6.B.14 in Shaked and Shanthikumar (2007).
Lemma A.3. If pi1 ≤lr pi2, the following hold for all x, pi and t = 1, . . . , T + 1:
(i) ∂Cˆt∂x (x|pi1) ≥ ∂Cˆt∂x (x|pi2);
(ii) yˆ∗t (pi1) ≤ yˆ∗t (pi2).
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Proof. The proof is by induction. The lemma clearly holds when t = T + 1 because
CˆT+1(·|·) = 0. Suppose it is true for t+ 1. One can show that
∂Cˆt
∂x
(x|pi) =

−c , x < yˆ∗t (pi),
Hˆt(x|pi) , x ≥ yˆ∗t (pi),
where function Hˆt(·|pi) is defined by
Hˆt(x|pi) = −p+ (h+ p)Φ(x|pi) + αE(Dˆt,Dt)|pi
[
∂Cˆt+1
∂x
(x− Dˆt|pi ◦Dt)
]
.
For fixed (dˆt, dt), by the induction assumption, we have
∂Cˆt+1
∂x
(x− dˆt|pi1 ◦ dt) ≥ ∂Cˆt+1
∂x
(x− dˆt|pi2 ◦ dt), (A.1)
since pi1 ◦ dt ≤lr pi2 ◦ dt (Lemma 2(c), Chen, 2010). In addition, for dˆ1t ≤ dˆ2t , d1t ≤ d2t , we
have
∂Cˆt+1
∂x
(x− dˆ1t |pi2 ◦ d1t ) ≥
∂Cˆt+1
∂x
(x− dˆ1t |pi2 ◦ d2t ) (A.2)
≥ ∂Cˆt+1
∂x
(x− dˆ2t |pi2 ◦ d2t ), (A.3)
where (A.2) follows from the induction assumption and that pi2 ◦d1t ≤lr pi2 ◦d2t (Lemma 2(a),
Chen, 2010), and (A.3) from the convexity of Cˆt+1(·|pi2 ◦d2t ). Therefore, ∂Cˆt+1∂x (x− dˆt|pi2 ◦dt)
is decreasing in (dˆt, dt). In addition, pi
1 ≤lr pi2 together with Lemma A.2 imply that
(Dˆt, Dt)|pi1 ≤st (Dˆt, Dt)|pi2. (A.4)
We thus have
E(Dˆt,Dt)|pi1
[
∂Cˆt+1
∂x
(x− Dˆt|pi1 ◦Dt)
]
≥ E(Dˆt,Dt)|pi1
[
∂Cˆt+1
∂x
(x− Dˆt|pi2 ◦Dt)
]
(A.5)
≥ E(Dˆt,Dt)|pi2
[
∂Cˆt+1
∂x
(x− Dˆt|pi2 ◦Dt)
]
, (A.6)
96
where (A.5) results from (A.1), and (A.6) from (A.4) and the fact that ∂Cˆt+1∂x (x− dˆt|pi2 ◦ dt)
is decreasing in (dˆt, dt) (Section 6.B.1, Shaked and Shanthikumar, 2007). We conclude that
Hˆt(x|pi1) ≥ Hˆt(x|pi2). Note that yˆ∗t (pi) is the solution to the equation Ht(x|pi) = −c. Also
note that Ht(x|pi) is increasing in x. Hence,
Hˆt(yˆ
∗
t (pi
1)|pi1) = −c = Hˆt(yˆ∗t (pi2)|pi2) ≤ Hˆt(yˆ∗t (pi2)|pi1),
which indicates that yˆ∗t (pi1) ≤ yˆ∗t (pi2).
It remains to show that ∂Cˆt∂x (x|pi1) ≥ ∂Cˆt∂x (x|pi2). Consider three cases:
(i) x < yˆ∗t (pi1). In this case,
∂Cˆt
∂x (x|pi1) = ∂Cˆt∂x (x|pi2) = −c;
(ii) yˆ∗t (pi1) ≤ x < yˆ∗t (pi2). In this case, ∂Cˆt∂x (x|pi1) = Hˆ(x|pi1) ≥ Hˆ(yˆ∗t (pi1)|pi1) = −c =
∂Cˆt
∂x (x|pi2);
(iii) x > yˆ∗t (pi2). In this case,
∂Cˆt
∂x (x|pi1) = Hˆ(x|pi1) ≥ Hˆ(x|pi2) = ∂Cˆt∂x (x|pi2);
This completes the induction proof.
With these lemmas established, we can now proceed to the proof of Proposition 2.6.
Proof of Proposition 2.6. The proof is by induction. The proposition is clearly true when
t = T + 1. Suppose for period t+ 1, C⊥t+1(x|pi) ≤ Ct+1(x|pi) for all x, pi.
Fix y. Consider function K(d⊥t , dt) = C⊥t+1(y − d⊥t |pi ◦ dt). Taking the derivative with
respect to d⊥t , we obtain
∂K
∂d⊥t
(d⊥t , dt) = −
∂C⊥t+1
∂(y − d⊥t )
(y − d⊥t |pi ◦ dt).
For d1t ≤ d2t , Lemma 2 of Chen (2010) implies that pi ◦ d1t ≤lr pi ◦ d2t . Lemma A.3 therefore
yields
∂K
∂d⊥t
(d⊥t , d
1
t ) ≤
∂K
∂d⊥t
(d⊥t , d
2
t ).
In other words, K(·, ·) has increasing differences in (d⊥t , dt). Thus, K(·, ·) is supermodular
in (d⊥t , dt).
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Let F ot (dˆt, dt) and F
⊥
t (dˆt, dt) be the distribution functions of the random vectors D
o
t =
(Dt, Dt)|pi and D⊥t = (D⊥t , Dt)|pi, respectively. Then we have
F⊥t (dˆt, dt) = P
{
D⊥t ≤ dˆt, Dt ≤ dt
}
= P
{
D⊥t ≤ dˆt
}
P {Dt ≤ dt}
≤ min
[
P
{
D⊥t ≤ dˆt
}
,P {Dt ≤ dt}
]
= min
[
P
{
Dt ≤ dˆt
}
,P {Dt ≤ dt}
]
= P
{
Dt ≤ dˆ, Dt ≤ d
}
= Fo(dˆ, d).
Therefore, by (9.A.3) in Shaked and Shanthikumar (2007), Dot and D
⊥
t are ranked in the
positive quadrant dependent (PQD) order: D⊥t = (D⊥t , Dt)|pi ≤PQD (Dt, Dt)|pi = Dot .
By (9.A.18) in Shaked and Shanthikumar (2007), Dot and D
⊥
t are thus ranked in the
supermodular order as follows:
D⊥t = (D
⊥
t , Dt)|pi ≤sm (Dt, Dt)|pi = Dot . (A.7)
We finally have
C⊥t (x|pi) = min
y≥x
{
c(y − x) + L(y|pi) + αED⊥t =(D⊥t ,Dt)|pi
[
K(D⊥t , Dt)
]}
≤ min
y≥x
{
c(y − x) + L(y|pi) + αEDot=(Dt,Dt)|pi [K(Dt, Dt)]
}
= min
y≥x
{
c(y − x) + L(y|pi) + αEDot=(Dt,Dt)|pi
[
C⊥t+1(y −Dt|pi ◦Dt)
]}
≤ min
y≥x
{
c(y − x) + L(y|pi) + αEDot=(Dt,Dt)|pi [Ct+1(y −Dt|pi ◦Dt)]
}
= Ct(x|pi),
where the first inequality follows from (A.7) and the definition of supermodular ordering,
and the second follows from the induction assumption. This completes the proof.
A.5 Proof of Proposition 2.8
Proof. Let dT = (d1, . . . , dT ) and d
′
T = (d
′
1, . . . , d
′
T ) be two demand paths such that dt ≤ d′t
for all t. Let dt = (d1, . . . , dt) and d
′
t = (d
′
1, . . . , d
′
t) be the subsequences of dT and d
′
T until
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period t, respectively. Let y(pi) = (yt(pi ◦ dt−1)) denote the myopic (also the optimal) policy.
It follows that pi ◦ dt−1 ≤lr pi ◦ dt−1 and hence
G(yt(pi ◦ dt−1)|pi ◦ dt−1) ≤ G(yt(pi ◦ dt−1)|pi ◦ dt−1) (A.8)
for all pi ∈ P because G(y|pi) ≤ G(y|pi′) for all pi ≤lr pi′. To see this, note that D|pi ≤st D|pi′
for all pi ≤lr pi′ and that min{y, d} is an increasing function in d.
We also have pi ◦ dt−1 ≤lr pi ◦ d′t−1 ≤lr pi ◦ d′t−1 for all pi ∈ P, which implies that
yt(pi ◦ dt−1) ≤ yt(pi ◦ d′t−1) ≤ yt(pi ◦ d′t−1). Therefore, we have
G(yt(pi ◦ dt−1)|pi ◦ dt−1) ≤ G(yt(pi ◦ dt−1)|pi ◦ d′t−1) ≤ G(yt(pi ◦ d′t−1)|pi ◦ d′t−1), (A.9)
where the first inequality follows from the fact that pi ◦ dt−1 ≤lr pi ◦ d′t−1 and the second
from the fact that G(y|pi ◦ d′t−1) is increasing over yt(pi ◦ dt−1) ≤ y ≤ yt(pi ◦ d′t−1). As a
consequence,
E[G(yt(pi ◦ dt−1)|pi ◦ dt−1)|pi] ≤ E[G(yt(pi ◦ dt−1)|pi ◦ dt−1)|pi]
≤ E[G(yt(pi ◦ dt−1)|pi ◦ dt−1)|pi]
for all pi ∈ P. The expectations are with respect to the random variable dt−1 over pi and
pi in the first two expressions and the third expression, respectively. The first inequality
directly follows from (A.8) whereas the second is due to (A.8) and that pi ≤lr pi.
Denote by ΠT (y, pi) the expected total profit when policy y is employed and pi is used as
the “true” prior for generating the Bayesian demand process. More specifically, ΠT (y, pi) =∑T
t=1E[G(yt|pi ◦Dt−1)|pi]. With this notation we can write RT (P) = maxy minpi∈P ΠT (y, pi).
Let pi∗(y) = arg minpi∈P ΠT (y, pi) for any policy y, thus ΠT (y, pi∗(y)) ≤ ΠT (y, pi) by
definition. For policy y(pi), it follows from the previous result that pi∗(y(pi)) = pi, or
ΠT (y(pi), pi) ≤ ΠT (y(pi), pi) for all pi ∈ P. Together with the fact that, for any pol-
icy y, ΠT (y, pi) ≤ ΠT (y(pi), pi) = VT (pi), we have RT (P) = maxy minpi∈P ΠT (y, pi) =
maxy ΠT (y, pi
∗(y)) = ΠT (y(pi), pi) = VT (pi).
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APPENDIX B
Proofs of Results in Chapter 3
B.1 Proof of Lemma 3.1
The proof of Lemma 3.1 employs results from the statistical literature on comparison of
experiments (Blackwell, 1951, 1953). In the following, we introduce the definitions of statistic
experiment.
Definition B.1 (Blackwell, 1951, 1953; Ginebra, 2007). A statistical experiment E =
{(X,SX); (Pθ,Θ)} (E{X;Pθ} for short) yields an observation on a random variable X
defined on SX , with an unknown probability distribution that is known to be in the family
(Pθ, θ ∈ Θ).
The two observation types introduced in §3.3.1 can be viewed as outcomes of the following
statistical experiments.
(i) Observations without timing information (XNT (q)): Consider ENT (q) = {XNT (q);PNTθ },
where XNT (q) = {s, e} as defined in §3.3.1. The joint distribution PNTθ of XNT (q)
under θ ∈ Θ is given by (3.2). ENT (q) is by definition a statistical experiment which
corresponds to using an allocation q when timing information is unobservable.
(ii) Observations with timing information (XT (q)): Consider ET (q) = {XT (q);P Tθ }, where
XT (q) = {s, e, ~τ} as defined in §3.3.1. The joint distribution P Tθ of XT (q) under θ ∈ Θ
is given by (3.3). ET (q) is by definition a statistical experiment which corresponds to
using an allocation q when timing information is observable.
Next, we introduce the sufficiency ordering between experiments.
Definition B.2 (Ginebra, 2007). Experiment E = {X;Pθ} is sufficient for experiment
F = {Y ;Qθ} if there is a stochastic transformation of X to a random variable W (X) such
that W (X) and Y have identical distribution under each θ ∈ Θ.
The following lemma is a restatement of Proposition 3.2 in Ginebra (2007) by ?.
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Lemma B.1 (Ginebra, 2007; Jain et al., 2015). Experiment E is sufficient for experiment
F if and only if, for every decision problem involving θ, the Bayes risk for E does not exceed
the Bayes risk for F , i.e., rpi(E) ≤ rpi(F) for all prior pi on θ.
Finally, we prove Lemma 3.1 by establishing sufficiency orderings between experiments
with different test inventory allocations.
Proof of Lemma 3.1(a). Let ET = {XT (q + δn);Pθ} and FT = {XT (q);Qθ} be the ex-
periments with timing information under allocation q + δn and allocation q, respectively.
Consider the following transformation from XT (q + δn) = {s, e, ~τ} to X ′ = {s′, e′, ~τ ′}:
(1) For all m 6= n: let s′m = sm, e′m = em, ;
(2) if sn = qn + 1, en = 1: let s
′
n = qn, e
′
n = 1, and ~τ
′
n = (τ
1
n, τ
2
n, . . . , τ
qn
n );
(3) if sn = qn, en = 0: let s
′
n = qn, e
′
n = 1, and ~τ
′
n = (τ
1
n, τ
2
n, . . . , τ
qn
n );
(4) if sn < qn, en = 0: let s
′
n = sn, en = 0, ~τ
′
n = (τ
1
n, τ
2
n, . . . , τ
sn
n ).
It can be verified that X ′ and XT (q) have identical distributions. Therefore, ET is sufficient
for FT according to Definition B.2.
We can recast our merchandise testing problem as a statistical decision problem with
period 2 ordering quantities y as the decision, and a loss function L(y, θ) = Πˆ∗(θ)− Πˆ(y|θ),
where Πˆ∗(θ) is the optimal expected profit in period 2 under θ, and Πˆ(y|θ) the expected
profit if the retailer’s ordering decision is y. The Bayes risk is thus rpi(ET ) = Epi[EPθ [L(y(pi ◦
XT (q + δn)), θ)]] = Epi[EPθ [Πˆ
∗(θ)]] − Epi[EPθ [Vˆ (pi ◦ XT (q + δn))]] = Epi[EPθ [Πˆ∗(θ)]] −
ΠT (q + δn|pi) for ET , and is rpi(FT ) = Epi[EPθ [L(y(pi ◦ XT (q)), θ)]] = Epi[EPθ [Πˆ∗(θ)]] −
Epi[EQθ [Vˆ (pi ◦XT (q))]] = Epi[EQθ [Πˆ∗(θ)]]− ΠT (q|pi) for FT . Note that Epi[EPθ [Πˆ∗(θ)]] =
Epi[EQθ [Πˆ
∗(θ)]] = Epi[Πˆ∗(θ)]. Lemma 3.1(a) thus follows from rpi(ENT ) ≤ rpi(FNT ) as a
result of Lemma B.1.
Proof of Lemma 3.1(b). Let ENT = {XNT (q + δn);Pθ} and FNT = {XNT (q);Qθ} be the
experiments without timing information under allocation q+δn and allocation q, respectively.
Consider the following transformation from XNT (q + δn) = {s, e} to X ′ = {s′, e′}:
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(1) For all m 6= n: let s′m = sm, e′m = em;
(2) if sn = qn + 1, en = 1: let s
′
n = qn, e
′
n = 1;
(3) if sn = qn, en = 0: let s
′
n = qn, e
′
n = 1;
(4) if sn < qn, en = 0: let s
′
n = sn, en = 0.
It can be verified that X ′ and XNT (q) have identical distributions. Therefore, ENT is
sufficient for FNT according to Definition B.2. We show ΠNT (q) ≤ ΠNT (q + δn) by an
argument similar to that in proving part (a).
Proof of Lemma 3.1(c). Suppose that allocation q∗ is optimal with timing information,
i.e., ΠT (q∗) ≥ ΠT (q) for any allocation q. If ∑Nn=1 q∗n < Q, consider allocation q′ =
q∗+(Q−∑Nn=1 q∗n)δ1, which has∑Nn=1 q′n = Q. It follows from part (a) that ΠT (q′) ≥ ΠT (q∗),
which indicates that q′ is also optimal. A similar argument applies to the case without
timing information.
B.2 Proof of Proposition 3.1
Proof of Proposition 3.1(a). Let E = {XT (q − δi + δj);Pθ} and F = {XT (q);Qθ} be the
experiments with timing information under allocation q−δi+δj and allocation q, respectively.
Consider the following transformation from XT (q− δi + δj) = {s, e, ~τ} to X ′ = {s′, e′, ~τ ′}:
(1) For m 6= i, j, let s′m = sm, ~τ ′m = ~τm, and e′m = em;
(2) Let s′j = 0, ~τ
′
j = ∅, e′j = 1;
(3) if si < qi − 1: let s′i = si, ~τ ′i = ~τi, and e′i = 0;
(4) if si = qi − 1, sj = 0: let s′i = qi − 1, ~τ ′i = ~τi, e′i = 0;
(5) if si = qi − 1, sj = 1, and τ1j > T −
∑qi−1
k=1 τ
k
i : let s
′
i = qi − 1, ~τ ′i = ~τi, and e′i = 0;
(6) if si = qi− 1, sj = 1, and τ1j ≤ T −
∑qi−1
k=1 τ
k
i : let s
′
i = qi, ~τ
′
i = {τ1i , . . . , τ qi−1i , τ1j }, e′i = 1.
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It can be verified that X ′ and XT (q) have identical distributions. Therefore, E is sufficient
for F . We show ΠT (q) ≤ ΠT (q − δi + δj) by an argument similar to that in the proof of
Lemma 3.1.
Proof of Proposition 3.1(b). Immediately follows from part (a).
B.3 Proof of Proposition 3.2
Proof of Proposition 3.2(a). We show the proof only for N = 2 and let i = 1 and j = 2
without loss of generality, namely, ΠT (q1, q2|α, β) ≤ ΠT (q1− 1, q2 + 1|α, β) for all q2 ≥ 0 and
q1 ≥ q2 + 2. The proof extends to the N > 2 cases by conditioning on the demand processes
at stores other than i and j.
We prove by two inductions—an inner induction nested inside an outer induction.
Proposition 3.1 guarantees that part (a) holds for q2 = 0 and all q1 ≥ 2. Suppose that it
holds for some q2 = q ≥ 0 and all q1 ≥ q + 2, that is,
Assumption B.1. ΠTT (q1, q|α, β) ≥ ΠTT (q1− 1, q+ 1|α, β) for some q ≥ 0 and all q1 ≥ q+ 2.
Assumption B.1 is the assumption for the outer induction. The subscript T in ΠTT makes
explicit the length T of period 1. We first show it holds for q2 = q+1 and q1 = q2 +2 = q+3.
By conditioning on the time s ≥ 0 until the first demand arrival at either store, which is
exponential with rate 2λ, we have
ΠTT (q + 3, q + 1|α, β)
= Eλ|α,βEs|λ
[{
1
2
ΠTT−s(q + 2, q + 1|α+ 1, β + 2s)
+
1
2
ΠTT−s(q + 3, q|α+ 1, β + 2s)
}
1s≤T + ΠT0 (q + 3, q + 1|α, β + 2T )1s>T
]
,
ΠTT (q + 2, q + 2|α, β)
= Eλ|α,βEs|λ
[{
1
2
ΠTT−s(q + 1, q + 2|α+ 1, β + 2s)
+
1
2
ΠTT−s(q + 2, q + 1|α+ 1, β + 2s)
}
1s≤T + ΠT0 (q + 2, q + 2|α, β + 2T )1s>T
]
.
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Note that
(i) ΠTT−s(q + 2, q + 1|α+ 1, β + 2s) = ΠTT−s(q + 1, q + 2|α+ 1, β + 2s) because stores are
identical;
(ii) ΠTT−s(q + 3, q|α+ 1, β + 2s) ≤ ΠTT−s(q + 2, q + 1|α+ 1, β + 2s) by Assumption B.1;
(iii) ΠT0 (q + 3, q + 1|α, β + 2T ) = ΠT0 (q + 2, q + 2|α, β + 2T ) since period 1 has zero length.
As a result, ΠTT (q+ 3, q+ 1|α, β) ≤ ΠTT (q+ 2, q+ 2|α, β); i.e., Assumption B.1 holds for q+ 1
and q1 = q + 3.
We still need to show that Assumption B.1 holds for q+ 1 and all q1 > q+ 3 to complete
the outer induction. We prove that by an inner induction on q1 which makes the following
induction assumption.
Assumption B.2. ΠTT (q + ∆q + 3, q + 1|α, β) ≥ ΠTT (q + ∆q + 2, q + 2|α, β) for q and some
∆q ≥ 0.
We have shown that Assumption B.2 is true for q and ∆q = 0. To show it holds for
∆q = 1, we again condition on the time s ≥ 0 until the first demand arrival at either store
and get
ΠTT (q + ∆q + 1 + 3, q + 1|α, β)
= Eλ|α,βEs|λ
[{
1
2
ΠTT−s(q + ∆q + 3, q + 1|α+ 1, β + 2s)
+
1
2
ΠTT−s(q + ∆q + 4, q|α+ 1, β + 2s)
}
1s≤T
+ ΠT0 (q + ∆q + 4, q + 1|α, β + 2T )1s>T
]
,
ΠTT (q + ∆q + 1 + 2, q + 2|α, β)
= Eλ|α,βEs|λ
[{
1
2
ΠTT−s(q + ∆q + 2, q + 2|α+ 1, β + 2s)
+
1
2
ΠTT−s(q + ∆q + 3, q + 1|α+ 1, β + 2s)
}
1s≤T
+ ΠT0 (q + ∆q + 3, q + 2|α, β + 2T )1s>T
]
.
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Note that
(i) ΠTT−s(q + ∆q + 3, q + 1|α + 1, β + 2s) ≤ ΠTT−s(q + ∆q + 2, q + 2|α + 1, β + 2s) by
Assumption B.2;
(ii) ΠTT−s(q+∆q+4, q|α+1, β+2s) ≤ ΠTT−s(q+∆q+3, q+1|α+1, β+2s) by Assumption B.1;
(iii) ΠT0 (q + ∆q + 4, q + 1|α, β + 2T ) = ΠT0 (q + ∆q + 3, q + 2|α, β + 2T ) since period 1 has
zero length.
Consequently we have ΠTT (q + ∆q + 1 + 3, q + 1|α, β) ≤ ΠTT (q + ∆q + 1 + 2, q + 2|α, β) which
completes the inner induction. This also completes the outer induction in showing that
Assumption B.1 holds for q + 1 and all q1 ≥ (q + 1) + 2 = q + 3.
Proof of Proposition 3.2(b). Immediately follows from part (a).
B.4 Proof of Proposition 3.3
Proof of Proposition 3.3(a). Let E = {XT (q + δi − δj);Pθ} and F = {XT (q);Qθ} be the
experiments with timing information under allocation q+δi−δj and allocation q, respectively.
Consider the following transformation from XT (q + δi − δj) = {s, e, ~τ} to X ′ = {s′, e′, ~τ ′}
for every θ ∈ Θ:
(1) For m 6= i, j, let s′m = sm, ~τ ′m = ~τm, and e′m = em;
(2) let s′i = 0, ~τ
′
i = ∅, e′i = 1;
(3) if sj < qj − 1 (qj ≥ 2): let s′j = sj , ~τ ′j = ~τj , e′j = 0;
(4) if si = 0, sj = qj − 1: let s′j = sj = qj − 1, ~τ ′j = ~τj , e′j = 0;
(5) if si = 1, sj = qj − 1, and Ψi(τ1i |θ) > Ψj(T −
∑qj−1
k=1 τ
k
j |θ): let s′j = qj − 1, ~τ ′j = ~τj ,
e′j = 0;
(6) if si = 1, sj = qj − 1, and Ψi(τ1i |θ) ≤ Ψj(T −
∑qj−1
k=1 τ
k
j |θ): let s′j = qj , ~τ ′j =
{τ1j , . . . , τ qj−1j ,Ψ−1j (Ψi(τ1i |θ)|θ)}, e′j = 1,
105
where Ψ−1j (·|θ) is the inverse cdf of the corresponding inter-arrival time cdf Ψj(·|θ). It can
be verified that X ′ and XT (q) have identical distributions under every θ ∈ Θ. Therefore, E
is sufficient for F . We show ΠT (q) ≤ ΠT (q + δi − δj) by an argument similar to that in the
proof of Lemma 3.1.
Proof of Proposition 3.3(b). Immediately follows from part (a).
B.5 Proof of Proposition 3.4
The proof involves an equivalent transformation from a problem in which stores have non-
identical arrival rates and identical lengths of period 1, to one in which stores have identical ar-
rival rates and non-identical lengths of period 1. We use ΠT (q|γ1λ0, . . . , γNλ0;T1, . . . , TN ;α, β)
to denote the ex-ante expected profit of an allocation q for a merchandise testing problem
with observable timing information, unknown arrival rate parameter λ0, relative demand
coefficients γ1, . . . , γN , and lengths of period 1, T1, . . . , TN . The retailer has a gamma prior
with parameters (α, β) on λ0. The following lemma shows that under gamma-Poisson
demand, a store n with arrival rate γnλn and length Tn in period 1 is equivalent in terms of
ex-ante expected profit to one with arrival rate λn and length γnTn.
Lemma B.2. ΠT (q|γ1λ0, . . . , γnλ0, . . . , γNλ0;T1, . . . , TN ;α, β) = ΠT (q|γ1λ0, . . . , λ0, . . . ,
γNλ0;T1, . . . , γnTn, . . . , TN ) for all q, γn > 0, α > 0, and β > 0.
Proof. We show the proof only for N = 1, i.e., ΠT (q|γλ0;T0;α, β) = ΠT (q|λ0; γT0;α, β).
The result extends to the N > 1 cases by conditioning on the demand processes at other
stores.
Observations during period 1 can be summarized by a pair of sufficient statistics (s, t),
where s is the sales quantity and t is the effective sales duration. Let αˆ and βˆ denote the
posterior parameters. Let P (D(T |λ) = s) be the probability of total arrivals being s during
time [0, T ] in a Poisson process with arrival rate λ, and g(t|q, λ) be the probability density
of the q-th arrival time. Then,
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(i) if λ = γλ0, T = T0: αˆ = α+ s, βˆ = β + γt. By conditioning on unknown parameter λ0
and observation (s, t), one obtains
ΠT (q|γλ0;T0;α, β) = Eλ0|α,βE(s,t)|γλ0 [Vˆ (α+ s, β + γt)]
= Eλ0|α,β
[
q−1∑
s=0
Vˆ (α+ s, β + γT0) · P (D(T0|γλ0) = s)
+
∫ T0
0
Vˆ (α+ q, β + γt) · g(t|q, γλ0)dt
]
= Eλ0|α,β
[
q−1∑
s=0
Vˆ (α+ s, β + γT0) · (γλ0T0)
se−γλ0T0
s!
+
∫ T0
0
Vˆ (α+ q, β + γt) · (γλ0)
qtq−1e−qγλ0t
Γ(q)
dt
]
; (B.1)
(ii) if λ = λ0, T = γT0: αˆ = α + s, βˆ = β + t. Similarly, by conditioning on λ0 and
observation (s′, t′) we have
ΠT (q|λ0; γT0;α, β) = Eλ0|α,βE(s′,t′)|λ0 [Vˆ (α+ s′, β + t′)]
= Eλ0|α,β
[
q−1∑
s′=0
Vˆ (α+ s′, β + γT0) · P (D(γT0|λ0) = s′)
+
∫ γT0
0
Vˆ (α+ q, β + t′) · g(t′|q, λ0)dt
]
= Eλ0|α,β
[
q−1∑
s′=0
Vˆ (α+ s′, β + γT0) · (γλ0T0)
s′e−γλ0T0
s′!
+
∫ γT0
0
Vˆ (α+ q, β + t′) · λ
q
0(t
′)q−1e−qλ0t′
Γ(q)
dt′
]
.
Let s′ = s, t′ = γt, then
ΠT (q|λ0; γT0;α, β) = Eλ0|α,β
[
q−1∑
s=0
Vˆ (α+ s, β + γT0) · (γλ0T0)
se−γλ0T0
s!
+
∫ T0
0
Vˆ (α+ q, β + γt) · λ
q
0(γt)
q−1e−qλ0γt
Γ(q)
dγt
]
(B.2)
= ΠT (q|γλ0;T0;α, β).
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The last equality follows from a comparison between (B.1) and (B.2).
The following lemma is a counterpart to Proposition 3.3 in which stores have identical
inter-arrival time distributions but have different lengths of period 1.
Lemma B.3. Suppose that stores have identical inter-arrival time distributions Ψ(τ |θ).
Then, ΠT (q|Ψ, . . . ,Ψ;T1, . . . , TN ;pi) ≤ ΠT (q + δi − δj |Ψ, . . . ,Ψ;T1, . . . , TN ;pi) for all q that
has qi = 0 and qj > 0 for some i < j, T1 ≥ · · · ≥ TN , and all pi.
Proof. Let E = {XT (q + δi− δj);Pθ} and F = {XT (q);Qθ} be the experiments with timing
information under allocation q+δi−δj and allocation q, respectively. Consider the following
transformation from XT (q + δi − δj) = {s, e, ~τ} to X ′ = {s′, e′, ~τ ′} for every θ ∈ Θ:
(1) For m 6= i, j, let s′m = sm, ~τ ′m = ~τm, and e′m = em;
(2) let s′i = 0, ~τ
′
i = ∅, e′i = 1;
(3) if sj < qj − 1: let s′j = sj , ~τ ′j = ~τj , e′j = 0;
(4) if si = 0, sj = qj − 1: let s′j = q, ~τ ′j = ~τj , e′j = 0;
(5) if si = 1, sj = qj − 1, and τ1i > Tj −
∑qj−1
k=1 τ
k
j : let s
′
j = qj − 1, ~τ ′j = ~τj , e′j = 0;
(6) if si = 1, sj = qj − 1, and τ1i ≤ Tj −
∑qj−1
k=1 τ
k
j : let s
′
j = qj , ~τ
′
j = {τ1j , . . . , τ qj−1j , τ1i },
e′j = 1.
It can be verified that X ′ and XT (q) have identical distributions. (Note that Ti ≥ Tj
guarantees that
∑qj
k=1 τ
′
j
k =
∑qj−1
k=1 τ
k
j +τ
1
i in (6) covers the entire [0, Tj ] interval.) Therefore,
E is sufficient for F . The lemma follows from an argument similar to that in the proof of
Lemma 3.1.
The following corollary applies Lemma B.3 to gamma-Poisson demand.
Corollary B.1. Suppose that demand is gamma-Poisson and that stores have identical
arrival rates λ, lengths T1 ≥ · · · ≥ TN ≥ 0 of period 1. Then, ΠT (q|λ, . . . , λ;T1, . . . , TN ;pi) ≤
Π(q + δi − δj |λ, . . . , λ;T1, . . . , TN ;pi) for all q that has qi = 0 and qj > 0 for some i < j,
α > 0, and β > 0.
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The following corollary applies Proposition 3.3 to gamma-Poisson demand.
Corollary B.2. Suppose that demand is gamma-Poisson and that stores have identical
length T of period 1 and relative demand coefficients γ1 ≥ γ2 ≥ · · · ≥ γN ), respectively.
Then, ΠT (q|γ1λ, . . . , γNλ;T, . . . , T ;pi) ≤ ΠT (q + δi − δj |γ1λ, . . . , γNλ;T, . . . , T ;pi) for all q
that has qi = 0 and qj > 0 for some i < j, α > 0, and β > 0.
Proof. Follows from Lemma B.2 and Proposition 3.3.
The following lemma shows that under gamma-Poisson demand, the retailer prefers
allocation q + δi − δj to allocation q that has qj = qi + 1 for some i > j, if stores have
identical arrival rates but store i has a longer length of period 1 than store j does.
Lemma B.4. Suppose that demand is gamma-Poisson and that stores have identical ar-
rival rates λ and lengths T1, . . . , TN of period 1, where Ti ≥ Tj for some i 6= j. Then,
ΠT (q|λ, . . . , λ;T1, . . . , TN ;α, β) ≤ ΠT (q+ δi− δj |λ, . . . , λ;T1, . . . , TN ;α, β) for all q that has
qj = qi + 1, α > 0, and β > 0.
Proof. We show the proof only for N = 2 and let i = 1 and j = 2 without loss of generality,
i.e., ΠT (q, q + 1|λ, λ;T1, T2;α, β) ≤ ΠT (q + 1, q|λ, λ;T1, T2;α, β) for all q = 0, 1, . . ., α, and
β. The proof extends to the N > 2 cases by conditioning on the demand processes at stores
other than i and j.
We write T = T2 ≥ 0 and ∆T = T1 − T2 ≥ 0. Consider a modification of the problem
where period 1 at each store always ends, instead of starts, at the same time. In this case,
after the modification, period 1 at store 1 covers time interval [0, T + ∆T ], whereas period 1
at store 2 covers time interval [∆T, T +∆T ]. We use a tilde as an identifier for corresponding
notation in the modified problem. Note that the lengths of period 1 for both stores remain
the same: T˜1 = T + ∆T = T1, T˜2 = T = T2. Since the stores are independent conditional on
λ and period 1 is purely for information learning purpose, such a modification in the start
time of testing at store 2 does not affect the ex-ante expected profit, i.e.,
Π˜T (q, q + 1|λ, λ;T1, T2;α, β) = ΠT (q, q + 1|λ, λ;T1, T2;α, β),
Π˜T (q + 1, q|λ, λ;T1, T2;α, β) = ΠT (q + 1, q|λ, λ;T1, T2;α, β).
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Let T = min{tq1,∆T}, where tq1 is the time of q-th arrival at store 1. By conditioning on
λ, T , and observation (s, t) (sales quantity and effective selling duration) during [0, T ], we
obtain
Π˜T (q, q + 1|λ, λ;T + ∆T, T ;α, β)
= Eλ|α,β
[
q−1∑
s=0
ΠT (q − s, q + 1|λ, λ;T, T ;α+ s, β + ∆T )P (D(∆T |λ) = s)
+
∫ ∆T
0
Π˜T (0, q + 1|λ, λ;T + ∆T − t, T ;α+ q, β + t)g(t|q, λ)dt,
]
,
Π˜T (q + 1, q|λ, λ;T + ∆T, T ;α, β)
= Eλ|α,β
[
q−1∑
s=0
ΠT (q + 1− s, q|λ, λ;T, T ;α+ s, β + ∆T )P (D(∆T |λ) = s)
+
∫ ∆T
0
Π˜T (1, q|λ, λ;T + ∆T − t, T ;α+ q, β + t)g(t|q, λ)dt
]
,
where g(t|q, λ) is the pdf of tq1 conditional on λ. Note that
(i) ΠT (q − s, q + 1|λ, λ;T, T ;α + s, β + ∆T ) ≤ ΠT (q + 1 − s, q|λ, λ;T, T ;α + s, β + ∆T )
for all s = 0, . . . , q − 1, following from Proposition 3.2;
(ii) Π˜T (0, q+1|λ, λ;T+∆T−t, T ;α+q, β+t) = ΠT (0, q+1|λ, λ;T+∆T−t, T ;α+q, β+t) ≤
ΠT (1, q|λ, λ;T + ∆T − t, T ;α + q, β + t) = Π˜T (1, q|λ, λ;T + ∆T − t, T ;α + q, β + t),
where the inequality follows from Corollary B.1.
As a result, Π˜T (q, q+1|λ, λ;T+∆T, T ;α, β) ≤ Π˜T (q+1, q|λ, λ;T+∆T, T ;α, β), or, ΠT (q, q+
1|λ, λ;T1, T2;α, β) ≤ ΠT (q + 1, q|λ, λ;T1, T2;α, β).
The following corollary is a counterpart to Lemma B.4 in which stores have identical
lengths of period 1 but different arrival rates.
Corollary B.3. Suppose that demand is gamma-Poisson and that stores have identi-
cal lengths T of period 1, and relative demand coefficients γ1 ≥ γ2 ≥ · · · ≥ γN . Then,
ΠT (q|γ1λ, . . . , γNλ;T, . . . , T ;α, β) ≤ ΠT (q + δi − δj |γ1λ, . . . , γNλ;T, . . . , T ;α, β) for all q
that has qj = qi + 1 for some i < j, α > 0, and β > 0.
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Proof. Follows from Lemma B.2 and Lemma B.4.
Proof of Proposition 3.4(a). We show the proof only for N = 2 and let i = 1 and j =
2 without loss of generality, i.e., ΠT (q, q + n|γ1λ, γ2λ;T, T ;α, β) ≤ ΠT (q + 1, q + n −
1|γ1λ, γ2λ;T, T ;α, β) for q = 0, 1, . . ., n = 1, 2, . . ., γ1 ≥ γ2, T > 0, α > 0, and β > 0. The
proof extends to the N > 2 cases by conditioning on the demand processes at stores other
than i and j.
The proof is by induction. The proposition holds for q = 0 and all n ≥ 1 according to
Corollary B.2. It also holds for all q ≥ 0 and n = 1 according to Corollary B.3.
Assume that the proposition holds for some q and all n ≥ 1. In addition, assume that it
holds for q + 1 and some n ≥ 1. We show that it continues to hold for q + 1 and n+ 1 by
conditioning on the time t ≥ 0 until the next arrival at either store, which is exponential
with rate (γ1 + γ2)λ. Once arrives, the next arrival occurs at store 1 with probability
γ1
γ1+γ2
and at store 2 with probability γ2γ1+γ2 . We have
ΠT (q + 1, q + 1 + n+ 1|γ1λ, γ2λ;T, T ;α, β)
= Eλ|α,βEt|λ
[{ γ1
γ1 + γ2
ΠT (q, q + 1 + n+ 1|γ1λ, γ2λ;T − t, T − t;α+ 1, β + γ1t+ γ2t)
+
γ2
γ1 + γ2
ΠT (q + 1, q + 1 + n|γ1λ, γ2λ;T − t, T − t;α+ 1, β + γ1t+ γ2t)
}
1{t ≤ T}
+ ΠT (q + 1, q + 1 + n+ 1|γ1λ, γ2λ; 0, 0;α, β + (γ1 + γ2)T )1{t > T}
]
,
ΠT (q + 2, q + 1 + n|γ1λ, γ2λ;T, T ;α, β)
= Eλ|α,βEt|λ
[{ γ1
γ1 + γ2
ΠT (q + 1, q + 1 + n|γ1λ, γ2λ;T − t, T − t;α+ 1, β + γ1t+ γ2t)
+
γ2
γ1 + γ2
ΠT (q + 2, q + n|γ1λ, γ2λ;T − t, T − t;α+ 1, β + γ1t+ γ2t)
}
1{t ≤ T}
+ ΠT (q + 2, q + 1 + n|γ1λ, γ2λ; 0, 0;α, β + (γ1 + γ2)T )1{t > T}
]
.
Note that
(i) ΠT (q, q + 1 + n + 1|γ1λ, γ2λ;T − t, T − t;α + 1, β + γ1t + γ2t) ≤ ΠT (q + 1, q + 1 +
n|γ1λ, γ2λ;T−t, T−t;α+1, β+γ1t+γ2t), following from the first induction assumption;
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(ii) ΠT (q+1, q+1+n|γ1λ, γ2λ;T−t, T−t;α+1, β+γ1t+γ2t) ≤ ΠT (q+2, q+n|γ1λ, γ2λ;T−
t, T − t;α+ 1, β + γ1t+ γ2t), following from the second induction assumption;
(iii) and ΠT (q + 1, q + 1 + n + 1|γ1λ, γ2λ; 0, 0;α, β + (γ1 + γ2)T ) = ΠT (q + 2, q + 1 +
n|γ1λ, γ2λ; 0, 0;α, β + (γ1 + γ2)T ) by definition.
Therefore, the induction is complete.
Proof of Proposition 3.4(b). Immediately follows from part (a).
B.6 Proof of Proposition 3.5
Proof of Proposition 3.5(a). We formulate the problem of maximizing the expected sales
during period 1 as a dynamic program. Let Sn(q) denote the sales at store n with test
inventory level q. Then
E[Sn(q)] =
q∑
x=0
xφn(x) + q
∞∑
x=q+1
φn(x),
where φn(·) is the unconditioned pmf of demand at store n. We thus have
∆E[Sn(q)] = E[Sn(q + 1)]− E[Sn(q)] = Φn(q), (B.3)
where Φn(q) =
∑∞
x=q+1 φn(x).
Let S(q) be the expected total test sales under allocation q = (q1, . . . , qN ), i.e., S(q) =∑N
n=1 Sn(qn). Let Vq(q) denote the maximum additional expected total test sales with q
units of test inventory left to allocate given an allocation q. The problem of allocating Q
units of test inventory to maximize test sales can be formulated as a longest path problem
with the following Bellman equations:
Vq(q) = max
n∈{1,...,N}
{∆E[Sn(qn)] + Vq−1(q + δn)}
= max
n∈{1,...,N}
{Φn(qn) + Vq−1(q + δn)},
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with V0(q) = 0 for all q. The maximum expected total test sales with Q units of test
inventory is given by VQ(0).
The proof of part (a) is by backward induction. For any allocation q = (q1, . . . , qN ),
relabel the stores by n1, n2, . . . , nN , a permutation of 1, 2, . . . , N , such that Φn1(qn1) ≥
Φn2(qn2) ≥ · · · ≥ ΦnN (qnN ). Note that
V1(q) = max
i=1,...,N
{Φni(qni) + V0(q + δni)} = Φn1(qn1) + V0(q + δn1),
as V0(q) = 0 for all allocation q. Suppose that for some q ≥ 1 and allocation q,
Vq(q) = max
i=1,...,N
{Φni(qni) + Vq−1(q + δni)} = Φn1(qn1) + Vq−1(q + δn1)
where stores are relabeled according to q such that Φn1(qn1) ≥ Φn2(qn2) ≥ · · · ≥ ΦnN (qnN ).
Consider
Vq+1(q) = max
i=1,...,N
{Φni(qni) + Vq(q + δni)}.
Note that Φn1(qn1) ≥ Φni(qni) ≥ Φni(qni + 1) for i = 2, . . . , N . Therefore,
Vq(q + δni) = Φn1(qn1) + Vq−1(q + δni + δn1)
for i = 2, . . . , N by the induction assumption. It follows that
Φni(qni) + Vq(q + δni) = Φni(qni) + Φn1(qn1) + Vq−1(q + δni + δn1)
= Φn1(qn1) + Φni(qni) + Vq−1(q + δn1 + δni)
≤ Φn1(qn1) + Vq(q + δn1),
where the inequality follows from the definition of Vq(q + δn1). As a result, we have
Vq+1(q) = Φn1(qn1) + Vq(q + δn1).
This completes the induction.
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Proof of Proposition 3.5(b). We prove part (b) by showing that the ordering q1 ≥ q2 ≥ . . . ≥
qN is preserved before each step of the Max-Sales algorithm. The ordering holds trivially
at the beginning of the algorithm as q1 = · · · = qN = 0. Suppose that the ordering holds
before some step i. By definition n∗ = min{n : Φn(qn) ≤ Φm(qm), ∀m 6= n}. The ordering
is preserved before step i+ 1 if n∗ = 1. When n∗ > 1, assume that qn∗−1 < qn∗ + 1, then
Φn∗(qn∗) > Φn∗−1(qn∗−1) ≥ Φn∗(qn∗−1) ≥ Φn∗(qn∗), where the first inequality follows from
the definition of n∗ and the last from the fact that qn∗−1 ≥ qn∗ . This leads to contradiction.
Hence we must have qn∗−1 ≥ qn∗ + 1, i.e., the ordering holds before step i+ 1.
B.7 Proof of Proposition 3.6
We show the proof only for N = 2. The proof extends to the N > 2 cases by conditioning
on demand at other stores and noting the fact that stores are identical.
Let Vˆ (aˆ, Sˆ) denote the optimal expected profit in period 2 at a single store under some
gamma posterior with parameters (aˆ, Sˆ). The ex-ante expected profit of allocation (q1, q2)
under a gamma prior with parameters (a, S) is given by
ΠNT (q1, q2|a, S) = Π(q1, q2)
=
∫ ∞
0
[∫ q1
0
∫ q2
0
Vˆ (a+ 2, S + xk1 + x
k
2)f(x1|θ)f(x2|θ)dx1dx2
+
∫ ∞
q1
∫ q2
0
Vˆ (a+ 1, S + qk1 + x
k
2)f(x1|θ)f(x2|θ)dx1dx2
+
∫ q1
0
∫ ∞
q2
Vˆ (a+ 1, S + xk1 + q
k
2 )f(x1|θ)f(x2|θ)dx1dx2
+
∫ ∞
q1
∫ ∞
q2
Vˆ (a, S + qk1 + q
k
2 )f(x1|θ)f(x2|θ)dx1dx2
]
pi(θ|a, S)dθ.
Following Bisi et al. (2011), we can write Vˆ (a, S) = Sˆ
1
k vˆ(aˆ), where vˆ(aˆ) = Vˆ (aˆ, 1). Taking
the derivatives, we have
∂Π(q1, q2)
∂q1
= qk−11
[
A(S + qk1 )
1
k
−a−1 + (B −A)(S + qk1 + qk2 )
1
k
−a−1
]
,
∂2Π(q1, q2)
∂q1∂q2
= k
(
1
k
− a− 1
)
(B −A)qk−11 qk−12 (S + qk1 + qk2 )
1
k
−a−2,
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∂2Π(q1, q2)
∂q21
= Aqk−21 (S + q
k
1 )
1
k
−a−2
[
(k − 1)S − kaqk1
]
+ (B −A)qk−21 (S + qk1 + qk2 )
1
k
−a−2
[
(k − 1)(S + qk2 )− kaqk1
]
, (B.4)
where A and B are constants given by A = Saka
[
a+1
a+1−1/k vˆ(a+ 2)− vˆ(a+ 1)
]
and B =
Sak
(
a− 1k
) [
a
a−1/k vˆ(a+ 1)− vˆ(a)
]
that have B > A > 0. We also have ∂Π(q1,q2)∂q2 =
∂Π(q2,q1)
∂q2
and ∂
2Π(q1,q2)
∂q22
= ∂
2Π(q2,q1)
∂q22
as Π(q1, q2) is symmetric with respect to q1 and q2.
It can be verified that ∂Π(q1,q2)∂q1 > 0 for all q1 > 0, q2 ≥ 0, and that
∂Π(q1,q2)
∂q2
> 0 for all
q1 ≥ 0, q2 > 0. Therefore, it suffices to consider allocations that satisfy q1 + q2 = Q.
Proof of Proposition 3.6(a). When 0 < k ≤ 1, from (B.4) we have ∂2Π(q1,q2)
∂q21
< 0 and
∂2Π(q1,q2)
∂q21
< 0 for all q1 > 0, q2 > 0. Furthermore, we have (
∂2Π(q1,q2)
∂q22
)(∂
2Π(q1,q2)
∂q21
) −
(∂
2Π(q1,q2)
∂q1∂q2
)2 > 0 for all q1 > 0, q2 > 0. Hence, Π(q1, q2) is jointly concave in q1 and
q2 for q1 > 0, q2 > 0. Also, Π(q1, q2) is continuous at points with q1 = 0 and/or q2 = 0.
Therefore, allocation q∗ = (q∗1, q∗2) with q∗1 = q∗2 = Q/2 maximizes Π(q1, q2).
Proof of Proposition 3.6(b). When k > 1,
(i) ∂
2Π(q1,q2)
∂q21
> 0 and ∂
2Π(q1,q2)
∂q21
> 0 for all q1 < Q0, q2 < Q0 where constant Q0 =[
(k−1)S
ka
] 1
k
. Also, (∂
2Π(q1,q2)
∂q21
)(∂
2Π(q1,q2)
∂q22
) − (∂2Π(q1,q2)∂q1∂q2 )2 > 0 for all q1 < Q0, q2 < Q0.
Hence, Π(q1, q2) is jointly convex on q1 < Q0, q2 < Q0. As a result, for all Q < Q0,
Π(q1, q2) is jointly convex on {(q1, q2) : q1 + q2 = Q}, and a single-store allocation
(Q, 0) or (Q, 0) maximizes Π(q1, q2).
(ii) ∂
2Π(q1,q2)
∂q21
< 0 for all q1 > Q¯(q2) and
∂2Π(q1,q2)
∂q22
< 0 for all q2 > Q¯(q1) where function
Q¯(q) =
[
(k−1)(S+qk)
ka
] 1
k
. Also, (∂
2Π(q1,q2)
∂q21
)(∂
2Π(q1,q2)
∂q22
) − (∂2Π(q1,q2)∂q1∂q2 )2 > 0 for all q1 >
Q¯(q2), q2 > Q¯(q1). Hence, for q1 > Q¯(q2), q2 > Q¯(q1), Π(q1, q2) is jointly concave in
q1 and q2, thus (Q/2, Q/2) is a local maximal. Also, as Q→∞, Π(Q/2, Q/2|a, S)→∫∞
0
∫∞
0
∫∞
0 Vˆ (a+ 2, S + x
k
1 + x
k
2)f(x1|θ)f(x2|θ)dx1dx2pi(θ)dθ ≥ Π(q1, q2) for all q1 ≥ 0
and q2 ≥ 0.
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APPENDIX C
Appendix for Chapter 4
C.1 Proof of Lemma 4.1
Proof of Proposition 4.1(a). Follows immediately by taking the first derivative of u(qˆ, s, θ)
with respect to qˆ.
Proof of Proposition 4.1(b). Follows immediately by taking the first derivative of u(qˆ, s, θ)
with respect to θ.
Proof of Proposition 4.1(c). u(qˆ, s, µθ + qˆ − q) = qˆ(σ
2
θ+sσ
2
T )+qˆσ
2
T
σ2θ+(s+1)σ
2
T
= qˆ.
C.2 Proof of Lemma 4.2
Proof. We prove by induction. Note that o∗1(qˆ, s) = 1 as FΘ(p − qˆ)V0(qˆ, s) +
∫∞
p−qˆ[p +
V0(u(qˆ, s, θ), s + 1)]dFΘ(θ) = pFΘ(p − qˆ) > 0 = V0(qˆ, s). Suppose that o∗t (qˆ, s) = 1, i.e.,
Vt(qˆ, s) = FΘ(p − qˆ)Vt−1(qˆ, s) +
∫∞
p−qˆ[p + Vt−1(u(qˆ, s, θ), s + 1)]dFΘ(θ). Since Vt(qˆ, s) ≥
Vt−1(qˆ, s) ≥ 0 by definition, we have FΘ(p− qˆ)Vt(qˆ, s)+
∫∞
p−qˆ[p+Vt(u(qˆ, s, θ), s+1)]dFΘ(θ) ≥
FΘ(p− qˆ)Vt−1(qˆ, s) +
∫∞
p−qˆ[p+ Vt−1(u(qˆ, s, θ), s+ 1)]dFΘ(θ) = Vt(qˆ, s). The equality follows
from the induction assumption. Therefore, o∗t+1(qˆ, s) = 1, which completes the induction.
C.3 Proof of Proposition 4.1
Proof of Proposition 4.1(a). We prove by induction. The result trivially holds for t =
0. Suppose Vt(qˆ1, s, θ) ≤ Vt(qˆ2, s, θ) for some t, all qˆ1 < qˆ2, s, and θ. We show that
Vt+1(qˆ1, s, θ) ≤ Vt+1(qˆ2, s, θ) for all qˆ1 < qˆ2, s, and θ. Consider the following regions of θ:
(i) θ < p−qˆ2. In this region, Vt+1(qˆ1, s, θ) = EΘVt(qˆ1, s,Θ) ≤ EΘVt(qˆ2, s,Θ) = Vt+1(qˆ2, s, θ).
(ii) p− qˆ2 ≤ θ < p − qˆ1. In this region, Vt+1(qˆ1, s, θ) = EΘVt(qˆ1, s,Θ) ≤ EΘVt(qˆ2, s,Θ) ≤
Vt+1(qˆ2, s, θ).
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(iii) θ ≥ p− qˆ1. In this region,
Vt+1(qˆ1, s, θ) = max{p+ EΘVt(u(qˆ1, s, θ), s+ 1,Θ),EΘVt(qˆ1, s,Θ)}
≤ max{p+ EΘVt(u(qˆ2, s, θ), s+ 1,Θ),EΘVt(qˆ2, s,Θ)}
= Vt+1(qˆ2, s, θ),
where the inequality uses the fact that u(qˆ1, s, θ) ≤ u(qˆ2, s, θ) as a result of Lemma 4.1(a).
These together complete the induction.
Proof of Proposition 4.1(b). The proof is by induction. The result trivially holds for t = 0.
Suppose Vt(qˆ, s, θ1) ≤ Vt(qˆ, s, θ2) for some t, all θ1 < θ2, and all qˆ and s. We show that
Vt+1(qˆ, s, θ1) ≤ Vt+1(qˆ, s, θ2) for all θ1 < θ2 and all qˆ and s. Consider the following regions
of qˆ:
(i) θ1 < θ2 < p− qˆ. In this region, Vt+1(qˆ, s, θ1) = EΘVt(qˆ, s,Θ) = Vt+1(qˆ, s, θ2).
(ii) θ1 < p− qˆ ≤ θ2. In this region, Vt+1(qˆ, s, θ1) = EΘVt(qˆ, s,Θ) ≤ Vt+1(qˆ, s, θ2).
(iii) p− qˆ ≤ θ1 < θ2. In this region,
Vt+1(qˆ, s, θ1) = max{p+ EΘVt(u(qˆ, s+ 1, θ1), s,Θ),EΘVt(qˆ, s,Θ)}
≤ max{p+ EΘVt(u(qˆ, s+ 1, θ2), s,Θ),EΘVt(qˆ, s,Θ)}
= Vt+1(qˆ, s, θ2),
where the inequality follows from Lemma 4.1(a).
These together complete the induction.
Proof of Proposition 4.1(c). This is a direct corollary of Proposition 4.1(b).
C.4 Proof of Proposition 4.3
Proof. The proof is by induction. The proposition holds trivially if θ∗t (qˆ, s) = θ∗t+1(qˆ, s) =
p− qˆ. Suppose that for some t > 1, θ∗t−1(qˆ, s) = p− qˆ and θ∗t (qˆ, s) > p− qˆ. We show that
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θ∗t (qˆ, s) ≤ θ∗t+1(qˆ, s), or, equivalently, p+Gt(u(qˆ, s, θ∗t (qˆ, s)), s+ 1) ≤ Gt(qˆ, s):
Gt(qˆ, s) = FΘ(θ
∗
t (qˆ, s))Gt−1(qˆ, s) + pFΘ(θ
∗
t (qˆ, s)) +
∫ ∞
θ∗t (qˆ,s)
Gt−1(u(qˆ, s, θ), s+ 1)dFΘ(θ)
≥ FΘ(θ∗t (qˆ, s))[p+Gt−1(u(qˆ, s, θ∗t (qˆ, s)), s+ 1)] + pFΘ(θ∗t (qˆ, s))
+
∫ ∞
θ∗t (qˆ,s)
Gt−1(u(qˆ, s, θ), s+ 1)dFΘ(θ)
= p+ FΘ(θ
∗
t (qˆ, s))Gt−1(u(qˆ, s, θ), s+ 1) +
∫ ∞
θ∗t (qˆ,s)
Gt−1(u(qˆ, s, θ), s+ 1)dFΘ(θ)
≥ p+Gt(u(qˆ, s, θ∗t (qˆ, s)), s+ 1).
This completes the induction.
C.5 Proof of Proposition 4.4
Proof of Proposition 4.4(a). Follows from a similar argument in the proof of Proposi-
tion 4.1(a).
Proof of Proposition 4.4(b). The proof is by induction. Suppose Vt(qˆ, s, x, θ) ≤ Vt(qˆ, s, x+
1, θ).
Vt+1(qˆ, s, x, θ) = max{p+ EΘVt(u(qˆ, s, θ), s+ 1, x− 1,Θ),EΘVt(qˆ, s, x,Θ)}
≤ max{p+ EΘVt(u(qˆ, s, θ), s+ 1, x,Θ),EΘVt(qˆ, s, x+ 1,Θ)}
= Vt+1(qˆ, s, x+ 1, θ).
This completes the induction.
Proof of Proposition 4.4(c). Follows from a similar argument in the proof of Proposition 4.1(b).
Proof of Proposition 4.4(d). This is a direct corollary of Proposition 4.1(c).
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C.6 Proof of Proposition 4.6
Proof of Proposition 4.6(a). Follows from a similar argument in the proof of Proposition 4.3.
Proof of Proposition 4.6(b). The proof is by induction.
C.7 Bayesian Updating Accounting for Selection Biases
Let pi(q) denote consumers’ prior belief on q. The posterior updated based on a review r is
given by
pˆi(q|r) = pi(q)fΘ(r + µθ − q|r + µθ − q + qˆ − p ≥ 0)∫∞
−∞ pi(q)fΘ(r + µθ − q|r + µθ − q + qˆ − p ≥ 0)dθ
=
pi(q)fΘ(r + µθ − q)1q≤r+µθ+qˆ−p∫∞
−∞ pi(t)fΘ(r + µθ − t)1t≤r+µθ+qˆ−pdt
.
One can verify that the posterior pˆi(q|r) is truncated Normal if pi(q) is Normal. Further
updating requires keeping track of the entire review history and there is no finite dimension
sufficient statistic.
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